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This dissertation assesses two competing approaches to public administration 
reform. Through an in-depth analysis of governance reforms in Argentina and Brazil, I 
demonstrate that, contrary to conventional wisdom, incremental changes sequenced over 
time (“problem-solving” reforms) are more effective in reducing corruption, increasing 
transparency, and enhancing accountability than swift, ambitious overhauls pushed 
through by political leaders (“powering”). Drawing on cognitive-psychological insights 
about decision making, I show that gradual, sustained changes are more promising 
because they allow for modifications and corrections along the way and do not depend on 
finding the right solution ex ante, a notoriously difficult task in the complex world of 
policy making.  
In addition, I examine the influence of political-organizational context on 
policymakers’ decisions to either embark on sweeping transformations or proceed more 
gradually. I argue that executive power concentrated in single-party cabinets facilitates 
large-scale change, while executive power sharing frustrates “big bang” reform attempts. 
The absence of repeated overhauls and the diverse actors involved in policy making in 
vii 
contexts of coalitional presidentialism, however, provides opportunities for technical 
experts within the state to advance individually small but often cumulatively significant 
changes. Paradoxically, political-organizational contexts that hinder grand reform 
attempts may facilitate greater long-term success.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
THE PUZZLE:  THE VARIED ADVANCES IN QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE  
Waves of democratization—Latin America in the 1980s or Eastern Europe in the 
1990s—often raise hopes that newly elected governments will attack the corruption, 
cronyism, inefficiency, and red tape that often cripple states’ abilities to deliver promised 
goods and services. Indeed, since the third wave of democratization began, politicians in 
developing democracies have made countless attempts to transform how, and how well, 
the state works. With the advent of elections, many hoped the leaders accountable to the 
people would sweep out corruption and transform states that privileged autocrats and 
their cronies at the expense of the general interest. The results of efforts to reform the 
state, however, reveal significant empirical variation. On one hand, many countries have 
indeed made progress in increasing transparency, ensuring accountability, and 
strengthening institutions. On the other hand, democracies often disappoint: After the 
dictators and autocrats leave, corruption persists, security remains precarious, and the 
quality of roads, health care, and education is left wanting. Why have some countries 
been able to make progress in reform and state building while others remain mired in 
corruption and plagued by weak institutions?  
Scholars have long argued that pulling developing countries out of dysfunctional 
equilibria of corruption and inefficiency requires radical, nonincremental, or “big bang” 
change (cf. Åslund 1994; Durand and Thorp 1998; Rothstein 2011, 117). Where maladies 
of the state are obvious and solutions seem clear, the problem is overcoming the 
resistance of well-known entrenched interests. Critical junctures or punctuated equilibria, 
rare moments of exogenous change, provide openings for imposing sorely needed 
reforms. If changes are more gradual, opponents will have time to organize resistance 
against them; if reforms are partial or incremental, they will fail to undercut the vested 
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interests focused on preserving the status quo. Thus, big bang change, or to use Hugh 
Heclo’s classic term, powering (Heclo 1974), holds promise to reverse the fortune of 
countries that seem doomed to the maladies of the developing world.  
Since the third wave of democratization, Latin American countries have 
attempted numerous powering reforms. In the 1980s and 1990s, the exceptional twin 
moments of democratization and economic crises gave rise to sweeping transformations 
of Latin American states as they adopted political and market reforms. In the following 
twenty years, institutions in a diverse set of domains ranging from social policy, to 
economic policy, to civil service were created, revitalized, or restructured. Exceptional 
moments passed, but Latin American presidents continued to power through crucial 
reforms. Organizational processes, such as budgeting, information systems, coordination 
mechanisms, and control and oversight were overhauled and modernized. More recently, 
transformations have focused on anti-corruption, transparency, and openness, with an 
increased use of new information technologies to achieve these desirable qualities.  
The results of these changes, however, varied widely. The last twenty years of 
public sector reform in Latin America reveal significant empirical variation in advances 
in quality of governance. Argentina and Brazil—the bases of this project’s case studies—
are paradigmatic cases of two different paths taken by Latin American states and present 
an empirical and theoretical puzzle.  
Beginning in the late 1980s, Argentine executives implemented numerous 
ambitious, rapid, and far-reaching state reforms. Conversely, in Brazil, a similar set of 
large-scale reforms was weakened, stalled, or halted completely. Surprisingly, many of 
the initially lauded institutional transformations in Argentina have been 
counterproductive, abandoned, or reversed entirely. Radical reforms did not produce the 
desired effect in Argentina, which, after numerous wholesale reforms, remains mired in 
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corruption and institutional weakness. Paradoxically, over time government 
accountability in Brazil, the laggard reformer, has gradually but markedly improved. 
According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, Brazil’s score on 
Voice and Accountability increased from 53.8 to 63.8 between 1996 and 2011; while 
Argentina’s declined from 59.1 in 1996 to 57.7. 
What explains the eventual success of reforms in Brazil and their frequent failure 
in Argentina? This leads to two open and related questions: First, why does powering 
fail? And second, given that powering fails, why do countries continue adopting the 
strategy? By addressing these two key questions, this dissertation answers the broader 
question: Under what conditions do states in Latin American democracies transform 
corrupt, weak institutions into durable, accountable, transparent ones?  Conversely, under 
what conditions do they fail to make progress in institution building? 
This dissertation casts doubt on the powering thesis. Existing arguments do not 
adequately explain why radical attempts at reforming the state often have disappointing 
outcomes over time. Nor do they explain why countries are actually able to make 
progress in state building in the long run. They fail to do so because scholars often focus 
on snapshots of reform and overlook gradual transformations of the state. My study 
lengthens the scope of analysis and investigates significant episodes of reform in health 
and transportation in both Argentina and Brazil and their effects over time. In particular, I 
focus on government contracting (i.e., procurement) reforms. With procurement 
accounting for approximately 10 to 30 percent of gross domestic product in developing 
countries (Thai 2009, 107; Ladipo, Sánchez, and Sopher, 58), these reforms are an 
important empirical lens for understanding how, and how well, the state works.  
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THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF: THE TORTOISE BEATS THE HARE 
Under what conditions are democratic states able to improve their ability to 
deliver goods and services to their citizens? This dissertation advances a theory of state 
building that explains, by invoking mechanisms of bounded rationality, why some reform 
strategies result in sustainable improvements and describes the political conditions under 
which policymakers tend to adopt such successful strategies.  
What reform processes result in effective and enduring improvements? This study 
provides a comparative examination of two approaches to governance reform. My 
research suggests that the approach embraced by many Latin American policymakers and 
international organizations—namely, swift, wholesale reform pushed through during 
“windows of opportunity” (i.e., powering)—does not tend to produce effective and 
lasting improvements. By contrast, I find that incremental changes sequenced over time 
(i.e., problem-solving reforms) are more effective and durable than sweeping 
transformations. While powering requires selecting or designing the right solution 
beforehand, the gradual problem-solving approach allows for adjustments and corrections 
along the way, a far less complex task than crafting radical overhauls. Specifically, 
problem-solving provides two crucial advantages over the powering approach.  
First, continual adjustments and modifications led by actors within the state 
engender an incremental learning process that allows reform tactics to evolve along the 
way. Instead of taking on comprehensive reform, problem-solving tackles smaller 
problems one by one and is often led by technocrats from within the state (technocratic 
insiders) who possess expertise and experience. The bounds of rationality are looser for 
experienced technocrats working on smaller problems than they are for political leaders 
and outsiders attempting to craft perfectly calibrated overhauls in one shot. Although 
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such change often advances slowly and haltingly, in the medium to long term these 
changes can accumulate and result in thorough transformations. 
Second, small changes sequenced over time make reform more sustainable and 
help preserve bureaucratic autonomy, especially in weak institutional environments. 
Whereas imposition of radical change breeds resistance, problem-solving relies on tactics 
that avoid conflict or imposition. Such tactics often proceed under the radar. Thus, 
support for change is built or won as reforms produce benefits, and reformers move on to 
the next step with a new set of beneficiaries. In doing so, the insider technocrats who lead 
modest reforms without strong political backing are likely to remain at their posts when 
political constellations shift, safeguarding their positions and creating opportunities to 
extend their reforms. 
The failure of powering raises a second important question: Why do countries 
continue to adopt this approach if it does not prove effective? More generally, why do 
some states tend to choose wholesale reform while others choose incremental changes?   
To answer this second set of questions, I examine the influence of political-
organizational context on policymakers’ decisions to either embark on sweeping 
transformations or proceed more gradually. I argue that executive power concentrated in 
single-party cabinets facilitates large-scale change, while executive power sharing 
frustrates “big bang” reform attempts. In contexts of coalitional presidentialism, however,  
relative stability (due to the absence of repeated, dramatic overhauls) and the diversity of 
actors involved in policy making provide opportunities for technical experts within the 
state to advance changes that build on each other over time. Paradoxically, the 
dissertation argues, political-organizational contexts that hinder grand reform attempts 
facilitate greater long-term success. Consequently, this project embeds arguments that 
establish microfoundations for reform success in the broader political-institutional 
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context. In this way, it provides an integrated explanation for the initiation and fate of 
state reform in contemporary Latin America.  
 
THEORETICAL RELEVANCE  
The present study has important implications for comparative politics. First, this 
project contributes to the growing field of research on institutional change. Extant 
literature has recently highlighted the importance of incremental change (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010), yet we know little about the causes of different 
types of change (cf. Murillo and Levitsky 2012) or their consequences. By examining the 
origin of reform and its evolution, this analysis addresses both of these shortcomings by 
demonstrating how political-organizational patterns shape variation in the bounds of 
rationality and the type of reform strategy pursued.  
Second, with my core argument, I propose a political theory of administrative 
reform. Whereas specialists often examine reforms from a narrow public policy 
perspective that is of limited interest to political scientists, my approach helps integrate 
this topic into the mainstream of the discipline. Political Science, especially Comparative 
Politics, has tended to focus on the input side of politics (e.g., elections and political 
parties), while the outcomes of politics are often considered atheoretical and descriptive 
and are relegated to public policy. This is a problematic imbalance. Policy outcomes have 
immediate consequences for millions of citizens and for the quality of democracy. By 
connecting politics to actual outcomes, this project analyzes a neglected topic that merits 
greater scholarly attention. 
Finally, the findings of this dissertation have important implications for the study 
of state reform. Policy studies often focus on specific episodes of reform: the adoption, 
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implementation, or initial effects of an important policy. Puzzling in any of these 
individual episodes appears quite unimpressive: a small adjustment here, a modification 
there. This research, however, shows that we only understand puzzling fully if we look at 
a whole sequence of reforms. As this study will demonstrate, an examination of long 
stretches of policy making reveals previously obscured factors crucial for the 





My research employs a multi-method approach that draws on extensive fieldwork. 
Between August 2011 and December 2012, I conducted over 120 elite interviews (with 
politicians, ministers, policymakers, civil servants, auditors, businessmen, journalists, 
scholars, experts, and World Bank officials, among others). Through case studies and 
within-case comparisons I test the key implications of my theory. Process tracing of 
specific reforms allows me to investigate the system of interlocking parts that transmits 
causal forces from reform type to specific outcome (Glennan 2002).  
Case Comparisons  
The selection of Brazil and Argentina allows me to apply a most similar systems 
design, or the multivariate Millian Method of Difference (Lijphart 1971). Brazil and 
Argentina have similar historical, cultural, economic, and political characteristics: 
import-substitution industrialization, interruptions in democracy, re-democratization in 
the 1980s, neoliberal reforms, and state modernization. By comparing across countries 
with many similarities but where outcomes diverged, the method of difference facilitates 
                                                 
1 For examples of two excellent studies that study policy-making over long stretches see Jacobs (2011) and 
Patashnik (2008).  
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evaluation of the causal impact of the remaining differences on the dependent variable 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970, 32–35). Further, it has been over thirty years since both 
countries have democratized, which provides a track record for assessing reforms over 
time. 
Within-case comparisons provide crucial analytic leverage for addressing 
challenges introduced by the classic issue of too many variables and too few cases 
(Lijphart 1971). I use matched comparisons of attempts to increase transparency, reduce 
corruption, and enhance accountability in government contracting. Comparisons of 
reform episodes, for example, allow for within-case tests of the proposition that 
incremental reforms result in more effective and enduring outcomes by holding constant 
background factors. Within each case, I trace processes of policy design and 
implementation and draw analytic leverage from comparing cases within the same 
country over time, across policy areas (i.e., health and transport), and  across systems. 
Process Tracing  
In order to overcome the limitations of Mill’s methods of comparison for causal 
inference, the comparison between Brazil and Argentina was complemented by process 
tracing. Process tracing—the technique of looking for the observable implications of 
hypothesized causal processes, including alternative explanations to the main theory of 
interest, within a single case—is particularly appropriate for sequential isolation of causal 
factors throughout the unfolding stages of reform (George 1979; Bennett 2008). The 
outcomes of early reform decisions condition later decisions; instead of ignoring the 
importance of temporal sequence, process tracing makes such path-dependencies a part of 
the longitudinal analysis of reform politics. Further, an examination of long stretches of 
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The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Part I presents a theory 
of state building and contains Chapter 2, which explains why some reform strategies 
result in sustainable improvements and Chapter 3, which describes the political 
conditions under which policymakers tend to adopt such successful strategies. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 discusses a number of alternative arguments. Then it 
demonstrates the flawed logic behind conventional wisdom regarding state reform and 
establishes the merits of an alternative approach (i.e., problem-solving) that draws on the 
insights of bounded rationality. It explains that incremental changes sequenced over time, 
in response to failings in previous policy, provide two crucial advantages over wholesale, 
rapid change: (1) Continual adjustments and modifications benefit from learning; and (2) 
an incremental approach makes reform more durable and helps preserve bureaucratic 
autonomy, especially in weak institutional environments.  
Chapter 3 explains the choice of reform strategy and embeds mechanisms of 
bounded rationality elaborated in Chapter 2 in political-organizational context, showing 
how established patterns of governing create variation in the type of reform strategy 
pursued. Whereas executive power in Argentina concentrated in single-party cabinets 
facilitates large-scale change, executive power sharing in Brazil frustrates “big bang” 
reform attempts. In contexts of Brazilian coalitional presidentialism, however, relative 
stability and the diversity of actors in the policy process open up space for technocrats 
within the state to make small changes that can accumulate over time. Thus, in Chapter 3 
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I argue that established patterns of governing, rooted in the long history of how power is 
organized and exercised, account for the cross-national differences in the predominant 
reform strategies, i.e., the choice of powering versus problem-solving. 
Part II is the empirical section. Chapters 4 through 7 analyze public sector 
reforms, with 4 and 5 focused on Argentina and 6 and 7 on Brazil. Chapter 4 on 
transportation in Argentina documents the powering overhaul in the early 1990s; it shows 
how ideal-type models failed to account for changing conditions and unforeseen 
circumstances and the very process of imposing changes weakened institutions, 
prompting a fresh set of radical reforms in 2012 that reversed those of the 1990s. This 
chapter demonstrates how powering creates its own unhealthy dynamic: failing to 
produce the expected results, but also making it very difficult for subsequent reformers to 
come in and begin a process of successful problem-solving. In doing so, it draws a 
baseline of for subsequent chapters by detailing the effects of the draconian, almost 
immediate transformations. 
The findings of Chapter 5 on health in Argentina corroborate the failures of 
comprehensive planning required of powering. The within-country comparison of 
transportation and health also provides useful analytical leverage in assessing the extent 
to which the speed and depth of reforms affect outcomes. This chapter shows that change 
to the health sector did not cut as deeply, or go as far as it did in transport, but areas of 
comparatively greater stability were more successful at fostering gradual changes down 
the line. The subsector in which the most drastic changes were made, health care for 
pensioners, ultimately resulted in the most disappointing outcomes over time. Thus, 
Chapter 5 substantiates the negative correlation between reform speed/depth and success, 
and shows how delayed and stalled powering reforms can give rise to gradual, problem-
solving efforts in some key areas. 
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 Chapter 6 on transportation in Brazil demonstrates how political-organizational 
context affects the adoption of the powering approach that was highlighted in Chapters 4 
and 5. Coalitional presidentialism, by inducing Brazilian presidents to share executive 
power, impeded most attempts at radical change, thus limiting the scale and speed of 
reform. For the few changes that did advance, however, a broader-based consensus was 
forged and plans were subjected to the scrutiny of a diverse set of interests and experts. 
Moreover, smaller-scale changes opened up greater space for experts within the state to 
use their longer time horizons and technical acumen to gradually sequence individually 
small but often cumulatively significant changes. Chapter 6 demonstrates that even 
though powering in Brazil has been a rare occurrence, when powering did occur, it left 
negative and enduring repercussions.  
Chapter 7 shows that health reforms in Brazil have proceeded even more 
gradually and with particularly high success. The multiplicity of actors involved in the 
policy-making process often diluted, delayed, or halted changes. This reduced the scale 
of the changes attempted and thus, the complexity of reforms attempted at any given 
time. The sequencing of change also allowed for learning that ultimately increased 
success.  
Chapter 8 concludes by summarizing the core findings of this study. After 
assessing the applicability of my theory to other areas of governance reform in Brazil and 
Argentina, the chapter analyzes the extent to which the argument extends to other 
countries in Latin America by examining reform processes in Chile and Venezuela. 
These countries have consistently relied on one reform type over the other, and therefore, 
allow for a clear illustration of and plausibility probe for my theory. Finally, I highlight 
the broader theoretical implications of my theory by discussing the application of 
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bounded rationality to studies of policy change and by highlighting the connections 
between historical institutionalism and bounded rationality.  
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PART I: THEORY 
Chapter 2: Bounded Rationality and Governance Reform 
The best is the enemy of the good. 
 Voltaire 
 
The return to democracy in Latin America has been followed by countless 
attempts to transform states into modern, efficient, transparent, and rational entities. 
Many dramatic reform efforts followed the dictates of predominant theories of 
institutional change, which argued that radical, nonincremental, or “big bang” change 
was required to overcome the resistance of well-known entrenched interests (cf. Åslund 
1994; Durand and Thorp 1998; Rothstein 2011, 117). Have these dramatic reform efforts 
achieved their goals? In many countries, civil service laws have been redesigned, yet 
cronyism persists; transparency systems implemented, yet opacity prevails; and even new 
constitutions written, only to be rewritten. Why did such impressive efforts fail to bring 
about the anticipated results? What reform processes result in effective and enduring 
improvements?  
This chapter first demonstrates how and why existing structural and 
institutionalist theories are ill-equipped to answer the research question at hand. Given 
the insufficiency of extant explanations, this study highlights agency, and specifically, 
reform strategy to fill the gap. In the following sections I present two competing 
approaches to public administration reform. I argue that contrary to conventional 
wisdom, incremental changes sequenced over time (“problem-solving” reforms) are more 
effective in reducing corruption, increasing transparency, and enhancing accountability 
than swift, ambitious overhauls pushed through by political leaders (“powering”). 
Drawing on insights from bounded rationality, I show that the problem-solving approach 
is more promising because it allows for corrections and modifications based on what 
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worked and what failed and does not require designing or selecting a wholesale 
transformation that gets to the heart of numerous problems beforehand, an extraordinarily 
difficult task even for experts.  
This argument adds to research on bounded rationality (Simon 1955; Lindblom 
1965; Jones 2001; Bendor 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Weyland 2007; Bendor 
2010; Weyland 2014) by emphasizing how problem complexity and the limited 
capabilities of decision makers affect reform outcomes. Reform approaches informed by 
rational choice theories and those based on insights of bounded rationality have an 
important point in common—they see reform as the result of goal-oriented activities 
driven by actors’ interests. But powering, which rests on rational choice micro-
foundations, is unrealistically optimistic about the ability of actors to achieve their reform 
objectives. To get such “big bang” reforms right requires a comprehensive grasp of the 
problem and a very well-designed, systematic plan to address it. 
The weight of ample evidence—from laboratory experiments to field studies—
shows that the judgments and inferences of normal mortals commonly deviate from the 
postulates of rational choice. Cognitive constraints mean that instead of evenhanded 
calculating advantages and disadvantages of reform solutions, decision makers regularly 
fail to meet such rational standards, often by seeking a satisfactory solution rather than 
the optimal solution (Simon 1956; Jones 1999; Bendor 2003).   
The extent to which cognitive constraints bind and decision makers deviate from 
rational standards, however, crucially depends on the interaction of two factors: 1) the 
computational capabilities of the actor and 2) the complexity of the task at hand (Simon 
and Simon 1962, Simon 1990, 7; Bendor 2010, 3; Bendor 2003, 435). The complexity of 
reform tasks vary enormously, ranging from minor adjustments to radical overhauls. It is, 
then, the relationship between a decision maker’s mental abilities and the information-
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processing demands of the problem at hand that determines whether cognitive constraints 
will “show through” (Simon 1996; Jones 1999, 297-8).  
This chapter will show how both of these factors operate in my framework. The 
problem-solving approach means that more experienced, competent decision makers 
(technocratic insiders) tackle reforms and that they engage with more manageable tasks 
by dividing complex reforms into pieces. By contrast, powering means less experienced 
decision makers (technocratic outsiders) attempt terrifically complex reforms (swift 
overhauls of the state). Thus, we might expect cognitive limitations to always bind in the 
case of powering, whereas bounds of rationality loosen for experienced decision makers 
who modify an existing policy or experiment with a new approach in the problem-solving 
model.  
Moreover, combining both of these factors—more capable decision makers and 
the simplification of the task environment—allows for learning over time. The problem-
solving approach involves advancing change in increments over time. In this sequential 
process of solving smaller problems, reformers develop a repertoire of pragmatic moves, 
increasing their ability to recognize solutions to a given problem (Simon 1990; 1996). 
This engenders a learning process whereby policymakers enhance their cognitive 
resources via experiential learning. By contrast, ideal-type models of change require 
getting design right in one shot. Such a one-shot approach requires an optimal solution, 
whereas change advanced piece-by-piece works even with decision makers who 
satisfice—that is, seek not the best option, but an acceptable option—because it allows 
them to learn and correct later (Simon 1956).  
The emphasis on learning also has implications for the way expertise is 
conceptualized in this chapter. The cognitive resources of decision makers are often 
thought of in terms of expertise, i.e., the education and sophistication of actors. As 
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regards Latin American policy making, foreign-educated technocrats might come to mind 
(technocratic outsiders). The theory that will be elaborated in this chapter, however, 
emphasizes another component of expertise—experience, which allows the capabilities of 
technocrats and government officials from within the state (referred to as technocratic 
insiders) to build over time, including knowledge of problems caused by previous 
policies. Thus, my application of bounded rationality to reform decision making 
highlights not only the importance of considering the complexity of the problem at hand, 
but also the importance of expertise developed by experiential learning over time.  
This chapter provides the micro-foundations for the theoretical framework of this 
thesis. It first shows how and why existing theories are ill-equipped to answer the 
research question at hand by analyzing the extant comparative literature on reform and 
state building. Next it presents two competing approaches to reform. It then argues that 
incremental changes sequenced over time in response to failings in previous policy (i.e., 
“problem-solving” reforms) provide two crucial advantages over wholesale and rapid 
overhauls of the state (i.e., “powering” reforms): (1) continual adjustments and 
modifications benefit from learning; and (2) an incremental approach makes reform more 
durable and helps preserve bureaucratic autonomy. After the following sections establish 
the differences between reform strategies and their microfoundations, the subsequent 
chapter explains predominant reform strategy by embedding mechanisms of bounded 
rationality in political-organizational macro-developments. In doing so, Chapter 3 shows 
how established patterns of executive power-sharing create variation in the reform 
strategy pursued. 
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INSUFFICIENCY OF EXTANT APPROACHES 
Structural Theories 
Theories focusing on structural factors predict progress in reform and state 
building as a product of system-level trends. According to this approach, structural 
factors such as economic modernization, persistent cycles of economic crisis, or external 
security threats determine the quality of institutions.  
Scholars have long argued that factors resulting from economic development 
result in the strengthening of institutions and state building; these arguments are loosely 
derived from modernization theory (Lipset 1959). Specifically, Goldsmith argues that 
greater transparency, accountability, and participation are the result of development 
(Goldsmith 2007, 165). Such an argument might explain differences in reform outcomes 
between regions, but falls short when applied to Latin America. After all, Argentina’s 
GDP per capita has long been higher and, more recently, comparable to that of Brazil 
(World Bank DataBank). Moreover, in the midst of state reforms in the 1990s 
Argentina’s rate of growth far surpassed that of Brazil (World Bank DataBank).  If the 
arguments advanced above were correct, we would expect to see effective and enduring 
reform in Argentina, especially during times of high growth; yet in the past twenty-five 
years Argentina has made less progress than Brazil in state building, even during periods 
of high growth. Thus, while theories based on modernization would predict Argentina’s 
success in strengthening institutions, these predictions have not borne out.  
Moreover, such arguments fail to explain within-country variation. That is, 
changes in economic development cannot explain why some attempts to strengthen 
institutions in Brazil have failed while others are successful. 
An alternative argument might suggest that persistent cycles of crisis result in 
variation in reform trajectories (Levitsky and Murillo 2013). According to this 
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hypothesis, Argentina’s recurring crises, and particularly the severe economic collapse of 
2001, explain its disappointing reform track record; whereas Brazil’s gains in institutional 
strength are due to periods of greater economic stability. This argument, however, is not 
convincing. The Argentine crisis was largely the result of decisions made during periods 
of high economic growth. Further, improvements to institutions in Brazil began in the 
1990s in the midst of crisis.   
Crisis arguments, then, turn the causal arrow in the opposite direction. Indeed, 
structuralist arguments in general raise a series of pernicious questions regarding 
endogeneity: does economic growth increase institutional quality? Or does institutional 
quality increase economic growth and preclude economic crises? The weight of the 
evidence seems to suggest that indeed institutional quality is an important cause of cross-
country differences in economic growth and prosperity (North 1990; Knack and Keefer 
1995; Collier and Dunning 1999; Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson 2001; Kaufmann 
and Kraay 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; Bates 2008).  While economic 
growth might matter for state building, it does not matter alone and theories roughly 
based on modernization provide unconvincing explanations for reform trajectories in 
Latin America.   
A final set of scholars posit another structuralist argument: external security 
threats explain successful institutional development (Tilly 1990; Doner, Ritchie, and 
Slater 2005; Teorell and Rothstein 2013). Tilly (1990) underscores the crucial role of war 
making for state building; Teorell and Rothstein (2013) argue that Sweden’s loss of a 
significant war against Russia (1808-9)2 resulted in the transition from a corrupt state to a 
Weberian one; and Doner et al. (2005) contend that extreme geopolitical insecurity was 
                                                 
2 In what is commonly called the Finnish War, Sweden lost Finland to Russia.  The Finnish War, in which 
the existence of Sweden as a nation was threatened, gave rise to the “revolution of 1809”  (Teorell and 
Rothstein 2013, 4). 
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crucial for the development of high levels of state capacity in East Asia. These arguments 
might explain differences between regions or countries that faced variation in external 
threat; however, countries such as Argentina and Brazil have no such obvious threat.  
Moreover, scholars such as Centeno (2002) argue that war in Latin America in the 
nineteenth century was directed toward destructive domestic ends and therefore did not 
contribute to state building in the same way as it did for European nation-states. 
In sum, structuralist theories are better at explaining variation between world 
regions, but fall short when invoked to explain within country variation or the difference 
between Brazil and Argentina, which share many structural characteristics. Moreover, 
characteristics that Latin American countries do not uniformly share, such as depth or 
frequency of economic crises, are more likely the result of improved institutional quality 
rather than the cause.  
Institutional Theories  
Interest Driven Theories and Political Insurance 
Interest driven theories, specifically theories of political insurance, claim that high 
levels of electoral competition result in successful reform. Such theories are informed by 
the rational choice paradigm: politicians are strategic actors with the objective of 
maximizing their chances of winning elections (Geddes 1995).  In order to achieve this 
objective, elected officials balance the costs of governance reforms (e.g., foregone access 
to state resources such as patronage) against the benefits (e.g., increased state capacity 
and governance outcomes).  Insurance theories of reform argue that if the electoral defeat 
of an incumbent is imminent, such officeholders will seek reforms that increase 
accountability and transparency as beneficial means to tie the hands of their successors 
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(Moe 1990).3 Thus, where electoral competition is high and there is frequent turnover of 
power, we should expect the strengthening of institutions.  
Such arguments have often been applied to foundational moments such as the 
creation of courts. For instance, Ginsburg (2003) argues that increasing fragmentation 
augments political uncertainty, which creates incentives for designers to create more 
autonomous and powerful courts that can protect them when they are out of power. Bill 
Chavez (2004) similarly shows that electoral uncertainty and fragmentation shape the 
creation, design, and operation of high-level courts (2004). A similar logic has been 
applied to a number of other areas. For instance, Berliner and Erlich (2013) argue that 
electoral competition is a major driver of transparency reforms in their analysis of sub-
national freedom of information laws in Mexico. The insurance argument has also been 
applied to post-communist state reconstruction by Grzymala-Busse (2007), who argues 
that even opportunistic political parties will limit their corrupt behavior and abuse of state 
resources when faced with strong political competition. In all of these instances 
uncertainty—either because of political fragmentation, political competition, or future 
loss of political control—motivates strategic moves by rulers to limit their own power.  
The insurance arguments apply to some institutional and policy domains, but not 
as well to others. That is, such theories may apply to the creation of powerful courts 
during highly uncertain foundational moments or institutions of horizontal accountability 
among government officials, but they are less useful for explaining variation in the 
effectiveness and endurance of state reforms initiated by the executive. 
                                                 
3 In Moe’s words, designers “do not want ‘their’ agencies to fall under the control of opponents. And given 
the way public authority is allocated and exercised in a democracy, they often can only shut out their 
opponents by shutting themselves out too. In many cases, then, they purposely create structures that even 
they cannot control” (Moe 1990, 125).   
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First, the logic of the political insurance argument unravels when considering 
officeholders’ strong demands for campaign financing and the sequence of events that 
could induce the governing party to implement reforms that enhance accountability and 
transparency. According to the political insurance logic, a governing party would only 
implement reforms when certain of its own impending electoral doom. Only then is there 
reason to tie the hands of one’s successor. Yet, one would expect that at precisely this 
vulnerable electoral time, such a party would be inclined to use public resources available 
to fund electoral prospects.  
Second, supposing that uncertainty did induce an executive to advance reforms 
that limited their own power and discretion (e.g., institutional mechanisms to enhance 
accountability or transparency), designing such changes, especially in the midst of 
uncertainty and impeding electoral defeat, is a complex task, one that assumes 
comprehensive rationality. That is, insurance arguments assume a seamless translation 
between interest and outcomes: If an executive wishes to increase transparency and 
accountability and has the power to implement reforms, such theories largely assume 
they will be able to design or select effective mechanisms of accountability and 
transparency. Insurance theories, then, confer a great deal of computing power to 
decision makers who are likely cognitively constrained by lack of time, information, 
attention, and resources. Thus, instead of their reforms automatically engendering 
institutions that limit presidents’ discretion, we might expect them to create imperfect 
reforms which may also result in various unintended consequences in the real world.  
Furthermore, political insurance arguments assume that if rules are adopted they 
will be sustained over time. This is also dubious. If the governing party passes a reform 
only when it foresees defeat, then there is little time to implement the changes. Even if 
lame ducks carried out reforms, little prevents an incoming governing party with enough 
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legislative support to renege on the reforms (Moe 1989; Moe 1990). Indeed, Johnson’s 
(2012) study of stabilization funds in Latin America demonstrates that nascent 
institutions meant to protect natural resource revenues, created based on the political 
insurance logic, tend to be unsuccessful in constraining future raids of such funds.  
In conclusion, while political insurance arguments may apply to some policy and 
institutional domains, they fail to adequately explain effective and enduring governance 
reforms. Many of these theories are valuable, however, in that they provide insights into 
some of the motivations for policies that limit the executive’s discretion and how 
fragmentation shapes the reform processes (Bill Chavez 2004), a point discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 3.  
Formal Institutional Theories 
A final set of theories also focus on strategic choice but expect reforms to be 
shaped by formal political institutions. Formal rules, according to the rational choice 
framework, constrain behavior by defining the set of choices actors can select to 
maximize their self-interest (cf. Shepsle 1989).   
Such arguments have been used to argue that presidential systems would result in 
political instability and gridlock. For instance, Linz (1994) influentially argued that 
presidentialism was less conducive to democratic stability because it engendered a 
winner-takes-all dynamic that polarizes competitors and results in zero-sum politics and 
deadlock. Presidentialism was expected to be particularly pernicious in Brazil. Scholars 
such as Mainwaring (1999) and Ames (2001) drew attention to perceived deficiencies of 
the party and electoral systems. Brazil’s electoral system of open-list proportional 
representation, high average district magnitude, and federal structure result in extreme 
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multipartism and high levels of fragmentation (Mainwaring 1999).
4
  This combination of 
multipartism and presidentialism was to exacerbate the “perils of presidentialism” by 
complicating interparty coalition building and was labeled as the “difficult combination” 
(Mainwaring 1993; Stepan and Skach 1993).   
These arguments regarding the deleterious effects of formal institutions are 
challenged by empirical evidence in Latin America. It is precisely the countries with the 
“wrong” formal institutions that have fared the best in terms of governance outcomes. 
After all, countries with coalitional governments such as Chile and Brazil consistently 
lead the region in rankings of control of corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of 
law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010).   
A revisionist literature has developed that seeks to explain the success of Brazil 
and the comparative failure in Argentina to sustain high quality policies. This literature 
provides some valuable contributions, but has some important weaknesses as well. For 
instance, Spiller and Tommasi (2007) focusing on Argentina hold that specific 
institutional arrangements result in low quality policies, emphasizing the importance of 
intra-temporal cooperation for high-quality policies. In particular, they argue that strong 
governors who seek to obtain fiscal favors from the executive and legislative careers 
linked to the province instead of the national level result in short-sighted executives and 
an unprofessional legislature, which in turn reduces cooperation over time and results in 
low-quality policies. Such an argument could plausibly explain the low quality of policies 
in Argentina, but it does not explain why Brazil tends to do better.  After all, governors in 
                                                 
4 The pattern of cabinet sharing in Brazil cannot, however, be attributed solely to the existence of PR or to 
its electoral system.  As Colomer details, the choice of electoral system are best understood as a 
consequence of the expectation and calculations of the established political leaders.  Proportional 
representation systems were adopted in pluralistic constituent conventions or by political agreements 
among multiple political parties that expected to compete in uncertain elections and to share power in 
multiparty cabinets (Colomer 2004, 86). 
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Brazil are also powerful and the legislature is a focal point for fiscal favors (cf. González 
2010).   
The Spiller and Tommasi analysis has been extended to explain other countries in 
Latin America as well. Scartascini, Stein, Tommasi, and collaborators argue that the 
institutions that define the policymaking process shape incentives of political actors, 
which conditions the quality of policies a country will adopt (Stein et al. 2006; 
Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi 2010). These authors highlight how features of the 
formal institutional framework, ranging from brief legislative careers (Jones et al. 2002; 
Saiegh 2010) to low bureaucratic capacity and autonomy (Zuvanic and Iacoviello 2010), 
have deleterious consequences for the quality of policies (Stein et al. 2006; Scartascini, 
Stein, and Tommasi 2010). Indeed, these factors and the role of intra-temporal 
cooperation are crucial for the quality of public policies.5   
Likewise, the revisionist literature on Brazil makes some important contributions. 
Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), some of the first to revise the pessimistic 
expectations regarding Brazil’s institutional structure, argue that institutions, such as 
presidential power and the existence of centralized leadership in the lower house, 
ameliorate political instability and gridlock. Similar arguments about the success of 
multiparty presidentialism in Latin America point to the importance of a strong executive 
and institutions of accountability able to check the president (Melo and Pereira 2013).6 
Other scholars have highlighted the importance of multiparty cabinet composition for 
securing governability (Deheza 1997; Amorim Neto 1998) or the importance of the 
                                                 
5 While their emphasis on cooperation and the importance of historical institutions for the policymaking 
process is well placed, their analysis fails to demonstrate why we would ever see countries move out of 
dysfunctional equilibrium.   
6 Existing analyses argue that a strong web of accountability is a precondition for the success of multiparty 
presidentialism (Melo and Periera 2013). However, such arguments fail to explain where such a web comes 
from or how strong checks and balances develop. 
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executive toolbox—distributive politics and coalition formation—for maintaining 
legislative support (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Raile, Pereira, and Power 
2010; Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power 2014).  
As Chapter 3 will demonstrate, my research builds on what we have learned about 
how presidents manage the legislature in countries with multiparty presidentialism. 
The problem with the literature on the quality of policies and multiparty 
presidentialism in Brazil, however, is its failure to address, arguably, the most important 
actor in policymaking explicitly: the executive. The quality of many public policies is 
ultimately determined by the executive (Bergara et al. 2006, 34), just as bureaucratic 
capacity and autonomy are largely determined by the executive (Ames, Carreras, and 
Schwartz 2012). Yet, existing literature tends to focus on the importance of the 
legislature (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010),7 
although many of the most important questions of the state are exclusively in the domain 
of the executive and his or her cabinet. Cabinets in presidential systems are accountable 
not to the legislature, but to the executive. Therefore, they are largely outside of the 
formal institutional framework (Martínez-Gallardo 2010, 120). Yet, instead of opening 
up the black box of the state, existing analyses highlight correlations between multiparty 
presidentialism and democratic sustainability and even success, but do not explain why 
multiparty presidential democracies have been more successful than critics presumed, 
leaving many questions unanswered: What effects does Brazil’s coalitional 
presidentialism have on reform and institutional strength? How and why have institutions 
of accountability been strengthened in Brazil? Why do we see greater bureaucratic 
                                                 
7 For exceptions, see Bersch, Praça, and Taylor (forthcoming; 2014). 
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autonomy and capacity in states that have coalitional presidentialism? What explains the 
dramatic within state variation in reform outcomes in countries such as Brazil?  
In conclusion, formal institutional arguments often do not produce the anticipated 
results. This has been clearly demonstrated by the revisionists’ attack on Linz. This 
newer literature does well to shed light on the importance of cooperation for quality 
policies and strategies presidents use to induce cooperation in fractious legislatures. Yet, 
at the same time these arguments fall short of identifying why cooperation occurs within 
the executive and the causal mechanisms that connect differences in political institutions 
to governance outcomes (cf. Bersch, Praça, and Taylor 2014). Above all, structural and 
institutional explanations cannot adequately explain within-country variation. They fail to 
do so because they leave little room for agency and leadership.  
THE IMPORTANCE OF REFORM STRATEGY: A THEORY OF EFFECTIVE AND ENDURING 
REFORM 
Given the insufficiency of extant explanations, this study highlights agency, and 
specifically, reform strategy. In the following sections I present two competing 
approaches to public administration reform, arguing that incremental changes sequenced 
over time (“problem-solving” reforms) are more effective and enduring than swift, 
ambitious overhauls pushed through by political leaders (“powering”). After the 
following sections establish the differences between reform strategies, the subsequent 
chapter shows how political-organizational context shapes the decision to rely on 
powering or problem-solving.  
The Merits of Problem-Solving over Powering 
Which reform processes result in effective and enduring improvements? A 
prominent strain of literature argues that the surest way to reform the state is swift, 
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wholesale change (cf. Åslund 1994; Durand and Thorp 1998; Graham and Naím 1998; 
Rothstein 2011, 211). Drawing on Heclo (1974), I call this approach powering. The goals 
of such forceful overhauls—whether passing pension restructuring or reducing the 
number of civil servants—are clear and comprehensive from the outset. Proponents argue 
that corruption and inefficiency can be eliminated by replacing dysfunctional institutional 
arrangements with policy programs that engender more salutary incentive structures. 
Under normal conditions, however, societal interests have a stranglehold over 
institutions, and thus, change must be imposed by driving rapid, far-reaching reforms past 
beneficiaries of the status quo. If reforms are carried out more gradually, opposition 
forces will coalesce and block them (Graham and Naím 1998, 336); if reforms are partial 
or incremental, they will fail to undercut vested interests focused on preserving the status 
quo. Thus, political entrepreneurs and reform champions are crucial for harnessing 
political will and power to push change past opposition forces during windows of 
opportunity. Reforms successfully shepherded through the challenging phase of initial 
implementation, adherents posit, will become durable and self-enforcing. 
A second set of scholars disagrees with the powering thesis. They illustrate that 
institutional reform is often the product of gradual change, resulting from efforts to 
address problems within the established policy-making process (Lindblom 1959; 
Hirschman 1973; Heclo 1974; Taylor 2009). I refer to such reform as problem-solving, 
understood as advances that seek to resolve policy problems and puzzles.8 Whereas 
powering pursues an ideal program and has clear, comprehensive goals, problem-solving 
fixes existing programs, its objectives arise from addressing problems caused by the 
                                                 
8 I thank Bryan Jones for suggesting this term. “Problem-solving,” is used broadly in cognitive and political 
science literature and is greatly influenced by Herbert Simon’s later work on complex tasks with Allen 
Newell (Newell and Simon 1972, Simon 1996, cf. Bendor 2003, 457).  I elaborate a specific meaning for 
the term here that draws on this earlier work. In other places I have labeled the same concept as “puzzle-
solving,” drawing on Hugh Heclo’s (1974) distinction between “powering” and “puzzle-solving.”   
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current policies in practice. Problem-solving implies that substantial changes are 
achievable by sequentially advancing small, novel, partial, or indirect changes, often 
quietly and under the radar of political and social forces.  Instead of pushing wholesale 
reform through at “critical junctures,” proponents of problem-solving take advantage of 
small opportunities and use the complexity of policy areas to advance individually minor 
but often cumulatively significant changes. Administrative officials convince politicians 
to agree to an incremental step, planning and hoping that the “one little step” sets in 
motion a sequence of steps that add up to significant transformation. This “reform-
mongering” approach, as Hirschman labeled it, results in a “non-spectacular, stealthy 
style of change,” which often yields impressive results over the long run (Hirschman 
1971, 335). 
Tackling Problems versus Applying Power 
The concepts of powering and problem-solving provide a prism through which to 
view theories of reform strategy. While powering assumes a homeostatic equilibrium able 
to maintain itself against external “disruption,” problem-solving assumes a more flexible 
equilibrium. Thus, while proponents of powering argue that a strong push is required to 
bring significant change, problem-solving starts from the premise that incremental 
change is achievable within the existing sociopolitical environment. And whereas 
powering confronts opposition head-on, problem-solving tends to avoid it. Three 
attributes are particularly important for distinguishing powering from problem-solving: 
the reform proponent, aspirational level, and time frame. Powering reforms are initiated 
or championed by political leaders who seek to overhaul institutions within the time 
frame of the executive’s term; problem-solving reforms are spearheaded by state 
technocrats who make incremental modifications over a longer time frame.  
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Table 1 expands on these distinctions. The different purposes and causal 
processes are formulated in ideal-typical terms, but it is important to note that any 
particular reform may fall on the spectrum between powering and problem-solving. 
 
Table 1 Types of Reform 
                                                                                                
                                            Powering    Problem-solving   
                       
Proponents   Politicians and political   Bureaucratic technocrats and   
    technocrats (outsiders)  civil servants (insiders) 
 
Source of Reform Attempt Surge/shift in power  Bureaucratic identification of  
        problems  
 
Objective   The goal is clear—must be  The exact goal is unclear; however,  
    imposed against opposition experts have a clearer idea of which 
        direction to take than political  
        actors 
 
Timing     Response only when problems  Continuous attempts at correcting   
    worsen to crisis proportions problems before they become crises 
 
Aspirational Level   Wholesale and rapid  Incremental and sustained  
    Based on ideal models  Based on experiential learning 
 
Strategy    Sweeping use of    Finding space and using  
political power to break   technocratic capacity to make  
through log-jams         gradual advances 
 
Time frame   Completed within executive’s  Sequenced over time across  
term    presidential terms 
 
Outcome    Episodic—depending on  Enduring 
                 Power balance                                           
In the early 1990s, advocates of powering highlighted the importance of the 
exceptional economic and political crises in Latin American and post-communist 
countries for tabula rasa state overhauls.9 When these extraordinary situations passed, 
scholars began to shift attention from macroeconomic reforms to strengthening the state 
(Naím 1994), de-emphasizing the importance of “exceptional” crisis and instead 
                                                 
9 See special issue on reform and democracy Journal of Democracy 5 (October 1994). 
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underscoring the crucial role of political entrepreneurs for imposing change regardless of 
opposition during “limited windows of opportunity” (Bunse and Fritz 2012, 6). 
Commitment of strong political leaders became the crucial element for successful reform 
(cf. Grindle 2004, 20; Bunse and Fritz 2012, 34–35). Such leaders, together with 
technocratic reform teams or “change teams,” would have the capacity to push complex 
overhauls of state institutions past resistance (Durand and Thorp 1998, 5; Graham and 
Naím 1998, 336; Grindle 2004, 187).10 Scholars even coined a new term for the marriage 
of technocratic skill and high-level political power, “technopols” (Domínguez 1997).   
Such political leaders and their hand-picked experts, here referred to as “outsiders” or 
“political technocrats,” were seen as crucial for bringing about political and economic 
transformations (Grindle 1977; Camp 1985). As recent analyses have pointed out, the 
focus on political will and the importance of political technocrats for ensuring reform 
outcomes remains pervasive in the development community and among International 
Financial Institutions (Andrews 2013, 7-15). 
By contrast, problem-solving implies that existing state actors (i.e., “insiders”) 
can drive the reform process without significant realignment of political forces (cf. 
Taylor 2009), advancing marginal changes in a gradual fashion without direct 
confrontation with powerful resistance (Hirschman 1973). The underlying assumption of 
a flexible equilibrium means it is possible to make partial changes, observe the impact, 
and make necessary corrections along the way.  This is not a dramatic process led by 
political leaders or technopols with the ear of the president.  Rather, technocrats or 
higher-level public servants fulfilling their regular professional duties are often the quiet 
                                                 
10 While these scholars emphasize the importance of strong political executives for successful reform, they 
cannot all be unequivocally labeled as adherents to the powering view.  Grindle, for instance, recognizes 
the challenges that imposed reform later creates for sustainability (Grindle 2004, 189-194).   
 31 
backers of these modest changes.11 This process does not require breaking through 
resistance with force; instead, it is a process of “muddling through,” to use Lindblom’s 
(1959) term, of learning from addressing problems in previous policy by making 
adjustments and corrections over time, thereby assessing what is effective and what is 
not. 
How can this slow, arduous process possibly produce advantages over powering’s 
promises of rapid, comprehensive, and enduring change? An evaluation of the limitations 
of the powering approach lends insight into problem-solving’s merits. The powering 
argument is based on two assumptions that are often unrealistic and unpromising in the 
real world: 1) It is possible to rationally design or select the appropriate reform; and 2) 
once implemented, dramatic, comprehensive reforms will persist as new vested interests 
begin to defend the status quo.   
Decision makers’ limitations in designing wholesale change     
The powering approach, which implies comprehensive rationality, overestimates 
the ability of political actors and decision makers to find the appropriate solution. If 
political actors were to rationally select a reform, according to the rational choice 
institutional approach, they would rank-order their goals and systematically evaluate the 
best means to achieve those ends. Yet, this is an especially daunting task when planning 
an overhaul to a program, agency, or ministry that aims at getting to the root of numerous 
problems at once. Such change is very different than simply adjusting the levels of 
existing policy (e.g., increasing the number of Medicare recipients).  It implies that it is 
                                                 
11 Scholars such as Huber and Stephens also advocate for more incremental policy change as opposed to 
dramatic change; however, their account does not attribute change to technocratic actors, but rather to 
“bottom up” pressures (Huber and Stephens 2012, 257).  Mahoney and Thelen’s power-distributional 
theory of institutional change recognizes the importance of gradual change, but says little about which 
types of processes engender effective and enduring change (Thelen 2010, 1-37). 
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possible to identify and systematically assess different reform alternatives by performing 
careful cost-benefit analyses. However, especially for the most complex problems the 
constraints on policymakers’ time and information and the considerable uncertainty they 
face make the extensive planning required unlikely to be carried out in a systematic and 
balanced manner (cf. Tetlock 2005; Weyland 2009). Indeed, the selection and execution 
of powering reform is not like playing chess where the rules of the game are fixed and 
agreed to by the players ahead of time. Instead, the rules themselves are up in the air. 
Powering implies creating a new game from scratch and forcing players, who were 
engaged in a prior game, to play with an entirely new set of rules. 
To execute these feats in such a complex task environment seems to require an 
omniscient and omnipotent political actor with extensive informational, computational, 
and financial resources. In short, it requires comprehensive rationality in an 
extraordinarily demanding task environment.  We know, however, that humans often fall 
far short of full rationality and are instead boundedly rational (cf. Jones 1999; Bendor 
2003; Weyland 2008). As Lindblom long ago argued, rationally designing wholesale 
comprehensive reform assumes “intellectual capacities and sources of information that 
men [and women] simply do not possess” (Lindblom 1959, 80). Instead of proactively 
seeking out alternatives, calculating advantages and disadvantages, and maximizing their 
utility by selecting the solution that ranks highest in terms of costs and benefits; 
policymakers commonly rely on heuristics that facilitate the process of making choices, 
often by seeking a satisfactory solution rather than the optimal solution (cf. Simon 1955; 
Bendor 2003).  
The extent to which actors rely on cognitive short-cuts depends not only on the 
task environment’s structure, but also on actors’ computational capability, which act 
together, according to Herbert Simon, like a “scissors [with] two blades” (Simon 1990, 7; 
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Bendor 2003, 435). Thus, it is important to note that while all decision makers confront 
limitations such as lack of time, attention, resources, information, and intellectual and 
computing capacity to rationally evaluate complex problems (cf. Jones 1999, 305–309), 
some face tighter bounds than others. Elected officials are particularly disadvantaged:  
Politicians do not have the resources to be experts in more than a few areas. Their 
attention span is short (Jones and Baumgartner 2005), and frequently jumps from 
economic crisis, to health care, to agricultural policy, and so on. And while their political 
technocrats may have impressive academic credentials, their fate is often linked to the 
political actor who appointed them, resulting in shorter time horizons and an absence of 
the expertise important for understanding the effects of change in a new context—
experience working in the government. Consequently, relying on “outsiders” to 
implement radical changes in new contexts heightens ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
unintended consequences. Thus, comprehensive reforms often fail to replace problematic 
institutional arrangements with functional alternatives; instead, they engender new 
dysfunctionalities (cf. Scott 1998).  
Problem-solving, designed to cope with a world of bounded rationality, is more 
realistic and, consequently, more promising. The limitations of decision makers 
highlighted above are less acute for the proponents of problem-solving. Newell and 
Simon long ago noted that problem-solving performance varies greatly: In chess, there 
are both grandmasters and duffers (Newell and Simon 1972). What separates the two is 
expertise, which allows the grandmasters to remember action rules and recognize 
repeated patterns. Duffers, however, are left to time-consuming attempts to compute their 
next play (Simon 1990, 8–11). The rules of chess, of course, are more fixed and 
predictable than 21st-century policymaking, which requires knowledge of informal rules 
governing the larger context within which reforms occur.   
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Such expertise is developed by the study of an area over time. And time is what 
accounts for the variation in the capabilities of powering versus problem-solving 
proponents: Whereas political actors have many issues “on their plate” and tend to have 
short time horizons, bureaucratic technocrats and civil servants are able to gain 
experience and expertise in a given area over time, including knowledge of problems 
caused by previous policies. As a result of this contextual understanding, they are 
frequently in a better position to evaluate problems and to design solutions in a particular 
policy area than their elected counterparts. 
Moreover, problem-solving divides complex problems into smaller steps, thereby 
simplifying the task environment. Instead of taking on comprehensive reform, problem-
solving tackles smaller problems one by one. Efforts to resolve these smaller problems 
draw on decision makers’ existing knowledge and experiences, not abstract planning that 
requires greater time, information, and intellectual capacity than is possible. This 
approach does not assume that definitive solutions to complex problems exist; solutions 
are instead discovered by comparing locally known alternatives with the status quo 
(Lindblom 1959). The improvement may not be the “best” possible solution, but it is 
better than the status quo, it is attainable, and, most importantly, it is improvable. 
Taken together, these two advantages of problem-solving—its fit with the 
capabilities of the decision makers and its simplification of the task environment—result 
in learning over time.
12
 In the sequential process of solving smaller problems, reformers 
acquire a repertoire of pragmatic moves and their results, increasing their ability to 
recognize solutions to a given problem (Simon 1990; 1996). In this way, problem-solvers 
work around the opposition one step at a time. Over time, changes often build on 
                                                 
12 For a definition of learning see Hall (1993, 278).  
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themselves and cumulatively create a thorough transformation of the original policy 
framework. As such, state actors improve their ability to address harder questions, 
building their expertise, learning about different types of reforms, and discovering what it 
takes to guide reforms past opposition. Whereas the advocates of powering search for 
magic bullets, problem-solving engenders an incremental learning process that allows 
reform tactics to evolve along the way. 
Challenges to the durability of powering 
The second assumption of powering—that once implemented, reforms will persist 
as new vested interests begin to defend the status quo—also regularly fails to hold in the 
real world. Powering has two goals: the elimination of the status quo and the 
establishment and consolidation of a new approach. These two goals, however, create a 
contradiction: Success in eliminating established arrangements endangers the chances of 
reform consolidation. 
Consider a powerful President A intent on sweeping out corruption in health care 
provision. By bringing in outside experts and change teams, President A may 
successfully overcome resistance, uproot the status quo, and establish a new approach.  
These changes, according to the powering logic, will generate a new set of vested 
interests that will defend the new policies. Deep-cutting reforms that usher in 
transparency or clean government, however, entail concentrated costs for opponents, 
often creating a backlash. Thus, when President B assumes power at t+1, she is likely to 
respond to the backlash and empower opponents before supporters of the diffuse benefits 
can organize a defense. And there is every reason to believe that B has similar power to 
A, especially if crises have persisted. Why, then, right after an entirely new policy 
framework is installed, would relevant actors believe it has staying power? The defenders 
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of the new program (diffuse benefits) are weaker than the prior defenders of the status 
quo (concentrated benefits) before A’s reforms.  Thus, B’s counter-reforms will face even 
less resistance. Therefore, the paradox of powering is that triumph in the eliminatory 
stage hinders the probability of enduring, consolidated reforms.
13
 
Moreover, the more “normal” the conditions under which powering is imposed, 
the more the paradox applies. War, earthquakes, or hyperinflation may effectively wipe 
out resistance to change without generating concentrated costs and backlash.  However, 
as noted earlier, in the absence of crises, proponents of powering emphasize political will 
or a political leader’s ability to cast a problem as a “crisis.” In non-crisis periods political 
technocrats—teams of experts or new political appointees that have the expertise and 
“will” to execute the changes—are brought in to implement reforms (Durand and Thorp 
1998, 140). Yet, political capital often runs out well before a reform’s diffuse 
beneficiaries are able to defend it against a new leader who abandons her predecessor’s 
unconsolidated reform efforts. Over time, this process chips away at bureaucratic 
capacity and experience, reduces the possibility of learning from past mistakes, and 
leaves reforms without defenders.  
When reform efforts predictably fail, powering changes are often discarded as a 
“partial” solution that failed to strike at the root of the problem and the search for a 
comprehensive model begins anew (Hirschman 1973, 240–241). Levitsky and Murillo 
label frequent and radical institutional change serial replacement (2013, 95; 2014). 
Although these authors are referring to overarching institutional changes, such as 
constitutional replacement, the same concept can be applied to public sector reform. In 
                                                 
13 I am grateful to Kurt Weyland for suggesting this term and idea.  
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weak institutional environments, then, powering can be particularly damaging to learning 
and institutional development. 
By contrast, problem-solving engenders stability. Modest, achievable 
improvements do not rely on powerful politicians or their political technocrats; they rely 
on professionals with a deep understanding of existing problems and their political 
context. These professionals encounter problems and have enough experience to 
understand what is achievable in addressing them. Instead of relying on power, problem-
solving emphasizes technical expertise and contextual knowledge. Instead of seeking to 
break the existing status quo, problem-solving relies on tactics that avoid conflict. Thus, 
the technocratic insiders who lead modest reforms without strong political backing are 
likely to remain at their posts when political constellations shift, safeguarding their 
positions and creating opportunities to extend their reforms. Whereas powering often 
meets strong resistance after the political will that gave rise to the changes evaporates, 
problem-solving tends to endure.  
In sum, problem-solving reduces the complexity of the large problems that 
powering seeks to solve, and is more promising because insider technocrats are often less 
bounded than political actors. Additionally, the sequencing of reform contributes to 
learning over time and creates a dynamic by which experts within the state can advance 
change without inciting opposition and remain in a position to defend and surreptitiously 
extend their reforms. Finally, if the problem-solving process is successful, then there is 
no need for wholesale reforms.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter elaborates and assesses two competing approaches to governance 
reform. It argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, problem-solving (incremental 
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changes sequenced over time) is more effective than powering (swift, ambitious 
overhauls pushed through by political leaders). Drawing on insights from bounded 
rationality, I show that the problem-solving approach is more promising because it allows 
for modifications and corrections along the way. Such changes are based on learning 
from previous reforms. Thus, the problem-solving approach does not require decision 
makers to design or select perfectly-calibrated comprehensive reforms in one shot, a 
complex task that places extraordinary demands on comprehensive rationality.  
The argument that problem-solving is more effective and enduring raises another 
set of important questions. Reform type, after all, is not determined randomly, nor is it 
always a matter of choice. What leads governments to power or to problem-solve? If 
powering is ineffective over the long-term, why do states keep powering?  Of course, 
states do not only power or only problem-solve. Indeed they do a mixture of both (Hall 
1993). At the same time, one type of reform or another is often more prevalent. What, 
then, causes these differences in reform approach? The next chapter addresses this 
question by showing how political-organizational context shapes reform type.  
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Chapter 3: An Explanation of Reform Type 
The theory of effective and durable reform advanced in Chapter 2 drew on 
bounded rationality to make an argument about how problem complexity and the limited 
capabilities of decision makers affect reform outcomes. Comprehensive attacks on 
problems via “powering” emerged as less effective and durable than gradual efforts to 
resolve problems via “problem-solving.” Such a theory does not, however, explain under 
what conditions governments tend to power or problem-solve. In order to account for this 
prior step, namely the choice of reform strategy, this chapter embeds mechanisms of 
bounded rationality in political-organizational context, showing how established patterns 
of governing create variation in the type of reforms pursued.   
I argue that established patterns of governing, rooted in the long history of how 
power is organized and exercised, account for the cross-national differences in the 
predominant reform strategies, i.e. the choice of powering versus problem-solving. These 
entrenched patterns influence policymakers’ decisions to either embark on sweeping 
transformations or proceed more gradually. In short, executive power concentrated in 
single-party cabinets facilitates efforts at large-scale change, while executive power 
sharing frustrates sweeping overhauls. In contexts of coalitional presidentialism, 
however, relative stability (due to the absence of repeated, dramatic overhauls) and the 
diversity of actors involved in policy making provide opportunities for insider 
technocrats to advance individually small but often cumulatively significant changes. 
Exclusionary governing patterns in Argentina tend to foster presidents’ selection of 
powering, whereas inclusionary governing patterns in Brazil tend to result in the 
predominance of the problem-solving approach.  
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The subsequent sections elaborate on this argument and demonstrate how 
entrenched governing patterns influence both the complexity of the change attempted and 
the collective capabilities of the reformers—both sides of Simon’s scissors. This chapter 
first situates my argument within the broader paradigm of historical institutionalism and 
highlights the theoretical connection between historical institutionalism and bounded 
rationality. Next, it demonstrates the endurance of governing patterns in Brazil and 
Argentina and places these countries in Latin American comparative perspective, 
highlighting the importance of formal institutional rules, but also underscoring that 
institutional rules alone cannot explain such patterns. Next, it offers an explanation of the 
persistence of these patterns, emphasizing the sequential nature of inclusion and 
exclusion. Finally, it shows how these entrenched practices of governing mediate the 
bounds of rationality in policy decision making by shifting the locus of decision making, 
which affects both the collective capability of reformers and the complexity of the 
changes they attempt.  
 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY  
The classical version of historical institutionalism is well suited to explain 
continuity, but not change. Critical junctures—rare moments of uncertainty when the 
rules of the game are in flux, followed by long stretches of continuity—can explain, for 
example, how the type of regime under which a party develops has indelible effects on its 
long-term growth and development (Collier and Collier 1991). Yet, such arguments 
emphasize that after short bursts of change, institutional stasis returns as new vested 
interests begin to defend the status quo and the rules of the game “lock in,” generating 
“increasing returns” to existing institutional arrangements (cf. Pierson 2000). This 
 41 
emphasis on long periods of continuity fails to explain ongoing incremental change or 
frequent, radical change.  
More recent variants of historical institutionalism have sought to correct for this 
lacuna and emphasize that institutional change often occurs outside of the context of 
critical junctures. Scholars such as Mahoney and Thelen show that gradual and 
incremental change, in which actors build upon, displace, subvert, or redirect institutional 
rules, is, in fact, quite common (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010).
14
 
Levitsky and Murillo also demonstrate that change is quite common. However, they call 
attention to a very different process of change that focuses on overarching institutional 
changes, such as constitutional replacement. They argue that in weak institutional settings 
radical overhauls of institutions, which they label “serial replacement,” are indeed a 
frequent occurrence (Levitsky and Murillo 2013; 2014). While Thelen and her co-
author’s gradual change is similar to the problem-solving process in Brazil, Levitsky and 
Murillo’s description of frequent and radical change accurately describes the pattern of 
powering change in Argentina. 
The revisionist historical institutionalism does well to highlight the empirical 
realities of change and posit hypotheses regarding the factors that might create such 
patterns, but both of these efforts stop short of developing a full theory that could explain 
the patterns of change they highlight. Mahoney and Thelen highlight the importance of 
veto possibilities for either accelerating or hindering the pace of reform. Weak veto 
possibilities and low levels of discretion in interpretation or enforcement of rules result in 
patterns of institutional displacement, whereas in contexts of strong veto players and high 
                                                 
14 Gradual change is also highlighted in early policy process models developed in the American context, 




levels of enforcement, layering is more common (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 19). 
Moreover, they argue that problems of rule interpretation and enforcement create 
opportunities for change, but fail to adequately address what happens in such gaps,  
suggesting only that power-distributional conflict drives change (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010, 4). Yet, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) is more of a classification scheme than a 
causal theory. For many of the episodes of “problem-solving” reform that this project will 
analyze, there simply is no obvious power-distributional shift that corresponds to an 
institutional change. These authors do highlight the role of actors such as “subversives,” 
who infiltrate the state apparatus in order to slowly layer new rules over the existing 
framework, but their approach fails to explain where these actors come from. Nor do they 
explain why such subversives have an advantage in advancing such reforms. 
Levitsky and Murillo argue that in Latin America, where institutions are often 
weak, processes such as layering, drift, and conversion are less common (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2014:192) than radical and recurrent change. But this generalization of the region 
cannot be easily extended to countries such as Brazil and Chile. Indeed, “radical and 
recurrent” transformation characterizes the powering reforms in Argentina quite well. 
However, Brazil, especially in the 1990s, would be characterized as a weak institutional 
environment in which the policy process on a wide variety of issues took the form of 
gradual change. Thus, it is not the case that gradual reforms are only a product of 
developed democracies that Thelen et al. study. In Latin America substantial cross-
national variations exists. Why, then, do we see radical and recurrent change in Argentina 
and gradual change in Brazil? Why have some countries in Latin America been able to 
escape serial displacement? 
Levitsky and Murillo’s work on overarching institutional changes provides a 
number of important factors that may determine why serial replacement occurs more 
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often in certain contexts than others, citing regime instability, electoral volatility, social 
inequality, frequent borrowing from abroad, rapid institutional design, crises, and the de 
facto weakness of formal institutional veto players (Levitsky and Murillo 2013, 105). 
Additionally, they present valuable insights into the conditions under which changes 
endure: “[W]hen powerful actors are excluded from the rule-writing process, they are 
likely to attack fledgling institutions early on. Consequently, new institutions are unlikely 
to endure long enough to gain broad public legitimacy, stabilize actors’ expectations, or 
generate the kinds of vested interest and institution-specific investments that increase the 
costs of replacement” (Levitsky and Murillo 2014, 201). Notwithstanding these valuable 
insights, they do not develop a complete theory that would explain why we tend to see 
serial replacement in some countries and gradual layering in others.  
In sum, the revisionist historical institutionalism does well to highlight the 
empirical realities of change and posit hypotheses regarding the factors that might create 
such patterns, but such efforts fail to adequately address the causes and consequences of 
change. Such shortcomings within the historical institutionalist paradigm are due in large 
part to the absence of microfoundations that adequately integrate structure and choice. 
The work of Jones and Baumgartner makes an important contribution to filling 
this lacuna (2005; 2012). Their general punctuation thesis emphasizes the role of human 
limitations in processing information in a policy-making system (2005) and demonstrates 
how bounded rationality can serve as a microfoundation for classical historical 
institutionalism. Under normal circumstances, information regarding policy problems is 
largely ignored and responses delayed due to the overabundance of information and 
limits on human attention. Thus, the policy-making process typically appears to be stable, 
unchanging, or incremental. However, as the pressure to address problems accumulates 
and as attention shifts to the issue, policymakers respond and overreact to the issue, 
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causing policies to shift in a disjointed and episodic manner. In this way the response is 
disproportionate to the problem (2012, 7).  
 Institutional change, then, appears to follow a “critical juncture” model—
exceptional changes followed by long periods of stasis. However, as Jones and 
Baumgartner point out, disjointed policy responses are “part and parcel of the same 
policymaking process that generated the periods of stability” (2012, 7). Problems are 
ignored until they become so acute that something finally must be done—this generates 
an overreaction to the problem, a disproportionate response. This pattern of underreacting 
then overreacting creates a leptokurtic distribution, characterized by many minor changes 
and some major breakthroughs. That is, a leptokurtic distribution has a higher central 
peak, more outliers than a normal distribution, and an absence of medium or 
proportionate changes (the type of changes that actually solve problems). Essentially, 
such a distribution reflects a “punctuated-equilibrium” or “critical juncture” pattern—
dramatic and rare shifts followed by periods of continuity (Jones and Baumgartner 2012, 
7-8). 
Thus, the Jones and Baumgartner general punctuation thesis can be used to set the 
traditional approach of historical institutionalism on cognitive psychology’s well-
corroborated findings regarding information processing and human choice. By drawing 
on the more empirically solid microfoundation of bounded rationality, their approach 
integrates periods of stasis with bursts of change. At the same time, it is important to note 
that their thesis alone cannot explain the cross-national variation observed by Levitsky 
and Murillo. Why is “serial replacement” ubiquitous in some contexts and gradual 
“layering” or “conversion” in others?  What explains variation among countries or even 
time periods?  What factors might tighten or loosen bounds of rationality? 
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In order to explain variation in information processing, Kurt Weyland’s research 
on diffusion waves in European democratization demonstrates how organizational 
developments mediate the bounds of rationality (2012; 2014). Before mass political 
organizations arose, citizens relied on informational shortcuts in order to decide whether 
to rise up and emulate foreign challenges to autocrats. Bounds of rationality were 
especially tight for such citizens and they often made hasty, ill-informed decisions. 
However, with the advent of mass organizations, regular citizens began to take cues from 
representative leaders who were able to process information in a more proportionate 
fashion. Thus, bounds of rationality loosen as citizens became tied to organizations with 
leaders who had access to information and greater processing capacity. In this way, 
Weyland explains how organizational developments condition the bounds of rationality.  
Drawing on Simons’ early work about how organizations can compensate for 
cognitive limitations by enhancing information processing (Simon1976; Bendor 2010, 
165-169), such research provides insights into how bounded rationality can be embedded 
in organizational contexts in order to explain collective variation in capabilities and even 
task environments. 
This project’s argument contributes to efforts at theory construction within the 
historical institutional paradigm by drawing on the work of scholars who focus on 
microfoundations of change (e.g., Baumgartner, Jones, and Wilkerson 2011; Simon 1990; 
Weyland 2009) while embedding such insights in organizational context (Simon 1976; 
March and Simon 1993; Weyland 2012). We see serial replacement because of consistent 
overreaction to information in some contexts and comparatively more stasis in other 
countries that tend to process information in a more balanced, proportionate manner. In 
particular, powering reforms, which frequently fail to consolidate, produce crisis. This 
consequently results in an overreaction to information, a new round of powering, 
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contributing to a pattern of serial replacement. By contrast, problem-solving relies on 
organization, which loosens the bounds of rationality, yielding higher quality decision-
making and information-processing (Simon 1976). This allows decision makers to 
process information in a more even-handed fashion, averts “crises,” and contributes to the 
pattern of gradual change. What causes this cross-national variation in organizational 
capabilities?  
ESTABLISHED PATTERNS OF GOVERNING: AN EXPLANATION OF REFORM STRATEGY 
My argument addresses this question by demonstrating how established political-
organizational context shapes variation in the bounds of rationality. Chapter 2 advanced a 
theory of effective and enduring reform that rests on insights of bounded rationality; 
accordingly, the variation in decision-making capacities and complexity of task 
environment explains reform outcomes. This theory did not, however, explain the 
conditions under which such variation occurs.  
I argue that established patterns of governing shape cross-national differences in 
the predominant reform strategies. Inclusionary governing patterns—where presidents 
share executive power with a coalition—result in greater reliance on the problem-solving 
strategy, whereas exclusionary governing patterns—where presidents appoint single-
party cabinets—result in greater reliance on the powering strategy.  
Consistent patterns of inclusion in Brazil and exclusion in Argentina have 
emerged over time. Argentine presidents, who win with slim majorities, have routinely 
governed in an exclusionary manner, concentrating executive power in single-party 
majority cabinets to the exclusion of other parties, appointing primarily members of their 
own party or faction to the cabinet and positions within executive (Lijphart 2012, 3; 
Teichman 1998, 32). By contrast, scholars of Brazil increasingly recognize that 
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“presidencialismo de coalizão” (i.e., coalitional presidentialism) has become the 
established governing approach in Brazil (Abranches 1988; Melo and Pereira 2013).
15
 An 
outpouring of literature in recent years has started to investigate how discretionary 
appointments, in addition to other executive “tools” such as pork and budget amendments 
(cf. Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010), are provided to political allies in tacit exchange for 
legislative support (Meneguello 1998). In this way, presidents, like European prime 
ministers, fashion multiparty cabinets and legislative coalitions. Brazilian presidents, 
unlikely to have a majority in Congress, have consistently shared government 
responsibilities with broad multiparty coalitions (cf. Lijphart 2012, 3).  
While formal electoral rules shape these patterns by conditioning the size of 
presidents’ legislative majorities and incentives for coalition building, they do not ensure 
the development of informal practices that facilitate coalition building.16 As Table 2’s 
index of coalitional necessity highlights, presidents who have a minority in the legislature 
have incentives to build coalitions in order to secure passage of their legislative agenda. 
Indeed, Brazil scores highest on the index and has developed strong power-sharing 
practices as its high score on proportion coalition shows.17 Like Brazil, Ecuador is a case 
of extreme multiparty presidentialism, and while scholars have highlighted the role of 
                                                 
15 Coalitional presidentialism is defined by Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power as “a strategic response to the 
institutional dilemmas posed by the coexistence of a presidential executive with a fragmented multiparty 
legislature. In order to win support for the legislative agenda of the executive, presidents must behave much 
like prime ministers in the multiparty democracies of Western Europe: they must first assemble and then 
cultivate interparty coalitions on the floor of the assembly. The objective of the president is to foster the 
emergence of a legislative cartel which will reliably defend the preference of the executive branch” (2012, 
3). Coalitional presidentialism is labeled “multiparty presidentialism” by Melo and Pereira; Amorim Neto 
refers to it as a statutory strategy in which the president “appoints a majority cabinet, selects more partisan 
ministers, and allocates portfolios on a more proportional basis” (Amorim Neto 2006, 424). Power (2010, 
25-26) provides a very broad definition that is used as a shorthand for the totality of ways in which 
macropolitics has adapted to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.  
16 Scholars such as Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power, have emphasized coalitional formation and cabinet 
inclusiveness is a political choice (Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power 2012, 9).  
17 It is important to note that Table 2 sets a low bar for what is defined as a coalition. Inclusion of any 
cabinet members from other parties constitutes a coalition.  
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clandestine “ghost cabinets” in coalitional management, these patterns of power sharing 
have not developed into enduring practices.18 Moreover, given institutional design, we 
might expect single-party cabinets in Uruguay. Yet, in large part because of the enduring 
and important role of factions, Uruguay has developed patterns of power sharing (Magar 
and Moraes 2012; Altman 2000; Caetano et al. 1988). This suggests that there is greater 
variation in governing patterns than formal electoral rules alone can explain.19  
Table 2        Multiparty presidentialism and coalitions in Latin America circa 2003-2004 
Country 
Effective number of 
parties in Lower 
House 
Lower House seats 
held by the 








Brazil 7.81 18.50 63.65 1.00 
Ecuador 6.71 25.00 50.33 0.60 
Chile  5.08 8.33 46.57 1.00 
Bolivia 5.21 26.50 38.29 0.89 
Venezuela 4.75 34.00 31.35 0.22 
Peru 4.24 40.50 25.23 0.89 
Mexico 2.79 37.00 17.85 0.00 
Argentina 3.18 48.00 16.54 0.18 
Colombia 2.02 20.00 16.16 0.81 
Uruguay 2.73 43.00 15.56 0.91 
Paraguay 2.73 51.00 13.38 0.30 
ª Index of coalitional necessity is obtained by multiplying the effective number of parties by the 
inverse of the percentage of seats held by the president's own party, then dividing by ten for ease of 
interpretation. Source: Calculated by author from data in Jones (2007). 
b 
Proportion of country-months where ministers of more than one party were represented in the 
cabinet. Source: Martínez-Gallardo (2005; 2010:126).  
Sources: Power 2010; Jones 2007; Martínez-Gallardo 2005; 2010,126 
                                                 
18 Mejía Acosta shows that between 1979 and 1996, Ecuadorian presidents had developed clandestine 
mechanisms for managing coalitions, what he labels “ghost coalitions.”  Yet, changes starting in 1996 
disrupted practices of coalition building and undermined governability (Mejía Acosta and Polga-
Hecimovich 2011). In the following years, three consecutive presidents were ousted before the end of their 
mandate.  
19 For instance, of all presidents without majority support in the legislature, 35 percent decided not to form 
coalitions (Martinez-Gallardo 2010, 126).  
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Entrenched governing patterns are shaped in large part by expectations about how 
a president will govern. Party (or group) A’s monopolistic practices  (e.g., eschewing 
compromise and negotiation with the opposition or even other factions of the party, 
stacking the bureaucracy and other institutions with loyalists, and reorienting the 
structure of institutions and the state to undermine the resources of would-be opponents) 
virtually guarantee that Party B’s practices will be equally exclusionary toward Party A. 
In this way, a pattern of sequential exclusion is developed.  
In Argentina, single-party cabinets date at least back to President Hipólito 
Yrigoyen (1916-1922), who established the precedent of hegemonic exclusion by 
appointing a narrow, rather than broad-based, cabinet. During the alternation in power 
between President Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922) and President Marcelo Alvear (1922-
1928), who were both from the same political party (UCR), Alvear removed nearly all 
Yrigoyen’s loyalists from the executive and installed his own supporters, rejecting 
notions of power sharing within the executive even within the same party (Romero 2010: 
50-53). After over a decade of military rule, the election of Juan Perón and the 
subsequent purge of the public sector, served to entrench the pattern of exclusion. Large 
numbers of bureaucratic personnel hired by previous governments were removed and 
Peronist loyalists installed (Buchanan 1985, 73; Kurtz 2012, 192), marking the beginning 
of a transformation of the state that involved the wholesale creation of institutions and 
sweeping changes to the economy. This pattern of gutting the bureaucracy with 
alternations in power between Peronists and anti-Peronists only reinforced the 
exclusionary governing pattern.  
By contrast, if a party (or group) includes other political parties in the governing 
coalition—appointing coalitional allies to ministries and agencies or providing pork—it 
induces the next power holders to include coalitional allies. Over time smaller parties 
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come to expect a certain level of participation in the executive. A pattern of inclusion is 
developed. In Brazil, wide-ranging coalitions date back to the Second Brazilian Republic 
(1946-64) when the typical cabinet included parties that represented 78 percent of the 
seats in Congress (Abranches 1988; Ames 2001, 160).  
As a pattern of sequential exclusion/inclusion is developed, the costs of deviating 
from the regularized practices increase as political actors develop expectations about the 
spoils they will enjoy with a president in power. As Pierson highlights, such political-
organizational arrangements “encourage individuals and organizations to invest in 
specialized skills, deepen relationships with other individuals and organizations, and 
develop particular political and social identities. These activities increase attractiveness 
of existing institutional arrangements relative to hypothetical alternatives. As social 
actors make commitments based on existing institutions and policies, their cost of exit 
from established arrangements rises dramatically” (Pierson 2000, 259). Thus, political 
actors develop expectations and skills based on the expectation that presidents will follow 
the mold. For instance, many Brazilian parties expect that, regardless of which party wins 
the presidency, they will receive a good share of executive appointments and a certain 
amount of budget amendments. By contrast, Argentine political actors maintain the 
implicit assumption that the president will reward her own party/loyalists with 
advantages of discretionary appointments.  
Deviation from these entrenched patterns has entailed high costs. Brazilian 
presidents who have governed in an exclusionary manner have been thrown out, whereas 
Argentine presidents who govern in an inclusionary fashion have been weakened and 
pushed out. For instance, since 1946, all formally democratic governments in Brazil have 
adopted the inclusionary governing style, with the exception of President Fernando 
Collor de Mello (1990-1992). Yet, Collor’s deviation demonstrates the costs of breaking 
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with the established approach. Upon taking office, the PRN, Collor’s party in the 
Chamber of Deputies, comprised only 5.1 percent of the seats, but instead of distributing 
discretionary appointments to form an oversized coalition in Congress, President Collor 
reserved cabinet positions for a narrow group of cronies and technocrats (Amorim Neto 
2002). Throughout his term other parties were indeed included in his cabinet, yet, by 
contrast to the largess of other Brazilian presidents in doling out positions within the 
government, Collor’s allocation of portfolios was woefully insufficient. This 
exclusionary approach was exacerbated by his extensive use of decree power; Collor 
issued 36 decrees in his first 15 days in office (Amorim Neto 2002:76). When Congress 
reacted to this by threatening to rein in executive decrees with a bill (Power 1998: 211), 
Collor then attempted to backtrack, reducing the number of executive decrees and 
increasing the number of discretionary appointments to other parties. However, it was too 
late: Congress ultimately put an end to Collor’s deviation from the inclusionary 
governing approach. After a corruption scandal erupted, President Collor was impeached 
by his colleagues in Congress (Weyland 1998). Other Brazilian presidents have survived 
severe scandals without sanction from Congress,
20
 but Collor was different in that he 
neglected the importance of coalition building.21 
                                                 
20 For instance, President Lula da Silva survived the Mensalão vote-buying scandal, one of the more 
prominent incidences of corruption involving some of the highest levels of government.  
21 Even the most programmatic and principled Brazilian parties have avoided Collor’s mistake of 
attempting to govern alone. For instance, in 1994 President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) of the 
social democratic PSDB party included the conservative Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL) and the 
clientelistic Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) in his coalition. Such unsavory alliances ensured an 
oversized majority with which to pursue the president’s policy goal. Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (2003-
2011) was initially constrained by the PT’s distinctive commitment to party discipline and expectations that 
the vast majority of available positions in the executive would be allocated to PT members (Hunter 2010, 
159-167). Yet, as Wendy Hunter points out, the once radical and programmatic PT ended up applying 
tactics, that it had long condemned by forging alliances with partners on the other side of the ideological 
spectrum (Hunter 2007). The PT accepted a running mate from the Liberal Party (PL), a small right wing 
party of evangelicals and businessmen. Furthermore, once in power the PT allied with the opportunistic 
Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). In this way, the PT applied the coalitional 
presidentialism approach used by Cardoso and allied with a large support party (PMDB for Lula and the 
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Upon the return to democracy in Argentina, presidents with slim majorities have 
consistently fashioned single-party cabinets, concentrating power within their party or 
party faction. However, President De la Rúa’s attempt to deviate from this well-
established pattern, an experiment with coalition rule, failed miserably and sheds light on 
the costs of deviating from expectations (Llanos and Margheritis 2006). In 1997 two 
parties, the UCR and FREPASO, came together to form the Alianza coalition that won 
the presidency (1999-2001) with its campaign to wipe out corruption. However, once in 
office, prospects of UCR and FREPASO amicably sharing power within government 
agencies were short-lived. Rather than fostering cooperation, shared governing 
responsibilities created turf battles with each party answering to its own chain of 
command. Ultimately, this failed attempt at forming a coalitional government, which 
further exacerbated a deepening economic crisis, resulted in an ungovernable situation in 
which President de la Rúa resigned. Since then, subsequent presidents have maintained 
the custom of appointing members of their own party or faction in an exclusionary 
manner, perhaps most clearly under President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who runs 
the country with a narrow cabinet of personal advisors. 
Deviation from the entrenched pattern that results in the ousting of presidents 
reinforces such practices over time and provides clear guidelines for what will and will 
not be tolerated by the political class. In this way, political learning contributes to the 
perpetuation of such patterns, reinforcing norms of executive power sharing and 
expectations regarding coalitional formation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
PFL for Cardoso) that provided a network of local elites and political machines, but that tended to be silent 
on programmatic issues (Power 2010, 232). Smaller parties (e.g., PTB, PL, and PP) were also included in 
the coalition, allowing the PT and its partners to reach 65-90 percent of seats in Congress. In this way, even 
the least likely parties have adapted to inclusionary governing practices. 
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Exclusionary Governing Facilitates Powering  
Cohesive governing groups with short time horizons: Swift, wholesale change 
In Argentina, exclusionary governing patterns result in single-party cabinets that 
concentrate power in loyal and cohesive teams of technocrats. If it is possible to appoint 
capable individuals that one trusts, why would an executive do otherwise? Such loyal 
technocrats (outsiders) are a key means to the president achieving his or her governance 
objectives. Yet, such individuals know that their time in office is limited. In Argentina, 
only one party or faction is in the government at a time; for instance, when a UCR 
president is inaugurated, the Peronists are not included in the governing coalition and 
vice versa. Because presidents win by slim margins, the governing group has to worry 
that they will no longer be in power after the next election. Thus, the absence of 
coalitions means that the current governing party has short time horizons, which creates 
incentives to rapidly move policy toward their ideal point and to push through reforms as 
quickly as possible.22 Election cycles are brief and political constellations often short-
lived. This creates time pressure to enact preferred policies and to make a difference 
before it is too late.  
Moreover, a variety of interests often have a stranglehold over the existing 
institutional arrangements. Thus, in order to undercut these forces, change is often 
imposed by driving rapid, far-reaching overhauls of the state past beneficiaries of the 
status quo before they can organize a defense. Reform teams are often composed of like-
minded individuals who are close to the president and are committed to similar 
                                                 
22 As Levitsky and Murillo (2014) note, a broad governing coalition means that the ruling coalition at t+1 
is likely not to be too far from the coalition that enacted the reforms, so policy stability results because of 
the  continuity of preferences. By contrast, the absence of coalitions in Argentina means that the ruling 
party that creates a set of institutions may have a very different set of preferences than the ruling party that 
inherits the institutions. This instability of preferences is also a source of instability for institutions in 
Argentina.  
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objectives. This facilitates political cooperation within the government (cf. Huber, 1998; 
Treisman, 2000; Spiller and Tommasi, 2003; 2007; Martínez-Gallardo 2011). Cohesive, 
insulated teams are often able to pursue their objectives with alacrity, unhindered by 
internal dissent and foot-dragging bureaucrats (cf. Axelrod, 1970; de Swann, 1993). 
Presidents unconstrained by diverse cabinets are able to give these teams the power to 
impose reform. Thus, single-party cabinets, which engender short time horizons and 
access to the president, facilitate powering.  
The appointment of loyal technocrats tightens cognitive constraints  
Single-party cabinets, and specifically the appointment of loyal technocrats to 
positions within the executive, also shape the collective capabilities of the decision-
makers. The Argentine president’s discretion in appointments results in the predominance 
of outsiders, individuals loyal to the president’s party/faction. The ability to bring in 
one’s own personnel often results in cadres of high-level technocrats—individuals with 
advanced degrees (Dargent 2011). In this context, experts may possess impressive 
academic credentials or trajectory, but their appeal may rely less on these qualifications 
than on the alignment of their policy views with those of the president. Thus, a newly 
elected president is likely to bring into the executive branch numerous outsiders, not civil 
servants or long-standing technocrats from within the state who might slow down the 
president’s policy pursuits, but rather individuals of confidence and great abilities who 
can help the president “get something done.” Indeed,  Bambaci, Spiller, and Tommasi 
(2007) demonstrate that “temporary bureaucrats” in Argentina tend to respond to the 
individual political patron who recruits them (Grindle 2012). Thus, presidents select 
individuals who will help them quickly achieve their policy goals.  
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This also means, however, that the fate of these political technocrats is linked to 
the political actor who appointed them. The result is shorter time horizons and an absence 
of the type of expertise developed over time from experience in the public sector. This 
contextual knowledge is crucial for understanding the effects of change in new contexts, 
and without which ambiguity, uncertainty, and unintended consequences are only 
heightened. 
Moreover, hand-selected teams of like-minded individuals are prone to the 
problems of “groupthink” (Janis 1982). Instead of fostering debate and deliberation to 
cross-check inferences and bringing to bear prior reform experiences on new problems, 
such tight-knit groups suffer from more severe distortions in judgment, with rash 
inferences reinforcing each other (Schafer and Crichlow 2010; McDermott 2004, 249-56; 
Weyland 2012, 56). Conformity and cohesiveness is good for rapid implementation, but 
not for identifying problems in grand reform plans.  
Finally, extensive leeway in bureaucratic appointments has enduring effects on 
the quality of the civil service. All countries in Latin America have rules on the books 
regarding a meritocratic civil service (Grindle 2014). Yet, governing patterns affect the 
extent to which presidents tend to abide by such rules. In Argentina, where the civil 
service rules are often disregarded, President A will come in and appoint his own cronies; 
then President B will dismiss them and appoint her own loyalists. This “individual-level 
serial replacement” engenders high rates of turnover within the executive. For instance, a 
president who decides to overhaul an agency is able to appoint a minister of his or her 
own party and such a minister is often free to bring in his or her own team of bureaucratic 
outsiders (Zuvanic and Iacoviello 2010, 167-8). In this way, resistance within the agency 
to the reforms can be overcome by either dismissing existing employees or shifting them 
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into irrelevant positions,23 facilitating lightning transformations of federal programs and 
agencies. Consequently, while exclusionary governing approaches might increase 
expertise in the short term, it is often at the expense of maintaining a neutral, 
meritocratically recruited civil service in the long term. In this way, exclusionary 
governing approaches tend to weaken the bureaucratic core overtime.  
In all of these ways, then, exclusionary governing patterns that foster the use of 
tight-knit, cohesive teams to force rapid reforms result in reduced collective capabilities 
of the reformers and tighter bounds of rationality in both the short and long term.  
In sum, political-organizational patterns of governing in Argentina contribute to 
the selection of reform plans that are tremendously complex because they attempt to get 
to the heart of various problems at once. Such radical changes are led by those with 
power—presidents and their political technocrats; but these tight-knit groups of 
technocratic outsiders often fall prey to groupthink and face tight cognitive constraints 
because of their inexperience in the public sector. 
Inclusionary Governing Frustrates Powering, Facilitates Problem-solving  
Broad coalitions slow, dilute, and moderate reform proposals   
By contrast, coalitional presidentialism, by inducing Brazilian presidents to share 
executive power, shapes decision making and information processing by shifting the 
prerogative to transform the public administration from presidents and their tight-knit 
reform teams to a broader group of coalition allies. As a result of negotiation and 
compromise with numerous veto players (Tsebelis 1995), radical and comprehensive 
reforms are rarely executed as a coherent whole; instead, changes often advance slowly 
                                                 
23 Such an approach creates “parallel bureaucracies,” see Zuvanic and Iacoviello (2010, 167-168).  
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and haltingly.24 Executive decision making is bogged down by the slow plodding 
required to get changes past coalitional allies representing a diverse set of interests.  
Yet, due to the necessity of including coalitional partners to both win the 
presidency and to govern, individual governing coalitions are less likely to push policy 
far to one extreme.25 Wide-ranging coalitions in Brazil mean that any party in the 
governing coalition has a high probability of inclusion in the next government. Parties 
such as the PMDB have been included in governments of both the PSDB and the PT. 
Further, until Lula, the PFL had always governed: during the military dictatorship and in 
the administrations of Presidents Sarney, Collor, Franco, and Cardoso. Everyone needed 
them. This dynamic lengthens the time horizons of parties and encourages them to build 
gradually. Even if a party is finally removed from the governing coalition, as the PFL 
eventually was under Lula, policy decisions do not change drastically because coalitions 
are comprised of such diverse interests; such a “big ship” is difficult to turn. Therefore, 
when the next governing coalition enters, there is not the same impulse to pull drastically 
back in the other direction. In this way, wide-ranging coalitions make sweeping reform 
that dramatically shifts the status quo rare. 
Thus, broad governing coalitions affect the reform process by slowing the pace 
and scale of reforms and also affect preferences: The inclusion of broad governing 
coalitions means that the policy positions of the ruling coalition at t+1 are likely not too 
far removed from the coalition that enacted the reforms, which results in greater 
continuity of preferences than in Argentina (Levitsky and Murillo 2014).  
                                                 
24 This argument resonates with Thelen and Mahoney’s emphasis on the importance of veto possibilities 
for either accelerating or hindering the pace of reform. In contexts of strong veto players and high levels of 
enforcement layering is more common (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 19).  
25 Broad multiparty coalitions in Brazil typically comprise approximately 70 percent of seats in Congress. 
These wide-ranging coalitions, which typically include parties of both the left and the right, move the 
preferred location of the governing coalition toward a more centrist position, and thus, more moderate 
policies. 
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Broad coalitional governments also afford a much greater role to insiders—
experts from within the state (e.g., technocrats and civil servants) in the policy-making 
process in a number of ways. First and foremost, coalitional presidentialism blocks 
sweeping, comprehensive change. This frustrates most attempts to gut bureaucratic 
agencies, providing greater stability for civil servants. Second, presidents, in order to 
achieve their policy objectives, often rely on neutral experts within the federal 
administration (Praça, Freitas and Hoepers 2011). Coalitional presidentialism means that 
Brazilian presidents are compelled to distribute positions in the cabinet and throughout 
the bureaucracy to allied parties, which means they are limited in the extent to which they 
may make unilateral replacements of ministry staff with hand-picked loyalists. This 
creates a governing dilemma: Broad, diverse coalitions mean that presidents turn over 
ministries and agencies to coalitional “allies” that may not be interested in advancing the 
policy/governance objectives in any meaningful way. In fact, their primary objective may 
be rent-seeking. As a partial antidote, Brazilian executives have often used experts within 
the state to serve as a counterweight to political appointments and to help achieve their 
governance objectives.26 This relative stability extends their time horizons for effecting 
change and smaller scale changes phased in over time are often left in civil servants’ 
hands, as opposed to political leaders or high-level technocrats.27 
Finally, the limits of attention of political actors bombarded by lots of issues and 
information open up possibilities for other actors with experience, longer time horizons, 
                                                 
26 Scholars have highlighted this strategy in Brazil where presidents often appoint neutral experts to the 
“number-two” positions of the ministries controlled by coalitional allies in order to avoid the worst 
excesses (Loureiro, Olivieri, and Martes 2010; Praça, Freitas and Hoepers 2011). Moreover, a striking 
number of civil servants are appointed to the discretionary positions in the public sector (Praça, Freitas and 
Hoepers 2011), and interviews with elite government administrators suggests that the presidential calculus 
of appointments has over time placed increasing weight on the importance of specialists within the state in 
order to advance the president’s governance objectives (Interviews Luis Santos and Graef).  
27 For an in-depth analysis of the trade-offs of different forms of politicization, in addition to their 
relationship with capacity and governance outcomes see Bersch, Praça, and Taylor (2014).  
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and expertise to fashion reforms that do not run up against such bounds. The absence of 
big comprehensive changes opens up space for smaller-scale reforms that build overtime.  
Coalitional presidentialism loosens cognitive constraints  
Coalitional presidentialism also increases the collective capabilities of reformers 
on two levels. First, it impels top-level decision makers to subject policy proposals to the 
scrutiny of a diverse set of interests and experts and to make changes. In contrast to 
policymakers in Argentina who are part of cohesive groups where problems are often 
overlooked as a result of groupthink (Schafer and Crichlow 2010; McDermott 2004), the 
numerous parties represented in the executive loosen the bounds of rationality by creating 
a deliberative environment that cross-checks inferences, even if it introduces political 
calculations to such decisions.  
Second, and more importantly, because Brazilian presidents are limited in the 
extent to which they can replace ministry staff with hand-picked loyalists, presidents 
often rely to a greater extent on neutral experts within the federal administration to 
achieve their governance objectives, as the previous section highlighted.28 Experts’ 
institutional positions and extensive experience mean that these officials have at their 
disposal much better information and greater capacity for processing it than high-level 
political leaders, who are forced to rely to a greater extent on cognitive shortcuts to craft 
and implement complex reforms. Additionally, experts within the state benefit from 
learning over time. Therefore, in the Brazilian context, while individuals still apply 
                                                 
28 The appointments of experts arise not only because of the constraints of veto players, but also because 
the appointment of neutral experts advances the governance objectives of a president. Thus, while this 
argument does not deny the importance of veto players (see Chapter 2 for discussion of insurance 
arguments and veto player logic), it also recognizes the important positive governance function that such 
appointments play (for other studies that emphasize the importance of the governance logic see Nunes 
2010; Brinks and Blass 2015).  
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inferential heuristics, their judgments tend to be closer to the mark because they rely on 
more solid information and have a greater capacity for processing it. 
Thus, who reformers are and how they reach their positions have direct 
consequences for the dominant reform type. Short time horizons of outsiders (in contrast 
to the longer time horizons and expertise of insiders) mean that they face tighter cognitive 
constraints. This differential provides greater opportunities for technocratic insiders to 
advance problem-solving reforms because smaller-scale reforms often do not gain the 
attention of coalitional allies, outsiders only temporarily in the executive. Further, the 
iterative reform process allows civil servants to increase their expertise over time.  
In sum, the presence of various veto players in the Brazilian context of coalitional 
presidentialism reduces the scale and speed of reform, thereby reducing complexity. That 
is, coalitional presidentialism in Brazil means that diverse cabinets slow reform 
initiatives; broad governing coalitions encourage more moderate reforms; and longer time 
horizons engender gradual change. Together, these factors reduce the incidence of 
powering reforms in Brazil; however, the absence of sweeping reforms, in addition to the 
presence of political actors with short time horizons and many demands on their 
attention, opens small spaces for civil servants with expertise and experience to 
sequentially advance incremental changes. Moreover, diverse perspectives enhance the 
quality of decision making by cross-checking policy designs and the greater role of 
technocrats from within the state loosens the bounds of rationality of policy decision 
makers. The emphasis on small changes does not mean that important changes do not 
occur, but rather that time is important in the reform process—transformations occur by 
sequencing changes over time that become cumulatively transformative. Instead of 
preventing much-needed change, the absence of drastic shifts creates possibilities for a 
more enduring and effective transformation of the state over time. 
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CONCLUSION  
This chapter has developed an explanation for effective and enduring public 
sector reform by demonstrating how established governing patterns influence reform 
strategy, i.e., the choice of powering or problem-solving. I argued that established 
patterns of governing, developed over the longue durée, account for the cross-national 
differences in the predominant reform strategies. Exclusionary governing patterns—
where presidents appoint single-party cabinets (e.g., Argentina)—result in greater 
reliance on the powering strategy, whereas inclusionary governing patterns (e.g., 
Brazil)—where presidents share executive power with a coalition—result in greater 
reliance on the problem-solving strategy. In doing so, it demonstrated how the 
organization of executive power mediates the impact of cognitive limitations on political 
decision making, which is a collective process. It did so by highlighting how the broader 
political-organizational context shapes 1) the scale and speed of the reforms pursued and 
2) the type of individuals involved.  
The locus of policy decision making in Argentina is concentrated in small, 
cohesive groups. This facilitates rapid and radical reorientations of the public sector. In 
such contexts, power is concentrated at the apex of the state, which results in presidents 
and their political appointees relying heavily on informational shortcuts in designing and 
implementing institutional transformations. Bounds of rationality are especially tight for 
such decision makers: Election cycles are short and such high-level appointees usually 
come and go with the executive who appointed them. Accordingly, they rush to make 
reform decisions in order to make a difference before opposition has time to mount 
against the changes. Thus, they sacrifice careful planning, evaluation, and scrutiny for 
short-term outcomes, leading to ill-informed decisions. Where there are fewer constraints 
to hold back political leaders, they pursue their governance objectives by resorting to 
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sweeping overhauls (overreacting to problems in the policy process). Yet, after the big 
push, powering often fails to achieve consolidation, which creates the next crisis.  
By contrast, the locus of policy decision making in Brazil is shifted to a broader 
set of actors. Coalitional presidentialism, which induces presidents to share executive 
power, means that negotiation and compromise with coalitional partners slow sweeping 
overhauls. Yet, such policy proposals benefit from scrutiny and discussion, since diverse 
perspectives lead to revisions and corrections. Such negotiations also often result in the 
downsizing of initial proposals. Consequently, dramatic overhauls and overreaction to 
problems are less common. In this context, experts from within the state are afforded a 
much greater role in the policy-making process; the relative stability extends their time 
horizons for effecting change and smaller-scale changes phased in over time are often left 
in their hands, as opposed to political leaders or high-level technocrats. Moreover, the 
technical acumen and access to information of technocrats and civil servants, in addition 
to the more limited scope of reform, means that these individuals are able to process 
information in a more balanced fashion. Thus, bounds of rationality loosen when 
sweeping change is broken into smaller pieces and experts with longer time horizons play 
a greater role in crafting change. As a result, we would expect fewer radical changes and 
more gradual transformations.   
Because this chapter has explained why presidents tend to select one reform 
strategy over another, the following four chapters focus mainly on the effects of the 
reform choices they make. Chapter 4 investigates transportation reform in Argentina, 
which constitutes the most dramatic instance of powering of the reforms analyzed in this 
dissertation. Chapter 5 details the Argentine reforms in the health sector and shows that, 
while powering resulted in deleterious consequences in the instances where it was 
applied, in other areas of health powering attempts were halted, resulting in problem-
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solving advances. Chapter 6 on Brazil transportation highlights the role of expectations 
regarding executive power sharing in halting powering in Brazil and the development of 
more successful problem-solving reforms. Finally, Chapter 7 on health in Brazil shows 
how problem-solving over a twenty-year period created a cumulative transformation of 
health in Brazil.  
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PART II: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, 
AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Chapter 4 Transportation in Argentina: Powering (Re-)Creates Crisis 
The return to democracy in Argentina has been followed by countless ambitious 
attempts to overhaul the state. In the 1990s, President Carlos Menem concentrated 
executive authority to push through a sweeping neoliberal transformation of the state—
restructuring state owned electricity, petroleum and natural gas, and telephone 
monopolies; privatizing postal services, water, and sewerage; auctioning off the rights to 
operate airports, roads, rails, and ports for fees, creating more than 100 such 
concessions;
29
 and reforming the civil service, health care, and pension systems. During 
the 1990s, Argentina became the poster child of executing politically challenging reform, 
with the World Bank, the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and numerous other analysts heaping 
praise on the efforts of the Menem government.
30 
 A decade later, however, corruption 
and performance problems plagued many of the same institutions Menem transformed, 
prompting Presidents Néstor Kirchner (2003-7) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
(2007-present) to use the same approach to push through another set of comprehensive 
overhauls, many of which reversed Menem’s changes. In both cases, however, the veneer 
                                                 
29 Concession agreements are considered a type of public-private partnerships and are negotiated contracts 
between a government and a company/operator that give the company the right to use all utility assets 
conferred, including the responsibility for operation and investment. The asset ownership remains under 
state ownership and assets revert to state authority at the end of the concession period. In a concession the 
company/operator typically obtains its revenues directly from the consumer. The difference with 
privatization is that concessions are not transferred to public ownership and they are contract-based not 
regulator-based. In both privatizations and concessions, however, the staff is transferred to the private 
sector.  
30 For instance, in October 1998 the managing director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, had only positive 
words for Argentina: “In many respects the experience of Argentina in recent years has been exemplary, 
including in particular the adoption of the proper strategy at the beginning of the 1990s and the very 
courageous adaptation of it when the tequila crisis put the overall sub-continent at risk of major turmoil. 
…Notable, too, are the efforts of Argentina since that time to continue its excellent compliance with the 
performance criteria under our arrangements” (Blustein 2005, 58). 
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of success quickly wore thin, revealing new performance problems. Thus, despite 
ideological differences, the same pattern—powering and its failure—has repeated itself 
during the center-right government of Menem and then the center-left Kirchner 
governments. What explains the same outcome from reforms of different ideological 
orientations? Why, despite initially impressive efforts to improve service delivery, are 
such plans abandoned? Why are the same institutions overhauled again and again, yet 
without any lasting success?  
Applying arguments developed in Chapter 2, this chapter answers these questions 
by analyzing transportation reforms over time in Argentina beginning in 1989. The 
chapter begins with Menem’s overhaul of transportation in the 1990s, which illustrates 
two of the deleterious facets of powering. First, it highlights the insurmountable 
challenges of designing comprehensive reforms, which ultimately leads officials to rely 
on inferential mechanisms of bounded rationality instead of well thought-out 
calculations.  In order to undercut the opposition, changes to the transportation sector—
transferring state operation and maintenance of roads and rails to the private sector in the 
1990s—were swift, deep-cutting, and completed during the “window of opportunity” 
provided by the economic crisis. The very same characteristics important for overcoming 
the opposition, however, made rapidly planning such extensive change in the midst of an 
economic crisis a Herculean task. Instead of proactively seeking out alternatives and 
calculating their advantages and disadvantages policymakers resorted to inferential 
shortcuts. They did so under pressure to act quickly during the “window of opportunity” 
provided by the economic crisis and to implement their complex plans before opposition 
could mount an attack against the changes. As a result of relying on cognitive shortcuts, 
unanticipated outcomes appeared almost immediately after the reforms were 
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implemented and grave performance problems continued to plague the transport sector 
long after changes had been implemented.   
Second, Menem’s transport reforms highlight powering’s deleterious effects on 
institutional capacity.  By bringing in outside experts and change teams and concentrating 
power in the hands of these high-level officials in the Ministries of Economics and Public 
Works, Menem successfully overcame resistance, uprooted the status quo, and 
established new transport agencies. While successful in demolishing existing agencies, 
reformers were less successful in creating new institutions crucial for the long-term 
success of privatized infrastructure, such as agencies responsible for monitoring and 
regulating transport. Such failures of reform consolidation had enduring effects. When 
Menem and his technocrats left office, few individuals remained in the federal 
administration who had concession expertise or experience.  The lessons learned from a 
decade of reform were essentially lost. In the following years, under subsequent 
presidents, control over transport remained centralized in the hands of political 
appointees, who lacked the time, experience, and attention to ameliorate the intractable 
problems that afflicted the sector. As a result, policy problems were papered-over and 
ignored, and the transportation sector continued to deteriorate.  
The chapter then shows how the failures of powering facilitated another wave of 
comprehensive change, failing to achieve the consolidation predicted by conventional 
historical institutionalism’s path dependency. The situation in transport deteriorated until 
in 2012, a massive train collision in downtown Buenos Aires that killed 51 people and 
injured 700 laid bare the depth of the problems in transportation. This dramatic event 
prompted Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to embark upon a fresh wave of comprehensive 
changes, which reversed the transport policies of the 1990s and essentially recreated 
Ferrocarriles Argentinos, the state-run rail company that existed before Menem 
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demolished it.  The penultimate section shows that while some technocrats attempt a 
more moderate problem-solving approach to problems in transportation and other sectors, 
these gradual efforts are thwarted by grander attempts at change.   
Thus, this chapter demonstrates how powering has run its full course in terms of 
transportation in Argentina: The same institutions were overhauled again and again. 
When powering reform efforts predictably failed, changes were discarded as a “partial” 
solution that failed to strike at the root of the problem and the search for another 
comprehensive model began anew. In this way, powering creates its own unhealthy 
dynamic such that not only do the results fail to produce the expected results, but also the 
recurring dramatic changes make it very difficult for subsequent reformers to come in 
and begin a process of successful problem-solving. Powering (re-)creates crisis.  
MENEM OVERHAULS TRANSPORTATION 
Argentina once had one of the most impressive transportation systems in the 
world. In the early 20
th
 century, the Argentine rail network was the most extensive in 
Latin America and the metro in Buenos Aires rivaled the modern subterranean systems in 
Europe and the United States. Furthermore, over the course of the 20
th
 century Argentina 
built one of the most extensive highway systems in Latin America.  
By the late 1980s, however, the quality of the rail and highway infrastructure had 
declined and the ever-increasing operation and maintenance costs had become a 
substantial drain on the Argentine national treasury (Gerchunoff and Coloma 1993, 276–
277). In particular, the integrated national public enterprise responsible for railway 
services, Ferrocarriles Argentinos (FA) consumed an estimated US$800 million to 
US$1.4 billion annually in the late 1980s (Sharp 2005, 15). Increasing dependence on 
automobiles and the poor quality of the rail network meant that financial performance 
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would continue to deteriorate unless changes were made.
31
 The highway system was also 
in need of improved management and substantial investment; in 1989, construction costs 
for the highway system’s public sector were twice what is considered best practice and, 
despite the millions poured into improvements, only 36 percent of the national highways 
were in fit condition (Natale 1993).
32
    
The hyperinflationary crisis of the late 1980s seemed to provide a “window of 
opportunity” for overhauling the transport sector.
33
 Faced with exploding inflation and 
depleted state coffers upon assuming the presidency in 1989, President Carlos Menem, in 
a stunning about-face, departed from his statist campaign promises, and embarked upon a 
sweeping reform program that implemented strict free market policies and radically 
transformed the state.
34
 Menem’s neoliberal crusade reached far beyond addressing 
immediate causes of hyperinflation and linked numerous problems to the acute crisis, 
including the problems in the transportation sector.
35
   
Comprehensive Change, Unintended Consequences  
The objective of the transportation reform was clear: reduce the deficit and 
improve quality by increasing access to investment finance. The concession model—
privatization of infrastructure services through long-term management and investment 
contracts—provided a rapid means of achieving such goals. Private companies pay a fee, 
                                                 
31 By 1990, 54 percent of the total network track was in either bad or fair condition, and only 49 percent of 
a total fleet of 992 locomotives were available for service (Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus 1999, 7). 
32 This was in part because of lack of investment, and in part, because of increased truck traffic due to the 
deterioration of the rail system. 
33 On the importance of hyperinflation for explaining the willingness of several Latin American 
democracies to enact harsh neoliberal reforms see Weyland (2002).  
34 On stabilization and market reforms in Argentina in the 1990s see Manzetti 1999; Teichman 2001; and 
Weyland 2002. 
35 In particular, Domingo Cavallo argued that “As a political strategy … all the reforms were linked to 
inflation and this link facilitated the support of public opinion and Congress. … Once the reform takes 
place and results can be observed, the people support it.” Interview, Domingo Cavallo, Minister of 
Economy and Public Works (1991 – 1996) (Murillo 2009, 240).  
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or canon, for the right to use infrastructure for the life of the concession agreement, and 
assets revert to state authority at the end of the concession period. By auctioning off the 
right to charge tolls, the state expected to generate substantial revenue in the short-term 
and to improve quality in the long-term by shifting the responsibility for modernization 
and maintenance to private companies (concessionaires). After contract negotiation, such 
agreements can immediately transfer responsibility to private companies.  
Instead of taking moderate steps to achieve these objectives or waiting until 
hyperinflation had passed, Menem and his team of reformers scheduled the first wave of 
transport concessions to occur just months after assuming office, during the height of the 
economic crisis. Acting quickly was indispensable, argued reform proponents, in order to 
gain credibility with foreign investors, raise cash to finance the fiscal debt, and prevent 
the organization of anti-privatization lobbies (Manzetti 1999, 99).   
Given the profound uncertainty created by the economic crisis and time pressures, 
evenhandedly calculating advantages and disadvantages of concession design options 
posed a near impossible task, even for experts. In order to carefully detail such 
agreements and apply systematic reasoning, the Minister of Infrastructure, Roberto José 
Dromi, drew on the expertise of the World Bank and IMF in crafting the concession 
agreements. The establishment of concession contracts provides a one-shot opportunity to 
craft a deal that will be effective for the life of the agreement, anywhere from twelve to 
thirty years. The whole idea of a concession contract is meant to protect both the public 
and the concessionaire by specifying all the terms of the concession in advance (Carbajo 
and Estache 1996, 3). Argentina’s concession contracts, and especially those of railways, 
were intended to be very specific about the way in which tariffs, quality, investment, 
exclusivity, etc., would evolve over time (Campos-Méndez, Estache, and Trujillo 2001, 
23). Yet, forecasting such details for numerous contracts, simultaneously, under a 
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situation of exploding inflation, placed unrealistic expectations on experts’ capabilities. 
Armando Canosa, Secretary of Transportation, argues that at the time no one, not IFI 
officials, not government officials, had a systematic way of estimating how much income 
concessionaires were expected to make, given the fluidity of the economic situation.
36
 
Faced with profound uncertainty and pressure to complete auctions within months, IFI 
experts used their “best assumptions” to overcome such challenges, and were thus forced 
to rely on inferential shortcuts rather than comprehensive planning and solid 
information.37  
The transport sector was transformed at a lightning pace, starting with twelve 
simultaneous bidding contests for intercity highway systems. By 1990, the government 
had auctioned off about a third of the intercity highways for which private companies 
paid US$890 million (Estache and Carbajo 1996, 2).
38
 Five months after the first set of 
concessions were signed, the government initiated a second wave of concessions, for 
Buenos Aires access roads. Meanwhile, a similar concession process had commenced 
which broke up Ferrocarriles Argentinos’ fully integrated and centralized network, 
dividing it into monopoly franchises that combine track and service operations for both 
freight services and metropolitan commuter rail. Between 1991 and 1993, five freight 
concessions, designed for a thirty-year duration, were completed; within the next two 
years, seven Buenos Aires commuter service lines were concessioned for twenty-year 
time periods. The rapid-fire concessions of railways and highways had completely 
transformed the state and the model of transport service provision in a few short years.  
                                                 
36 Author interview with Armando Norberto Canosa, Secretario de Transporte de la Nación (1996-1999), 
Ministerio de Economía y Obras y Servicios Públicos de la Nación, November 21, 2012. 
37 Author interview with Canosa.   
38 Concessionaires initially pay a canon to the state for the use of the road infrastructure during the life of 
the concession agreement. The road concessions initially appeared competitive (147 bids were submitted). 
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The challenges of comprehensive planning, however, resulted in numerous 
unforeseen consequences, the first of which appeared during the auction processes. In 
theory, companies would compete against each other in the bidding contest (Gerchunoff 
and Coloma 1993); yet, the main competitors, especially for the highways system, had 
agreed amongst themselves for which routes they would compete.
39
 For the access roads, 
the maximum number of bidders was two and most of the concessions were made 
through auctions involving a single bidder; in other cases, the concessions were cancelled 
for lack of interested companies (Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus 1999, 18). In some 
instances, domestic groups failed to meet the financial and technical prerequisites 
imposed by the terms of the contracts, which meant that the government had to either 
decide to postpone or risk a long-term concession agreement with private sector partners 
who may be unable to maintain roads adequately (Manzetti 1999, 100). 
Interviews with government contractors suggest that had concessions not been 
auctioned off simultaneously and had experts from the Dirección Nacional de Vialidad 
(DNV, the agency responsible for the planning, design, maintenance, and construction of 
the national highway system) been involved, some of the cartel activity could have been 
prevented.
40
 Yet, in order to push through the changes rapidly and avoid resistance from 
public sector employees, Dromi had sidelined DNV experts in the concession design 
process. Given pressures to push the changes through along with the broader 
macroadjustment plan, the Menem government chose to go ahead with the concessions 
even in the absence of bidders who met technical prerequisites. Thus, instead of 
increasing competition and improving the ability of the state to maintain and modernize 
infrastructure, the unexpected outcomes of the auction process threatened both objectives.  
                                                 
39 Author interview with Horacio Fischbarg, Government Contractor (1982-2005).  
40 Ibid; Author interview with anonymous former employee of a highway concessionaire.  
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Lightning transformations under conditions of profound uncertainty created by 
hyperinflation and macroeconomic adjustment meant that the problems in the reform 
design ran even deeper. The models used to forecast profits of the concessionaires had 
changed dramatically as a result of the macroeconomic adjustment plan. As a result, in 
1991 concessionaires began charging tolls that violated the stipulations of the concession 
agreements. To make matters worse, they were charging $2.50 per 100 km as opposed to 
the amount agreed to in the concession, $1.50 (Gerchunoff and Coloma 1993, 280). The 
agreements stipulated that the most serious deficiencies in the pavement and signaling 
must be repaired before collecting tolls (Estache and Carbajo 1996). Yet, companies 
argued that the macroadjustment plan had adversely affected their ability to collect 
revenue—a situation not covered in concessions agreement; thus, in order to complete 
promised repairs, they imposed tolls and increased rates.  
As a result, only five months after the contracts had been signed and in the midst 
of popular outrage over the toll hike, a renegotiation process began under Domingo 
Cavallo, the Minister of the Economy, who had inherited the mess from Dromi. In 
September 1992, after a year and a half of renegotiations for the initial set of auctions, the 
government and concessionaires signed new contracts (Decree 1,817 of 1992). The 
Menem administration was able to attain an agreement whereby the toll would be set at 
$1.50, but at a steep cost to the government: the US$890 million canon payment was 
eliminated and tax relief and subsidies were granted to the concession holders, at a cost to 
the treasury of about US$1,755,000,000 for the duration of the concessions period 
(Gerchunoff and Coloma 1993, 280–1). Only three years later, renegotiation processes 
resumed for nearly all of the highway contracts and continued throughout the 1990s 
(Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus 1999, 16–17).   
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By contrast, railway concessions initially generated more optimistic evaluations, 
suggesting that the overhauls were successful in improving services while controlling 
costs (Manzetti 2003, 346). The title of a World Bank article from 1996 declared that 
railway concessions in Argentina were “Heading Down the Right Track” (Carbajo and 
Estache 1996, 1). Railway traffic increased by 180 million passenger trips a year (see 
Table 3 below), and the first years of privatization of the metropolitan commuter railways 
in Buenos Aires showed an improvement in the quality and quantity of services (FIEL, 
1999; CEER, 2001). As Table 4 shows, the freight concessions also appeared to be 
successful: Freight tonnage increased from 10.2 million tons in 1992 to about 18.9 
million tons in 1997 (Sharp 2005, 16).  
Table 3: Argentina Commuter Railway Concessions 






1993-95   











Urquiza Metrovías S.A. 1994 25.6 36% 
San Martín Transporte Metropolitano S.A.  1994 55.4 64% 
Belgrano Sur  Transporte Metropolitano S.A.  1994 58.4 69% 
Mitre Trenes de Buenos Aires (TBA) 1995 182.1 74% 
Roca Transporte Metropolitano S.A.  1995 252.4 83% 
Belgrano Norte Ferrovías S.A. 1994 51.9 408% 
Sarmiento  Trenes de Buenos Aires (TBA) 1995 166.6  
Source: Comisión Nacional de Transporte Ferrovíario 
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Table 4: Argentina Freight Railway Concessions 



















Urquiza Ferrocarril Mesopotámico 1993 2,751 50% 
San Martin Buenos Aires al Pacífico 1993 5,493 92% 
Rosario-Bahia Blanca Ferroexpreso Pampeano 1991 5,163 130% 
Roca Ferrosur Roca 1993 4,791 160% 
Source: Comisión Nacional de Transporte Ferrovíario 
 
Praise for the radical transformation was premature, however. By the late 1990s, 
experts agreed that the bidding process prompted concessionaires to make unrealistic 
projections and investment promises to help them win auctions (Carbajo and Estache 
1996, 3).
41
 Outcomes for freight concessions were especially disappointing—not only 
had revenues fallen far short of predictions, the concessionaires had arrears in canon 
payments of close to US$15 million (Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus 1999, 13). In many 
cases, unanticipated issues, such as drops in international grain prices or the delayed 
privatization of the Bahia Blanca port, meant that freight concessionaires experienced 
steep losses (Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus 1999, 13).
42
 Freight concessionaires averaged 
70 percent of the projected traffic, and actual revenues were between 50 and 60 percent 
of expected levels.
43
 Without the necessary revenue, the concessionaires were not able to 
fulfill their investment promises. The regulatory agency responsible for oversight of 
                                                 
41 Author interview, Dr. Luisa Maria Hynes, Directora de Control de Obras Públicas, Tribunal de Cuentas 
de la Nación (1982-1991); Asesora de Gabinete, AGN (1994-1995), Consultant PNUD and UNDP (2006-
2009), August 28, 2012. 
42 Ferroexpreso Pampeano, Rosario-Bahia Blanca concession, was most severely affected.  
43 Author interview with Eladio Sánchez, Secretariat of Transportation, Ministry of the Interior and 
Transportation, November 27, 2012. 
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freight concessions filed penalties, but given the financial situation of the 
concessionaires, it could not demand both investment and payment of penalties.
44
 Thus, 
by 1998 the government was renegotiating all railway concessions, while spending 
US$400 million per year in subsidies, with a commitment from the state to pay for US$6 
billion in investment over the following twenty years (Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus 
1999, 10).  
In conclusion, the experts tasked with designing transportation policy that would 
transform the sector fundamentally and all at once faced a near impossible task, not only 
because of the complexity of the reform, but also because of the rapidly evolving 
economic situation. Moreover, in order to avoid opposition from bureaucratic agencies 
and to bring in expertise, IFI experts and other technocrats were brought in to design and 
execute changes. These individuals lacked experience in the Argentine federal 
administration that might have allowed them, for example, to anticipate cartel behavior in 
the auction process.
45
 For all of these reasons, decision-makers deviated significantly 
from the maxims of rational decision-making, relying instead on cognitive shortcuts that 
resulted in wildly different estimates from expert to expert regarding concessionaires’ 
expected profits and operation costs. When the comprehensive concession plans failed, 
officials were pushed into renegotiation and crafting comprehensive changes again in the 
midst of a fluid environment and time pressure to achieve agreement.
46
 Consequently, 
instead of creating a new and better model of transportation, the changes engendered new 
dysfunctionalities.  
                                                 
44 Author interview with Canosa. 
45 Author interview, Dr. Luisa Maria Hynes, Directora de Control de Obras Públicas, Tribunal de Cuentas 
de la Nación (1982-1991); Asesora de Gabinete, AGN (1994-1995), Consultant PNUD and UNDP (2006-
2009), August 28, 2012. 
46 Author interview with Eladio Sánchez, Secretariat of Transportation, Ministry of the Interior and 
Transportation, November 27, 2012. 
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Institutional Capacity Destroyed 
How had Menem successfully accomplished the feat of pushing changes past 
what was thought to be intransigent opposition, especially by the unions? Certainly, 
packing the Supreme Court and arrogating more extensive decree authority provided a 
means to circumvent those who might challenge his decisions.
47
 Indeed, between 1990 
and 1994, Menem utilized decrees of necessity and urgency over 300 times (Manzetti 
1999, 92). Yet, one of the most crucial tools for strengthening and concentrating the 
power of the president was the reform process itself—in particular, revamping the state 
apparatus. Deep and precipitous changes to the public sector not only served to weaken 
political rivals’ access to patronage by uprooting public officials appointed by Menem’s 
predecessors, but also mitigated bureaucratic antagonism towards the new policies. In 
addition, reform processes undercut union power. Privatization became a process 
whereby Menem could “emasculate” the Peronist union structure and consolidate his own 
power (Manzetti 1999, 91). For instance, concessions that transferred operation of 
railroads to the private sector resulted in the almost immediate destruction of 
Ferrocarriles Argentinos, which debilitated the once all-powerful railroad unions. In 1989 
FA had 92,500 employees; by 1996 that number had been slashed to 17,000 (Carbajo and 
Estache 1996, 3). The first phase of reform—dismantling the institutions that had been 
previously responsible for transportation—strengthened the concentration of authority in 
the hands of the executive and undercut opposition and rivals. 
While Menem had been successful in the destructive first phase of powering, 
preparations for the far more difficult task of reconstructing institutions responsible for 
regulation and oversight had been woefully insufficient (cf. Naím 1994). Regulatory 
                                                 
47 Two laws passed in 1989, the Law for Reform of the State and the Economic Emergency Law, provided 
the legal framework that allowed the president to bypass Congress and institute changes by presidential 
decree. 
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agencies, crucial for monitoring the compliance of private companies to concession 
contracts and enforcing such agreements, were not even set up before concession 
contracts were signed.
48
 Indeed, Argentina in the 1980s had an agency responsible for the 
planning, design, maintenance, and construction of the national highway system, the 
Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (DNV), but because responsibility for highway 
construction and maintenance was transferred to the provinces and to concessionaires, the 
DNV was effectively dismantled. Over 1,300 DNV positions had been slashed by 1992 
and cuts to staff continued in the following years.
49
 According to reform plans, the DNV 
was to be reoriented to serve as the regulatory agency responsible for supervision of 
concessions, but efforts to reconstruct and strengthen the DNV as a regulatory body were 
almost non-existent.
50
 Analysts, by the late 1990s and increasingly so in the early 2000s, 
noted that the DNV was neither independent, nor adequately organized and staffed to 
effectively supervise the concessionaires (Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus 1999). 
Similar problems plagued railway institutions; from 1992 to 1996, there were at 
least four separate attempts to create different types of regulatory bodies (AGN 2004).
51
  
In 1996 the Comisión Nacional de Regulación del Transporte (CNRT) was created 
(Decree 660 of 1996). This decentralized regulatory agency, however, was not given the 
authority, capacity, or autonomy to modify contracts or collect accounting information 
from private firms, critical for monitoring and enforcing concession agreements 
                                                 
48 Author interview with Beatriz Hebe López, Head of Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (2001), November 
14, 2012. 
49 The World Bank played also played an important role in the transformation of the DNV (World Bank 
1993). 
50 Author interview with López. 
51 See also http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/ari/Informes/informe_ferrocarriles.pdf. 
 78 
(Campos-Méndez, Estache, and Trujillo 2001).
52
 Finally, after a number of different 
organizational arrangements, the CNRT was placed under the direct control of the 
Ministry of Economy and Public Works, further weakening the independence of the 
regulatory body.  
The weakness of institutionalized capacity led to particularly narrow bounds of 
rationality for decision-makers, creating a downward spiral. The absence of independent 
and capable administrative agencies and regulatory bodies meant that the Ministry of 
Economy and Public Works, rather than the regulatory agencies, retained all 
responsibility for changes in concession contracts and for fare setting (Campos-Méndez, 
Estache, and Trujillo 2001, 6–7). High-level officials assumed extensive responsibility 
for oversight of rapidly evolving change in the transport sector. Such individuals, 
however, were bombarded with problems that divided their attention and, for almost all 
of these political technocrats, working in the federal administration and affecting such 
dramatic change was uncharted territory. Thus, as Armando Canosa, the Secretary of 
Transportation, recounts, “There was little time for careful evaluation. … We were 
fighting numerous fires, but I believed that despite the challenge, eventually market 
forces would demonstrate the advantages of privatization and deregulation. … We were 
doing something unprecedented in the world.”
53
 Such concentrated decision authority 
meant, however, that judgements were not subjected to collective decision-making or 
organizational structures that enhance technical expertise. Instead they were made by 
individuals at the top without a strong capacity to process the torrent of new information 
about the reform process.  
                                                 
52 Author interview, Dr. Luisa Maria Hynes, Directora de Control de Obras Públicas, Tribunal de Cuentas 
de la Nación (1982-1991); Asesora de Gabinete, AGN (1994-1995), Consultant PNUD and UNDP (2006-
2009), August 28, 2012.  
53 Author interview with Canosa. 
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The effects of such weak mechanisms for information-processing and meaningful 
oversight were evident. By the late 1990s, some concessionaires were distributing record 
profits, even though they had failed to pay the canon sum and were receiving subsidies 
from the state (Baer and Montes-Rojas 2008, 332). Without capable and independent 
regulatory agencies to put a stop to excessive demands for renegotiation, Menem’s model 
of “regulation by contract” was distorted into a system of “regulation by renegotiation” 
(Gómez-Ibáñez 2003). During the late 1990s, 42 percent of infrastructure contracts in 
Argentina, in comparison to 28 percent for Latin America as a whole, were renegotiated 
within a two-year period, outside of the normal mechanisms established in the contract 
(Guasch, 2004). Moreover, because details of contract renegotiations and subsidies were 
poorly maintained and unavailable in a consolidated manner, neither the Menem 
administration nor journalists or watchdogs were able to draw inferences from solid 
information.
54
 Given this opacity, it is not surprising that reports of shady deals between 
concessionaires and top-level government officials soon emerged.
55
 In sum, the radical 
transformation of the transport sector in the 1990s was successful in the destruction of the 
status quo, but much less successful in creating strong institutions that would ensure the 
continued success of reforms.  
COALITIONAL GOVERNMENT, POWERING HALTED: THE ALIANZA (1999-2001)   
Government corruption became a defining issue of the 1999 Argentine election. 
The lack of transparency and ongoing renegotiation of contracts with transport 
concessionaires and in a number of other sectors cast a pall of corruption over Menem’s 
overhaul of the state. In response to such growing concerns, presidential candidate 
                                                 
54 Daniel Santoro, personal communication, July 28, 2010.  
55 Página12, December 4, 1999. 
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Fernando de la Rúa, running on the Alianza
56
 ticket, promised that if elected he would 
head a “Gobierno de Cristal,” by enhancing transparency and eliminating the corrupt 
practices of the previous administration.
57 
The Alianza was an electoral coalition formed 
in order to defeat the PJ candidate; in it, the UCR joined with FREPASO (a party formed 
in the mid-1990s by eight deputies breaking away from the PJ, including Carlos 
“Chacho” Álvarez) and other small parties who opposed Menem’s neoliberal policies. 
Their anticorruption appeal resonated with the electorate: 26.3 percent of de la Rúa voters 
responded that they had selected the Alianza candidate based on his anticorruption 
agenda, 40.2 percent on his honesty, and 31.8 percent based on the ethics of UCR, the 
party of de la Rúa.
58
 The Alianza was successful in electing de la Rúa, but fulfilling 
expectations to increase transparency and strengthen institutions would prove challenging 
given the political and economic conditions he faced—deep divisions in the fractious 
Alianza coalition, the Peronist majority in the Senate, and the loss of the province of 
Buenos Aires, in addition to an economic recession.  
Although one of the central campaign promises was to fight corruption, there was 
little consensus about how to do so. FREPASO advocated the creation of an ad hoc bi-
cameral committee in Congress to investigate past cases of corruption (i.e., during the 
Menem administration), while President de la Rúa preferred a multi-agency approach that 
would rely on traditional judicial and administrative agencies (Charosky 2002, 208-9; 
Guillan-Montero 2011, 434). The Alianza was able to come together to establish the 
Anticorruption Office (OA) within the Ministry of Justice, which was perhaps their most 
successful and significant anticorruption policy. Yet this effort was successful in large 
                                                 
56 Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación (Alianza) 
57 La Nación, May 26, 1999.  
58 Clarín, October 25, 1999. 
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part because the creation of the new OA did not require the destruction of an existing 
agency, instead creating a new one charged with investigation and policy-making 
functions (Law 25.233 and Decree 102 of 1999). Powering efforts in other areas, 
however, were hamstrung by deep rifts in the governing coalition. 
Attempts to enhance transparency in public spending illustrate such challenges. 
De la Rúa, following his transparency campaign promise, launched the “Cristal” 
program, an initiative to disseminate online, and in an easily understandable format, all 
information concerning the use of public funds in Argentina.
59
 This was an effort to 
assuage increasing public concern over the impervious concession renegotiations. In the 
words of the Chief of Cabinet, Rodolfo Terragno, “No contract will be signed or pension 
paid without everyone being able to enter on the Internet webpage to see it.”
60
 The 
project was ambitious in scope and promised to explain the redistribution of public funds 
between the national government and provinces; provide information on goals and results 
by gathering information on all national policies to evaluate their management and the 
manner in which public funds are assigned; and present information regarding 
accountability by consolidating information related to the control of corruption, both in 
government and the non-governmental sector (Radics 2001). The administration 
delegated the responsibility of auditing the site to Foro Transparencia, a body made up of 
15 non-governmental organizations concerned with government transparency (Radics 
2001). The de la Rúa administration announced the Cristal program in December 1999 
and set a deadline of completing the website by February 2000. This was especially 
                                                 
59 This was to include all contracts signed by the state and all purchase orders and payments issued by the 
state; essentially, all budget information and how these funds are administered (Página12, November 6, 
1999). 
60 La Nación, December 17, 1999.  
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ambitious because the de la Rúa team needed to obtain such information from other 
agencies and ministries.  
Efforts to complete the website, however, were frustrated by constant 
organizational restructuring and infighting within the executive between UCR and 
FREPASO. Upon assuming office, de la Rúa replaced the majority of public servants in 
key posts with members of the UCR, using a mechanism of exception in the civil service 
law,
61
 and issued a decree reorganizing the ministries and secretariats of government. 
This move transformed the Secretaría de la Función Pública (SFP), created in the first 
year of the Alfonsín government, into the Subsecretaría de la Gestión Pública (SSGP)  
under the Secretaría de Coordinación General de la Jefatura de Gabinete. This granted 
the new SSGP the functions of reforming the organization and management of the 
administration, in addition to responsibilities of achieving greater transparency and 
efficiency in the system of public contracts, which included the Cristal project (Decree 
20/1999). The reshuffle, which placed partisan personnel in positions reserved for those 
selected based on merit, not only violated the spirit of established civil service rules,
62
 but 
also the UCR’s agreement with FREPASO to evenly distribute executive posts (Balán, 
2011, 155). Consequently, FREPASO leadership demanded increased representation and 
participation in the Cristal efforts. In response, less than a month later de la Rúa issued 
the creation of the Secretariat for the Modernization of the State, under Vice President 
Álvarez (Decree 17/2000), which was also given responsibility for Cristal. Under this 
                                                 
61 The SINAPA civil service system allows for the designation by exception for a period of 180 days. After 
that time period, however, the appropriate competition must be performed (Coutinho 2007, 36). Since de la 
Rúa began using this loophole, executives had either ignored the competition requirement or continued to 
reappoint public employees every 180 days (such appointments are referred to as “designación transitoria 
en la planta permanente”). Author interview with Horacio Anguita, Director of Personnel Development and 
Organization of the General Secretariat, Buenos Aires, November 1, 2012. 
62 This violated the rules of the career civil service system implemented in Argentina in 1991, known as 
SINAPA (see Decree No. 993 of 1991). 
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new arrangement, the roles of the SSGP and the new Secretariat for Modernization were 
indistinguishable, except that the former responded to the UCR and the latter, FREPASO 
(cf. Volosin 2010, 153–157). Instead of creating an integrated team, the inclusion of both 
parties created a two-headed monster: Each party within their own secretariat reported to 
its own leadership without coordination. 
Unsurprisingly, the ambitious website, constructed in the midst of constant 
organizational restructuring and coalitional infighting, was a failure. After an 
unsuccessful first launch in February 2000, the government re-launched the website 
months later. The administration claimed that all the promised information was available 
and attempted to draw attention to data, such as steady monthly increases in the average 
number of visitors to the site, and accolades, such as the site’s finalist status in the 
Government category for the 2000 mate.ar award, a recognition of best internet sites in 
Argentina. However, the new site failed to provide all the information promised and had 
already lost the public’s confidence. Meanwhile, organizational restructuring continued, 
hindering attempts to modify and improve the Cristal project over time (cf. Volosin 2010, 
153–157).  
Powering failed in this circumstance, not because of the outcome, as the prior 
cases highlighted, but because of output: Policies were not fully enacted or implemented 
in the first place.  The Alianza, a coalitional government, hindered the ability of the de la 
Rúa administration to concentrate power and decisively push through reforms.  
De la Rúa resorted to tactics that flew in the face of his own anticorruption 
agenda. In June 2000, La Nación published an article revealing that Peronist senators had 
received significant personal favors for passing a labor reform bill.
63
 Shortly following 
                                                 
63 La Nación, June 25, 2000. 
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the incident, FREPASO vice-president Chacho Álvarez resigned to protest the 
government’s bribery of the opposition.
64
 The division between the governing alliance 
only deepened thereafter. De la Rúa’s appointment of Domingo Cavallo, who had led the 
neoliberal crusade under Menem, to be Minister of the Economy only heightened the 
political crisis. In the ensuing months, the economic situation deteriorated, generating 
massive street protests and lootings, to which the government responded in a heavy-
handed manner. Finally, a weakened and isolated de la Rúa resigned. After five 
presidents in twelve days, the Legislative Assembly finally appointed Eduardo Duhalde 
as a provisional president to complete de la Rúa’s term (Katz 2006: 415-418). In 2003, 
with the election of Néstor Kirchner, it seemed that political and economic crises were at 
last abating.  
CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF TRANSPORTATION REFORMS (2001-2012) 
The problems that plagued Menem’s transportation reform in the late 1990s only 
intensified during the unprecedented crisis of 2001-2002. The economic models upon 
which calculations for concessions were based relied on success of the broader reform 
project, which assumed that with the right policies, long-term economic growth would 
ensue. However, the government could no longer keep its contractual investment 
obligations. At the same time, use of rails and roads dropped, reducing the 
concessionaires’ revenue from tolls and rail tickets. 
 While passenger traffic recovered quickly after 2002, the inability of regulatory 
agencies to sanction concessionaires meant that private companies operating railways 
failed to make necessary investments or resume service (AGN 2004). Alarming reports in 
2003 showed that 70 percent of railway cars had problems with their brake systems, but 
                                                 
64 La Nación, October 7, 2000. 
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the Auditoría General de la Nación (AGN) showed that in only one case was a 
concessionaire sanctioned (CNRT 2003; AGN 2004). In February 2003, Judge Angel Di 
Mateo stated that he had found the railway cars and stations in the Roca line “in a 
calamitous state,” and the passengers traveling “like cattle,” and ordered the 
concessionaire, Transporte Metropolitano S.A., to provide “decent and efficient service.” 
By late 2003, a total of 389 railway passengers in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area had 
been killed in accidents and many commuters lost limbs while riding the footboards or on 
top of packed trains after waiting hours upon hours for trains to arrive. That year, over 83 
percent of Argentine respondents answered that privatizations were not beneficial for the 
country (Latinobarómetro 2003). 
Under Néstor Kirchner, and in the first years under his wife and successor to the 
presidency, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, problems continued to accumulate. Making 
the concession model functional would have required strengthening institutions and 
solving a number of problems that the initial set of comprehensive reforms had created, 
but the mechanisms set in motion by Menem’s unilateral imposition of reform continued 
to hinder improvements in the transport model and demonstrate the difficulty of making 
improvements and headway after powering. In particular, transportation under the 
Kirchners highlights two particular aspects of the problems with powering. 
First, institutions weakened by Menem’s reforms facilitated the continued 
centralization of authority. In order to push through big-bang changes of the 1990s 
Menem concentrated power within tight-knit reform teams, but because the second stage 
of reform, reconstructing institutions and strengthening capacity (a lengthy process), was 
far from complete at the end of his term, authority was never fully devolved to regulatory 
and transport oversight agencies. The DNV was a shadow of its former self, and its roles 
and responsibilities indistinguishable from those of the Órgano de Control de 
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Concesiones Viales (OCCOVI), a new agency created in 2001 to regulate highway 
concessions. Ferrocarriles Argentinos no longer existed, and the regulatory agency, 
Comisión Nacional de Regulación de Transporte (CNRT) had never been given any real 
power; it had essentially 12 agents to monitor over 240 stations, 900 km of roads, and 
2,000 locomotives and railcars (Pérez 2014, 120), not nearly enough to adequately 
enforce standards specified in concession contracts. An AGN report completed just 
before Néstor Kirchner assumed office corroborates the weakened nature of the 
regulatory agencies, stating that their failure to monitor and sanction concessionaires 
contributed to concessionaires’ consistent failures to make promised investments (AGN 
2004, 14-15).   
As a result, when Menem and his political technocrats left office, few individuals 
remained in the federal administration with expertise or experience in concession 
contracting, a situation that continued during the de la Rúa administration as well. If there 
had been stronger regulatory institutions and a core cadre of experts left within the 
administration, perhaps they might have been able to regulate concessionaires and resolve 
some of the issues in the concession model through gradual improvements over time. 
Without such continuity, however, the lessons learned from a decade of reform were 
essentially lost.   
This vacuum facilitated the continued concentration of authority. In 2003, 
Kirchner created a new Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Public Services that 
absorbed competencies and resources from other ministries and the presidency. Kirchner 
appointed a trusted advisor, Julio De Vido, an aide from Santa Cruz, as minister; De 
Vido’s new bureaucratic empire spanned transportation, communications, mining, 




 Another long-time Santa Cruz connection, Ricardo 
Jaime, was appointed to the Transportation Secretariat within De Vido’s ministry. In this 
and other areas, the failure of Menem’s reforms was used to justify sustained 
centralization of authority in the hands of political appointees. Menem usurped control of 
regulatory agencies, such as the CNRT, by unilaterally appointing interventors, side-
stepping legal requirements that require autonomous regulatory agencies to be run by a 
Board of Directors. Kirchner justified maintaining the intervention of CNRT and 
OCCOVI (Decree 1388/1996) because of the “failure of the management to meet its 
objectives for users, competitiveness of the market, and safe transport” (ACIJ 2008, 10–
12). This undercut the regulatory agencies’ autonomy, making them dependent on the De 
Vido-Jaime nexus, which retained de facto authority to sanction, renegotiate, and re-
privatize concessionaires (Cipoletta Tomassian and Sánchez 2009, 56). Such 
concentration of authority extended well beyond transport; Kirchner also appointed 
interventors to regulatory agencies of public utilities (gas, electricity, communications, 
etc.), alleging “situations of exception” and lack of time to undergo the selection process 
in order to appoint these key positions (Scherlis 2010, 104).  
The bounds of rationality were particularly tight for such high-level officials. Not 
only did they lack experience in the federal government prior to appointment, they were 
also bombarded with policy problems. Without a core cadre of individuals with expertise 
and experience, such problems were dealt with in a haphazard manner. For example, 
instead of seeking a sustainable means of financing the transport sector, the Kirchner 
administration papered-over the problem by relying on government subsidies, from off-
the-books fondos fiduciarios that transferred public funds to private companies 
                                                 
65 Accumulation of control in the hands of the Ministry of Planning continued; the budget of the Ministry 
was increased by 40 percent in 2005 and continued to grow; in 2007 the budget increased by 76.2% over 
the budget passed by Congress (Carrió 2008, 7). 
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responsible for highways and railroads.
66
 Despite the increase in funds to the transport 
sector, problems were largely ignored and violations of concession contracts overlooked. 
The case of ALL Central SA, a Brazilian company that held one of the most important 
freight concessions, is representative of this trend—the government failed to hold the 
company to account despite violations of the concession agreement and continued to 
provide substantial subsidies (AGN 2006; ACIJ 2007, 20).  Similarly, there were no 
consequences when concessionaires, such as Metropolitano, failed again and again to 
make basic upgrades or ensure security on its lines, even though the company was 
receiving substantial subsidies.  
Given the overwhelming number of problems in transportation, the attention of 
high-level transport officials focused on the most dramatic problems while neglecting 
others. For instance, in 2004, after a number of fatalities on the San Martín line, AGN 
released a scathing report regarding the precariousness of the transport situation and in 
particular the San Martín line held by Metropolitano. Instead of taking measures to 
monitor the company, the Kirchner administration terminated its San Martín concession 
with Transporte Metropolitano Gral San Martín S.A. (Decrees 798/2004 and 591/2007),
67
 
placing the re-nationalized concession in the hands of the government-created Unidad de 
                                                 
66 Fiduciary funds, trust funds originally created to allocate money for a specific purpose. During the crisis 
such funds were first used to compensate concessionaires for freezing of tariffs. In 2001 there were only 
eight such fiduciary funds; by 2007 there were over 16, and expenditures from such trusts had increased by 
6,000 percent, from $96.9 million to $5,947,000,000 (Uña 2007, 4). Such funds are financed through the 
budget, revenues, and tariffs, as well as the profits from assets of privatized firms, and loans from 
international credit institutions (AGN 2004, 14-16). Most importantly, because such trusts are not governed 
by the same rules as other public expenditures, it is impossible to know how the money is used. Such funds 
are not included in the annual public budget, even though by 2005 fondo fiduciario’s expenditures had 
surpassed the level of expenditures authorized by Congress (Rinaldi et al. 2005, 4). Accounting and control 
standards are absent and there are no external audit requirements (AGN 2004, 15; Lo Vuolo and Seppi 
2006), and attempts by AGN to monitor these funds have been met with hostility. Legal requirements 
obligate the Chief of Cabinet to inform Congress on fiduciary funds (Law 25.827/04), but in practice this 
has not occurred (Rinaldi and Staffa 2006, 1).  
67 For the endless legal battles that ensued, see La Nación, June 26, 2004. 
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Gestión Operativa Ferroviaria de Emergencia (UGOFE), a consortium of Argentine 
companies formed in January 2005 by Ferrovías, Metrovías, and Trenes de Buenos Aires, 
the remaining companies that operated the commuter rail services in Buenos Aires 
(Decree 789/04, Secretaría de Transporte Resolution 408/04). Metropolitano maintained 
control over two other concessions, Belgrano Norte and Roca. Yet, the government again 
failed to take steps to monitor the concessionaire, overlooking warning signs, until 2007, 
when hundreds of passengers attacked the facility of the Constitution Terminal and 
confronted police for hours after they had again been informed that service was 
suspended (Pérez and Rebón, 2012). After this dramatic incident, instead of taking steps 
to monitor the concessionaire, again the government placed operation of the rail under the 
control of the remaining concessionaires.  
Second, transportation under Kirchner highlights how powering weakens the 
incentives to strengthen a predecessor’s powering reforms. Why would Menem’s 
successors want to make his reforms successful, especially after changes had been 
discredited because of poor performance? Why champion improvements of a “failed” 
reform? As problems mounted, Kirchner placed blame on his predecessor’s reforms and 
the concessionaires. Instead of strengthening institutions important for transport, 
Kirchner allowed them to continue to flounder. As graph X shows, the DNV, responsible 
for highway concessionaires, steadily lost civil servants, crucial for monitoring 
compliance with contracts and applying sanctions. A comparison of the budget of CNRT, 
the regulatory agency for railways, between 2001 and 2007 reveals that it was the agency 
with the least growth in terms of budget (ACIJ 2008). Despite CNRT’s bleak outlook, 
 90 
experts argue that the personnel situation was even more precarious in OCCOVI and 
DNV.
68
   
 
Figure 1: Evolution of DNV civil servants and number of agents per 1000 km of 
highway network concessioned 
 
Source: Dirección Nacional de Vialidad 
 
The continuation of Nestor Kirchner’s policies under the administration of his 
wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, resulted in further increases in subsidies even as 
the system deteriorated. Between 2005 and 2011, state subsidies to the railways tripled, 
from $2,411 million to $6,837 million pesos (2011 pesos) (IDESA 2012). Figure 1 shows 
that despite this investment, the quality of services deteriorated; the number of seats were 
reduced from 2007 to 2010, and the number of passengers who actually paid for tickets 
declined because operators stopped collecting fares (IDESA 2012). La Nación estimated 
that the subsidy was ten times the basic one-peso ticket price, while only six in every 100 
metropolitan rail passengers purchased a valid ticket.
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68 Author interview with Eladio Sánchez, Secretariat of Transportation, Ministry of the Interior and 
Transportation, November 27, 2012. 













1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Civil Servants Number of Agents per 1000km of Highway Concessioned
 91 
 
Figure 2 : Subsidies, available seats, and tickets purchased 
  
Sources: IDESA and Comisión Nacional de Transporte Ferrovíario 
Given the feeble institutions, concentration of decision-making authority, and 
weak incentives to improve Menem’s transportation reforms; it is not surprising that 
allegations of corruption swirled around those at the helm of transportation agencies. De 
Vido, Jaime, and Claudio Uberti, the interventor of the highway regulatory agency 
OCCOVI, along with contractors, were implicated in numerous scandals that involved 
bribes, cartels, cost overruns in contracting, and work compensated but never completed 
(Guillan-Montero 2011; Volosin n.d.; Cabot and Olivera 2008). In particular, in 
November 2005 the minister of the economy, Roberto Lavagna, denounced the 
“cartelization” of highway contracts, after the World Bank had discovered that 63 percent 
of highway works were awarded to four companies, with ties to Santa Cruz, where they 
had obtained similar deals in the 1990s from De Vido, who was minister under then-
Governor Néstor Kirchner (Manzetti 2014, 185; Cabot and Olivera 2008, 22-23).
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70 The World Bank along with the Kirchner administration had funded a program called CREMA, designed 
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Carrió, in a criminal lawsuit against Kirchner and De Vido,
71
 further detailed the cartel 
operation that resulted in a cascade of other money laundering investigations surrounding 
Santa Cruz entrepreneurs. These included the infamous Lázaro Báez, who earned public 
contracts worth US$1 billion and allegedly set up an intricate money laundering scheme 
in which over 50 ghost firms were used to transfer money abroad.
72
 In 2007 Claudio 
Uberti, a close associate of De Vido and responsible for concessions that controlled all 
tolls in the country, was dismissed after he was found with a group carrying non-declared 
bags containing US$800,000 from the Venezuelan government, allegedly destined to 
finance Cristina Kirchner’s electoral campaign (Cabot and Olivera 2008; Scherlis 2010, 
156).
73
 In 2009, Ricardo Jaime turned in his resignation after investigators accused him 
of accepting bribes from, among others, the Cirigliano Group, whose family company, 
Cometrans, controlled Trains of Buenos Aires (TBA), a company that received millions 
in state subsidies for railway concessions.
74
 Jaime was also alleged to have illicitly 
collected millions for the Kirchner campaign by pressuring companies to contribute.
75
 In 
sum, the weak institutions and centralization of control that resulted from Menem’s 
reforms in many ways facilitated siphoning money out of the transport sector to be used 
for the Kirchners’ political ends.
76
  
                                                                                                                                                 
investigating problematic cost overruns. Later in 2006, the DNV found that such contracts had cost 
overruns that exceeded the budget anywhere between 29 to 290 percent (Manzetti 2014, 185). 
71 For the full text of Carrió’s allegations see Perfil, November 27, 2008. 
72 On Báez, see La Nación Feb. 7, 2010; June 26, 2007; June 30, 2008; Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2014. 
73 Even after he was dismissed, Uberti allegedly served as a so-called “parallel ambassador” to Venezuela 
(Perfil, April 8, 2012).  
74 Prosecutor of Administrative Investigations, Manuel Garrido, led the effort that denounced the Secretary 
of Transportation (Perfil, February 24, 2009). 
75 Clarín, November 22, 2010. Jaime currently faces around 20 separate court cases of administrative fraud 
and overpricing of railway concession contracts. 
76 Guillermo Jorge and confidential interviews with legal counsel at the some of the largest governmental 
contractors suggest that corruption under the Kirchners does not follow the cartel model as it did under 
Menem, but rather the government selects which companies it will work with and provides extensive 
subsidies in return for kick-backs into political coffers. Author interview with Guillermo Jorge, Law 
Professor, San Andres University; IFI consultant on money laundering and corruption, August 22, 2012.  
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Throughout this period, ominous reports that provide overwhelming indications 
that catastrophe would strike unless corrective actions were taken were ignored.
77
 The 
AGN released report after report that revealed the calamitous state of the railways and 
corruption in public works contracts. Several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
labor unions, and government agencies denounced the critical state of several services 
and the failures of the government to hold concessionaires to account (Baer and Montes-
Rojas 2008, 331; ACIJ 2008). From 2007 to 2011, the number of railway accidents 
steadily increased. The average deaths in the Buenos Aires Metropolitian Area alone 
were 400 a year. In 2008 alone there were more than 3,200 accidents, resulting in 2,700 




Then, on February 22, 2012, tragedy stuck: A train on the busy Sarmiento line 
failed to stop at the Once station in downtown Buenos Aires and careened into the 
platform, killing 51 people and injuring 700. Modern safety technology would have 
prevented the train cars, run by concessionaire TBA, from slamming into each other after 
                                                 
77 Complaints, including those of the unions, about investment and maintenance seemed to fall on deaf ears 
(La Nación, February 23, 2012). The national commission of transport regulation (CNRT) submitted 
several official reports to Secretary of Transport Juan Pablo Schiavi in 2010 and 2011 in which they 
emphasized the precarious state of the rails. In particular, the report from March 21, 2011, states that Línea 
Sarmiento, operated by Trenes de Buenos Aires (TBA), is in a deplorable state, with “structural 
deficiencies [that] continue to increase the considerable maintenance deficit, generating a deterioration of 
the components and the superstructure of the railway.” The tracks’ “irreversible faults” mean that the trains 
should reduce their speed; the report also stated that “a pronounced maintenance deficit can be observed, 
with worrying faults from the security viewpoint, because of their gravity and recurrence.” The report 
continues: “The infrastructure delivered from the [TBA] concession presents significant deficits regarding 
the contractually established requirements …, and both its routine maintenance such as human and material 
resources are insufficient to reverse a situation of steady decay.” The report was issued by the Manager of 
Transportation Safety of CNRT, Horacio Faggiani, and signed by the interventor of the organism, Antonio 
Sícaro (Nota CNRT 445/2011; La Nación, February 29, 2012).  Yet, according to AGN, CNRT took no 
meaningful corrective actions, despite the fact that AGN issued a report in 2008 (and continued to issue 
such reports) that highlighted failures of the TBA: among other deficiencies, trains had missing handles on 
emergency brakes and ineffective handbrakes (La Nación, February 23, 2012). 
78 Página12, May 16, 2007. 
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a hard stop, but the carriages used on the Sarmiento line were more than 50 years old. 
Then, in June 2013, two passenger trains collided into each other, again on the Sarmiento 
line, killing 3 and injuring more than 100. Then, again, in October of the same year a 
train failed to stop and crashed into the buffers of the Once station, injuring 99 people. 
The government cast blame on TBA. But as a result of the Once crash and the subsequent 
collisions, the Fernández administration finally shifted its attention to the problems in 
transport, as the next section will demonstrate.  
POWERING DÉJA VU: FERNÁNDEZ REVERSES MENEM’S REFORMS (2012-2015) 
Following the Once crisis, executive attention dramatically shifted to problems in 
transportation. However, instead of making medium or proportionate adjustments and 
improvements, such as monitoring concessionaires, enforcing concession contracts, or 
upgrading the most dilapidated train cars, the Fernández administration embarked upon a 
sweeping overhaul of the transport sector.  
The new model rescinded concession contracts and centralized control of railway 
services in state-owned companies. While this constituted a new approach in contrast to 
privatization, the Fernández transformation essentially recreated the transport model as it 
was before Menem’s reforms. Fernández transferred responsibility for operation and 
maintenance of transport from the private sector to the state, by centralizing control for 
railways in Trenes Argentinos and its freight sister-company, Belgrano Cargas. Thus, the 
transport model pushed through by the Fernández administration is strikingly similar to 
what existed before Menem took office.  
The strategies used to reverse Menem’s changes drew upon the same pattern of 
tactics—massive organizational restructuring, concentration of power in interventors, and 
the use of executive decrees (Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia, DNU) in the face of 
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“crisis.” Following the Once tragedies, the administration of transportation, including 
control over massive subsidies, was moved from De Vido’s empire in the Ministry of 
Planning to the Ministry of Interior, which henceforth became the Ministry of Interior 
and Transportation (Decree 874). In March 2012, the minister of the newly created 
agency, Florencio Randazzo, “intervened” in TBA, taking over the company’s 
management of the metro and appointing a “caretaker” for the private company. Instead 
of delegating day-to-day operation to the ministry and its agencies, interviews suggest 
that the president communicated directly with the Minister of Interior and Transportation 
on matters regarding transportation.
79
 
Concessions then fell like dominoes: The Fernández administration canceled one 
contract after the other. Randazzo announced in October 2013 that the Sarmiento line 
contract with TBA would be rescinded (Resolution 1083/13).
80
 Operation of the 
Sarmiento line was placed in the hands of Trenes Argentinos (also known as Sociedad 
Operadora Ferroviaria Sociedad del Estado, SOFSE), a nascent state-run company that 
ran a few minor lines in the interior of the country, while another newly created agency, 
ADIF, would be responsible for investments to maintain and modernize the railway 
infrastructure (Resolution 1244).
81
 During the same period of time, state-run Trenes 
Argentinos and ADIF similarly assumed responsibility for the San Martín, Belgrano Sur, 
and Roca lines, which had been run by the UGOFE consortium (which had included 
                                                 
79 Author interview with Maria Eugenia Coutinho, Directora General Programas y Acción de Gobierno at 
Presidencia de la Nación (November 5, 2012). 
80 This intermediary step was taken because if the government were to rescind the contract outright, and the 
courts did not find enough evidence that the crash was the result of negligence, the State would have to foot 
a multi-million dollar bill for breach of contract (Latin American Weekly Report, March 1, 2012). 
81 Página12, October 26, 2013. 
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TBA); the Mitre line (which had also been run by TBA); and the Tren de la Costa line 
concession with Sociedad Comercial del Plata was rescinded.
82
  
The transformation extended to freight as well.
83
 In May 2013, the Fernández 
administration nationalized the Belgrano Cargas freight line, which once covered 14 
provinces and connected Argentina to Bolivia, until it was concessioned in 1997. In 1998, 
the Belgrano Cargas had transported 3,287,515 tons per year; in 2006 when the 
agreement was revoked, the annual cargo was just over 500,000 tons.
84
 The operation of 
the line was handed over to newly created state-owned, Belgrano Cargas y Logística 
Sociedad Anónima (hereafter, Belgrano Cargas), comprised of Trenes Argentinos, the 
General Port Administration (Administración General de Puertos, AGP), and ADIF 
(Decree 566/2013). Then, on June 4, 2013, the state revoked the contract with the 
Brazilian logistics company América Latina Logística (ALL), which ran the San Martín 
and General Urquiza freight lines. The Fernández administration struck a deal with China 
to help rebuild rail networks of Belgrano Cargas (making it easier to get soy to port and 
shipped to China) and to modernize the line’s rail-car fleet.
85
  
                                                 
82 La Nación, June 5, 2013. 
83 During the same time, the Mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri, finally announced he would take 
over responsibility for the Metro (Subte), which was desperately in need of upgrades, from the Fernández 
administration. Macri initially refused to take over the metro and the massive cost of needed repairs stating, 
“I felt that we Argentines owed ourselves a reflection. … Unfortunately the metro can’t escape reality. … 
We cannot take responsibility for 10 years of no investment. … I will neither lie nor become an accomplice 
in endangering users for lack of security and investment, [for these reasons] we decided to call a halt to the 
handover.” Later, in an about-face, he announced he would indeed assume responsibility for the services 
(Latin American Weekly Report, March 1, 2012; La Nación, December 20, 2012; Latin American Weekly 
Report, July 4, 2013).  
84 The history of this concession is complicated. Initially, a union of railway workers, Unión Ferroviaria, 
and Laguan Paiva, an industrial cooperative, were granted the concession. The union, however, allegedly 
siphoned off subsidies that were meant for rail investment, and the government rescinded the contract. 
During Néstor Kirchner’s presidency, “Shima,” a Chinese company, and Franco Macri presented an 
investment plan. However, when the government demanded that Emepa and Grupo Roggio (the owners of 
major passenger rail operations in Bueno Aires) along with unions be part of the operator holding, the 
consortium withdrew (La Nación, May 23, 2014). 
85 Financial Times, July 14, 2010.  
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The recreation of Ferrocarriles Argentinos was completed after the government 
announced that it would take over operation of long-distance passenger rail services in 
July 2014,
86
 and after the government rescinded contracts with the two remaining 
concessionaires, Grupo Roggio’s Urquiza line and Emepa’s Belgrano Norte line a year 
later (Resolution 171/2015). This move made the Ministry of Interior and Transportation 
responsible for operation and maintenance of Buenos Aires railways, inter-city, and 
freight services.  
Rescinding contract after contract constituted a disproportionate response to the 
problems, however. The Fernández administration cited noncompliance with contractual 
agreements. In particular, with regard to ALL, the government argued that the Brazilian 
company had repeatedly failed to meet conditions set forth in the concession contract. 
These serious breaches, the government argued, resulted in over 30 percent of ALL’s 
fleet being disabled. Yet, according to reports by AGN, such failures were not adequately 
sanctioned; in only one of the cases did CNRT effectively apply the appropriate penalty 
(AGN 2013).
87
 The absence of capacity and autonomy to effectively monitor contracts 
with concessionaires calls into question the ability of the government to tackle the more 
formidable challenges of operating rail lines. But, instead of taking the more moderate 
approach and monitoring concessionaires and applying sanctions, policymakers 
overreacted to the problems, causing a major shift in transport policy.  
The timing of this transport overhaul also suggests that political motivations 
played a crucial role. Hugo Moyano, a key ally of the Kirchners from 2003-2011 as 
leader of the CGT, the nation’s largest trade union, drew the base of his support from the 
truck drivers’ union. His sectoral interests clashed with those of freight operators; while 
                                                 
86 Clarín, July 11, 2014. 
87 ElAuditor.Info, May 29, 2013.  
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the deterioration of freight increased the power of the truck drivers’ union, CGT, to shut 
down transport in Argentina, efficient and extended freight lines would attenuate the 
truck drivers’ control over shipping. Moyano’s alliance with the Fernández 
administration effectively ended with a series of truckers’ strikes in 2012. Thus, it seems 
that the decision to invest in improvement of freight in 2013 was a way to weaken the 
power of the truckers’ unions and their ability to halt transport in Argentina.   
What is remarkable about the Fernández administration’s takeover of 
transportation was the absence of resistance to such sweeping changes. One might argue 
that the rail system was in such a state of crisis that there was consensus that something 
dramatic needed to be done. Such an argument, however, masks the fact that numerous 
groups anticipated such a tragedy given the state of rail infrastructure. Concessionaires 
did not put up a fight because they had nothing to lose—they had already benefitted from 
the extravagant subsidies, and the cancelation of their concession agreements now meant 
that they could return the dilapidated tracks, train cars, and locomotives to the state, 
washing their hands of responsibility. The continued poor performance had discredited 
the privatization model and so citizens were in favor of dramatic reform after years of 
underinvestment and neglect. Finally, the civil service was not going to stand in the way 
of change, since under the Kirchners the civil service system constructed under Menem 
had also been transformed.
88
 Finally, most agencies related to transport had been vitiated 
by Menem, then by the Kirchners. Thus, institutional weakness—the result of powering 
reforms that purged decision makers and also civil servants with experience—meant that 
the Fernández administration faced few barriers to change that again seemed necessary 
given the problems that had precipitated a “crisis.”   
                                                 
88 Guillermo Schweinheim, former Director of Training and Development, Tribunal de Cuentas de la 
Nación (1984-1992), Director of the Center of Studies of the Association of Personnel of the Audit 
Institutions (APOC), August 22, 2012. 
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PROBLEM-SOLVING TRAMPLED  
Powering’s frequent and massive overhauls of the state trampled problem-solving 
processes. In the midst of the powering highlighted above, there were indeed a variety of 
attempts at gradual problem-solving reforms that made gains: Eduardo Salas, the director 
of the National Office of Public Employment, worked to maintain meritocratic standards 
for the civil service and bolstered training for public employees (Coutinho 2007, 5);
89
 
Oscar Luna in the National Office of Contracting enhanced government contracting 
transparency (Volosin 2010);
90
 Nicolás Raigorodsky, as head of Transparency Policy in 
the Anticorruption Office, advanced standards for monitoring contracts (IADB 2006); 
and Guillermo Bellingi, the head of the National Office of Contracting, introduced 
legislation that ameliorated ambiguities in the legal framework for procurement.
91 
These, 
and many other similar efforts, may have stalled or thwarted some of the most deleterious 
effects of powering. Ultimately, however, the dramatic changes in the service model in 
the 1990s—swinging from state to private provision of services—meant disrupted mmost 
of these efforts.  
This meant that expertise was not built over time. By the late 1990s powering 
tactics—organizational restructuring, concentrating power, and dismissing civil 
servants—had left few individuals with the institutional knowledge crucial for anything 
other than concessions, interrupting experience and learning. Administrative capabilities 
for planning, purchasing, operations, and oversight, tasks required for anything other than 
                                                 
89 Author interviews with Hugo Dalbosco, Administrador Gubernamental, Ministry of Economy, Civil 
Service Secretariat, November 6, 2012; Graciela Silva, Coordinator for Management of Training and 
Quality, National Institute of Public Administration (INAP), November 5, 2010; Guillermo Schweinheim,  
former Director of Training and Development, Tribunal de Cuentas de la Nación (1984-1992), Director of 
the Center of Studies of the Association of Personnel of the Audit Institutions (APOC), August 22, 2012.  
90 Author interview with Guillermo Bellingi, Director of the National Office of Contracting (2010-2012), 
November 14, 2012. 
91 Author interviews with Vanesa del Boca, Anticorruption Office, September 12, 2012; Oscar Luna, 
Director of the National Office of Contracting (1996-2006), September 12, 2012. 
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concessions, were abandoned. Concessionaires, not government officials, became 
responsible for buying materials to lay track or purchase train cars, meaning procurement 
procedures for public works were largely unused for over a decade.  
The same pattern repeated itself under the Kirchner and the first part of the 
Fernández de Kirchner administrations. Problem-solving attempts to improve the 
neglected procurement model of contracting and address the long-standing issues—lack 
of transparency, rigidity of rules, inefficient procedures, corruption, and collusion
92
—
provide a poignant example. The director of the Office of National Contracting (ONC), 
Oscar Luna, a civil servant and engineer, led numerous incremental, moderate attempts to 
increase transparency in contracting by automating procedures and placing information 
online. Such efforts initially flew under the radar of political attention. In 2002 when 
President Duhalde and the country were still focused on the aftermath of the 2001 
political and economic crises, contracting reform was far down on the agenda, but Luna 
took this moment of national preoccupation with larger crises as an opportunity to begin 
making incremental changes. Luna sought out assistance from the international financial 
community, and in 2002 acquired a technology solution from the Government of 
Australia, which automated contracting procedures and published them online. This 
solution met a number of desiderata: the system was essentially free; source code was 
provided to allow Argentina to adapt the system to their own requirements; and it was 
flexible, allowing for incremental changes to the project (Trotta 2008, 9). 
The quiet gradual efforts of Luna’s team seemed to hold promise; as Chapter 6 
will highlight, the ONC team employed a similar approach to successful problem-solving 
efforts in Brazil. However, the intentionally low-key, piecemeal efforts were stymied by 
                                                 
92 Author interview with Nicolás Raigorodosky, Director of Transparency Policies, Anticorruption Office. 
(2002-2007), November 13, 2012.  
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the lack of a stable team: Luna’s team was so often “reorganized” from above that he 
instead relied on consultants from IFIs or college interns as developers.
93
 While such 
individuals were often quite skilled, their brief stints in the Argentine public 
administration meant that Luna’s team had little meaningful continuity and his efforts at 
reform suffered as a result. The adaptation of the Australian model to the Argentine 
context should have been simple, quick, and cost-effective; however, consultants and 
interns often failed to write down their modifications to the original source code, which 
created insurmountable challenges when they left.
94
   
Despite growing problems, in December 2005 the Secretary of Public 
Management, Juan Abal Medina, finally introduced the electronic system, Sistema 
Electrónico de Contrataciones Públicas (SECOP), and its internet platform, the site 
“ArgentinaCompra,” in a presentation that included various public authorities. Only days 
later, Luna again lost the key technical members of his team to “organizational 
restructuring” (Volosin 2010, 172). SECOP was obsolete before it was even introduced, 
and became a project “para inglês ver” (for the English to see) a shiny façade that 
conceals a significantly different reality on the ground. In 2007 the ONC finally 
abandoned the idea of trying to resuscitate the system which had become a labyrinth of 
jumbled code, the result of the modifications of an endless stream of different interns and 
consultants.
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 Without the stability of a core team, Luna’s problem-solving initiatives 
were not sustained. Luna, one of the few civil servants with detailed knowledge of 
                                                 
93 Author interview with Oscar Luna, Director of the National Office of Contracting (1996-2006), 
September 12, 2012. 
94 Author interview with Hernan Clerc; SECOPs team lead and contracting expert at the National Office of 
Contracting (2009-2012), July 16, 2010.  
95 Author interview with Bellingi. 
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procurement, the budget, and past attempts to increase transparency and accountability in 
contracting, resigned in 2006 out of frustration.
96
 
The reasons for this failure, however, extend beyond this particular instance. After 
Luna left, Fernando Díaz and Guillermo Bellingi, the subsequent directors of the ONC, 
attempted to implement two different e-Government Procurement systems and failed. 
Indeed, experts argue that Argentina lags far behind most countries in Latin America in 
terms of transparency of government contracts.
97
 Underlying the failures of problem-
solving in this area and in many others are the countervailing effects of the powering 
approach. Each time, just as the initiative looked promising, employee turnover or 
organizational restructuring resulting from patronage appointments or factional disputes 
displaced the team that had just been constructed.
98
 The trampling of reforms in these 
areas is particularly problematic now that the state has again assumed responsibility for 
the transport sector. 
In order to cope with the lack of capable personnel, problem-solvers often rely on 
outsiders. Under Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the number of 
agreements with universities has skyrocketed as have the off-the-books funds directed to 
such entities.
99
 This pattern seems to follow a political logic; the federal administration’s 
unprecedented connection to universities has been correlated to the rise of La Cámpora, 
the youth movement led by the son of the Kirchners, Máximo. Foreign consultants and 
interns serve as an important source of expertise.  
                                                 
96 Author interview with Luna. 
97 Author interview with Dr. Guillermo Rozenwurcel, Coordinador of the Inter-American Network on 
Government Procurement (RICG), August 22, 2012. 
98 Author interview with Bellingi. 
99 Author interviews with Guillermo Schweinheim,  Director of the Center of Studies of the Association of 
Personnel of the Audit Institutions, August 22, 2012; Hugo Dalbosco, Administrador Gubernamental, 
Ministry of Economy, Civil Service Secretariat, November 6, 2012. 
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While such solutions resolve short-term capacity issues, they imply long-term 
costs for the public administration: Once such individuals leave, their knowledge goes 
with them, inhibiting the accumulation of expertise, and frustrating gradual attempts to 
increase transparency, reduce corruption, and strengthen institutions. This means that 
companies are able to take advantage of the lack of knowledge on the part of the public 
sector. Employees of big construction companies readily admit that they can count on 
their government counterparts not to understand the contractual details and technical 
requirements, which gives the private sector an upper hand.
100
 The learning process starts 
from scratch with each administration or turnover of personnel, eroding institutional 
capacity over time.  
CONCLUSION  
Faced with crisis situations in the early 1990s, President Menem instituted 
wholesale changes to wipe out corruption and improve basic service delivery at lightning 
speed before opposition could slow reforms. The challenges of designing and 
implementing such complex overhauls at break-neck speed in a new context were too 
great, however: The ideal-type models failed to account for changing conditions and 
unforeseen circumstances. Moreover, the very process of destroying the status quo and 
autocratically imposing changes weakened needed institutions. Thus, reforms 
deteriorated during subsequent administrations until the situation had reached crisis 
levels, prompting President Fernández de Kirchner to undertake a fresh set of radical 
reforms that reversed those of the 1990s.  
                                                 
100 Author interviews anonymous employees of companies with government contracts; Claudia Maskin, 
Regional Compliance Officer, Siemens, November 22, 2012.  
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Thus, this chapter has demonstrated how powering has run its full course in terms 
of transportation in Argentina: The same institutions were overhauled again and again. 
When powering efforts predictably failed, changes were discarded as a “partial” solution 
that failed to strike at the root of the problem and the search for another comprehensive 
model began anew.  
This chapter also demonstrated how grander transformations that usher in 
“modernization” and “flexibility” have trampled efforts at problem-solving. The 
oscillation between privatization and re-nationalization meant that important efforts to 
gradually reform the transportation sectors were neglected. Bulldozing existing 
institutions in order to wipe out established corruption crucially hindered the 
consolidation of reforms and has had pernicious effects on bureaucratic stability over the 
long run, and as time revealed, corruption and inefficiency proliferated in the new 
institutions—which perversely led to new attempts at wholesale reform. 
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Chapter 5 Health in Argentina: Impeded Powering Fosters Problem-
Solving 
The preceding chapter demonstrated the failure of the powering approach for 
transportation in Argentina and focused on two problems of powering: the challenges of 
comprehensive planning and the destructive effects on institutions. The swift and deep-
cutting changes allowed Menem to undercut opposition, but because of the 
insurmountable challenges of rapidly planning such extensive change, reforms led to 
unintended consequences and new performance problems. Moreover, the weak 
institutions left in the wake of restructuring the transportation sector and dismantling the 
state apparatus left lasting repercussions that continued to hinder improvements in the 
sector long after the initial reforms.  Service provision deteriorated until it reached crisis 
levels, prompting a fresh set of powering reforms.  
The analysis of transportation reforms, however, generated a number of questions 
that are unanswerable with a single set of cases in one sector: What if reforms had been 
crafted and implemented under more typical circumstances instead of at the height of the 
hyperinflationary crisis? What effect did the depth and speed of reform have on the 
outcomes? Would powering have been more successful if reforms had been crafted by 
Argentine experts with greater experience than IFI teams and political technocrats? To 
what extent are the arguments advanced in Chapter 4 extendable to other policy areas?   
This chapter answers these questions by analyzing health reforms in Argentina.  
Beginning in the 1990s, Argentine executives attempted to transform the health sector 
using the same powering approach applied to transportation. The within-country 
comparisons provide useful analytical leverage, first, for illustrating aspects of the 
problems and paradoxes of powering. Like reforms in transportation, failures at 
comprehensive planning for health transformations of the 1990s resulted in disappointing 
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outcomes. In addition, reforms in health, and in particular Néstor Kirchner’s powering 
reform in the Programa de Atención Médica Integral (PAMI), which provides health 
services for pensioners, illustrate another aspect of the problems with powering—the 
credibility issue.  
As explained in Chapter 2, the credibility issue arises when relevant actors doubt 
the staying power of change, which diminishes the probability of enduring, consolidated 
reforms. The powering thesis assumes that comprehensive changes generate benefits, and 
thus, a new set of beneficiaries, who will make changes viable in the long term by 
opposing attempts to weaken, abandon, or reverse reforms. The problem, as the case of 
PAMI under Néstor Kirchner will demonstrate, is that reforms do not automatically 
engender beneficiaries with the motivation and capacity to defend changes. In fact, the 
very process of powering makes such a situation unlikely. Deep-cutting reforms that 
usher in transparency or clean government entail concentrated costs for opponents and 
diffuse benefits. Thus, once the political will that sustained the change dries up, defenders 
of the new program (diffuse benefits) are weaker than the prior defenders of the status 
quo (concentrated benefits). Further, because institutions were dismantled and 
bureaucratic continuity disrupted, there are few internal defenders of changes once 
technocratic reform teams move on. Potential beneficiaries, then, have many reasons to 
question the endurance of radical change, and thus, as this chapter will show in the case 
of PAMI reforms under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, are less likely to come out and 
support the changes.  
The cases presented in this chapter also provide a means for assessing to what 
extent the speed and depth of reforms affect outcomes.  Chapter IV drew a base-line for 
this analysis by detailing the effects of the draconian, almost-immediate transformation of 
transport. This chapter contrasts the reforms in the Ministry of Health. The changes to the 
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health sector did not cut as deeply, or go as far as they did in transport, but areas of 
comparatively greater stability were more successful at fostering gradual changes down 
the line. The area in which the most drastic changes were made, PAMI, ultimately 
resulted in the most disappointing outcomes over time. Thus, this chapter substantiates 
the negative correlation between reform speed/depth and success, and shows how delayed 
and stalled reforms gave rise to gradual, problem-solving efforts in some key areas. 
This chapter first analyzes cases of health reform starting in 1995, highlighting 
the challenges of comprehensive planning. It then turns to reforms in PAMI under the 
Kirchners, which underscores the credibility problem. The third section explains why an 
attempt at powering in the Ministry of Health failed, underscoring the importance of  
sustained political will for executing radical reforms. This section, then, illustrates how 
relative continuity in some areas of the Ministry of Health fostered efforts at gradual 
improvements, while also highlighting how the legacy of the reforms of the 1990s has 
continued to have detrimental effects in other program areas. The penultimate section 
compares Argentina’s reforms in transportation, analyzed in Chapter 4, and in health, the 
subject of the present chapter, demonstrating that the more draconian the powering 
reforms—the swifter and deeper the change—the more corrosive the effects on 
institutions over time.  
HEALTH REFORM IN THE 1990S  
The IADB described Argentina’s health sector reform as, “the greatest 
transformation of a health care system in Latin America in the 1990s” (IADB, 1998), and 
the World Bank lauded Argentina’s ability to implement all the “key elements of reform . 
. . in a very short period of time” (World Bank 1998, iii). Despite such accolades, the 
following analysis will show that changes fell far short of achieving their goals.  
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In the mid-1990s the Menem government turned its attention from 
macroeconomic stabilization and privatization to increasing competition within 
Argentina’s ill-performing health care system.101 Deepening deficits and a steady stream 
of corruption scandals fueled the perception that the health sector was in a state of 
crisis.102 Among specialists, the problem that plagued the health care sector in Argentina 
was clear: health insurance funds, known as obras sociales, operated as monopolies, 
precluding competition.103 In 1996, there were about 310 obras sociales in operation, 
which covered 18 million, about 55 percent of the population, and consisted of three 
different types of funds: national obras sociales (9 million), province-based obras 
sociales (5 million), and the Program of Integrated Medical Care (Programa de Atención 
Médica Integral, or PAMI), a special obra serving the elderly and disabled (4 million) 
(World Bank 1996, 13).104 Trade unions administered most of the national and province-
based obras, which meant that employees in the formal sector in Argentina had 
compulsory health insurance with an obra social, operated by their respective trade 
union.  Such funds differed considerably in terms of size, benefits provided, and financial 
stability, and in the absence of effective state regulation, the system had become a 
complex labyrinth of contracting and subcontracting. Yet, because the system generated a 
significant revenue stream for many unions (Torres 2004; Murillo 2001), labor union 
opposition to change was expected to be fierce (Pribble 2010). Specialists argued, 
however, that the solution for improving care while eliminating deficits entailed taking 
                                                 
101 This was one of a number of “second stage” reforms, which placed greater emphasis on improving 
social conditions and strengthening institutions (Naím 1994).   
102 See, for instance, AGN report on corruption and the fiscal crisis in PAMI (1994). Moreover, two of 
PAMI’s previous directors, Miguel Nazur and Matilde Menéndez, had been charged with corruption.  
103 Author interview Hernán Charosky, Chief Analyst (health sector), Anticorruption Office (2000-2005); 
Executive Director, Poder Ciudadadano, Argentine Chapter of Transparency International (2010-2012), 
October 3, 2012. 
104 On the long history of obras sociales see McGuire (2010, 131-143) and Belmartino (2005). 
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on the unions and changing the regulations to increase competition among obras 
sociales,105 on one hand, and between private insurance providers, on the other.106  
The mid-1990s seemed a propitious opportunity to attempt such a feat.  It was 
becoming obvious that if nothing was done, the large operating deficits and growing 
arrears of obras sociales and PAMI would endanger economic stability (World Bank 
1996, 7). Moreover, Menem was a proven reform “champion,” as he had demonstrated to 
IFIs with his fiscal reforms and execution of a complex and politically challenging 
transformation of infrastructure; and thus, pushing ahead with the formidable task of 
overhauling health sector would take advantage of Menem and his team’s reform 
acumen. Furthermore, tackling the deteriorating health services held promise for 
addressing concerns among the electorate about the poor quality of healthcare.  For all of 
these reasons, the powering approach—using political will to drive through a clear 
reform project in a moment of crisis—seemed promising.  
Indeed, most viewed the crucial challenge as one of imposing changes against the 
opposition of potent unions and political forces that benefitted from the status quo, not 
one of reform design (cf. Pribble 2010).107 Crafting complex reforms was left to World 
Bank experts. World Bank personnel along with the Menem government undertook a 
sectoral analysis in the second half of the 1990s which resulted in clear milestones for 
“revolutionary and irreversible changes in the mandatory health insurance system” 
(World Bank 1997; 1999). Together, the milestones focused on increasing competition by 
allowing beneficiaries of obras sociales and PAMI to select membership with other 
                                                 
105 PAMI was considered to be one of the obras sociales. So the idea was to increase competition between 
all obras, including the health insurance fund for pensioners.   
106 Author interview with Dr. Mariana Chudnovsky, Professor, Universidad de San Andrés, October 25, 
2012. 
107 Author interview with José Priegue, Coordinator, International Finance Unit (2002-2007, 2009-
Present), Ministry of Health, November 29, 2012. 
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health insurance providers, either another obra social or a private one, and to transfer 
their membership and financial contributions to it.108 World Bank personnel brought 
extensive expertise to bear on developing and assisting with implementation of health 
reform after their efforts in the region in the early 1990s and earlier work in the Argentine 
health sector (World Bank 2002, 3). The Bank also provided financing for the ambitious 
mission, with loans totaling over US$350 million (World Bank 2002, 4).109
 
  
In order to execute swiftly the new measures, the highest levels of government—
the President and Ministers of Labor and Health, and perhaps most importantly the 
powerful Minister of the Economy, Cavallo—along with the World Bank adopted a tight 
alliance and a unified position on the reform strategy (World Bank 2002).
 
 To by-pass 
potential obstacles in Congress that would delay and dilute the plan, the Menem 
administration, with the support of the World Bank, approved initiatives as decrees 
(Montoya and Colina 1998).110 In PAMI, Menem appointed an interventor-normalizador, 
Alejandro Bramer Markovic, to intervene in the institute in order to carry out changes 
with the World Bank team, and then to “normalize” management by handing control back 
over to an elected board, restoring its autonomy.111 Markovic and the heads of the 
Ministry of Health and regulatory agencies brought in a new cadre of Argentine 
managers, lawyers, and technical specialists to build the capacity of the health sector in 
order to implement changes (World Bank 2002, 3). Finally, private firms were 
subcontracted to address the especially complex tasks of designing a new organizational 
                                                 
108 On reform plans see World Bank (1996; 1997). 
109 On the extensive role of the International Financial Institutions in the reform process of the 1990s see 
Teichman (2004). A separate loan of US$25 million funded technical experts to assist in the execution of 
the changes (World Bank 2002, 4). 
110 Decrees 292 and 492 of 1995. See also MS 492/95 and MS 247/96. 
111 Markovic seemed an ideal choice; as executive director of the National Social Security Administration, 
he had uncovered many of the problems in PAMI, and he was hailed for this health credentials and his 
close personal connection to the president (La Nación, August 1, 1996). 
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structure for PAMI and carrying out financial analysis of individual obras sociales.  
Together, these efforts concentrated power in a reform team of outsiders, with little 
experience in the health agencies.  
That the team was not beholden to the status quo was crucial for pushing changes 
past the strong resistance of the unions. By using a policy of “divide and rule” and 
providing fiscal rewards to obras that signed on early and performed well, the health 
team eroded union opposition (World Bank 2002, 3).  Many unions took advantage of the 
changes as a means of attracting members from rivals, and because unions were engaged 
in more than one battle with the administration at once, reform teams could leverage 
reform threats in one area for concessions in another (Acuña and Tuozzo 2000).112  
Many aspects of the project initially appeared quite successful.  Competition was 
opened up among obras sociales and between obras and PAMI. By 1999, nearly 300,000 
workers had switched funds (World Bank 1999, iii). For the first time, even the poorest 
funds offered a basic package of services (approximately $40 per member per month).113
 
 
Moreover, many of the obras sociales had been restructured to improve financial 
indicators, increase internal efficiency, and develop adequate systems to comply with 
new regulations (World Bank 1999, iii). The Fondo Solidario de Redistribución (FSR, 
solidarity redistribution fund), was redesigned so that if an obra was unable to meet such 
commitments, the obra social would receive resources from the fund. A unified 
regulatory agency, the Superintendencia de Servicios de Salud (SSS), was established. 
Finally, PAMI officials had restructured internal controls and regulation, cut staff, 
                                                 
112 Author interview with Dr. Mariana Chudnovsky, Professor, Universidad de San Andrés, October 25, 
2012. 
113 In 1994 average revenue per beneficiary varied from US$5 to US$80 (Lloyd-Sherlock 2006, 357). 
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eliminated PAMI’s debt, and restructured the contracting system (Lloyd Sherlock 2006, 
360).  
As was noted at the beginning of the section, the IADB described Argentina’s 
health sector reform as the greatest transformation of the health care system in Latin 
America in the 1990s (IADB 1998; World Bank 1998, iii). A few years later, however, 
analysts declared: “overall, the reforms of the 1990s did almost nothing to improve the 
performance of the SHI [social health insurance] sector; indeed, in many ways they made 
matters worse” (Lloyd-Sherlock 2006, 359).  Why did such an initially promising reform 
effort result in such disappointing outcomes? 
Comprehensive Plans Generate New Performance Problems 
Crafting a coherent and perfectly calibrated plan in one shot is a monumental task, 
requiring extensive computing capacity to evaluate complex problems, to seek out 
alternative solutions, and to calculate advantages and disadvantages.  Yet, if any country 
were to surmount these challenges, it should have been Argentina. The World Bank 
brought some of the world’s top experts on health reform and poured millions into the 
sectoral analysis and design of the program.  Thus, after key changes were implemented, 
many expected success. 
Reform assumptions, however, did not hold in Argentina and resulted in 
unintended consequences.  As a scholar of health reforms stated, “It was assumed that a 
‘rational and responsible’ private insurance sector would seek to compete against the 
obras sociales [and]  that new public management would revolutionize hospitals” (Lloyd-
Sherlock 2005, 1899). Such expectations were not born out.  Econometric models used to 
justify cutting contributions were based upon continued growth. This did not hold in 
1998-1999 and it meant that PAMI had even larger deficits than it had prior to the 
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reforms; the situation only became increasingly dire during the 2001 economic crash.  
The reforms generated a number of other unforeseen consequences: Analysts did not 
anticipate that some obras sociales would go along with the changes, but that they would 
be the obras that were in the best position to gain members from rivals, and the 
appearance of “Gerenciadoras de Salud,”or health management agencies, was “not 
imagined at the time of initial design of the legal framework,” yet these agencies ended 
up running the plans for obras (World Bank 2002, 6).114 The result was that well off 
migrated to private insurers (pre-pagas). While the initial objective of the health overhaul 
was to reduce inequality and fragmentation of the health system by increasing 
competition and transparency, the reforms exacerbated inequality and increased 
fragmentation (Pribble 2010). 
By 2002, one of the key achievements in the 1990s reform—the limited 
allowance for movement between obras—became one of the most important problems.  
The growing number of affiliates, which included mostly high income earners, were 
changing funds but going to richer obras which had contracts with private insurers.115 In 
May 2002, there were 21,000 transfers to richer obras, which forced 38 of the poorer 
funds into semi-bankruptcy (Maceira 2009).  The crucial components of the reform that 
were meant to ameliorate the problems  that plagued the Argentine health sector were the 
very same components that by 2003 generated new performance problems.   
Many scholars of the 1990s health reform argue that the reform did not go far 
enough and that the real problem was the resistance of the labor unions to the changes 
                                                 
114 While the crucial role of the World Bank in the planning may have contributed to the adoption of faulty 
assumptions, the complexity of the changes attempted meant that even health experts who had spent years 
in the Ministry of Health did not foresee the appearance of gerenciadoras.  
115 Author interview Hernán Charosky, Chief Analyst, Anticorruption Office (2000-2005); Executive 
Director, Poder Ciudadano, Argentine Chapter of Transparency International (2010-2012), October 3, 
2012. 
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(Pribble 2010; Niedzwiecki 2014).  Indeed, union resistance posed serious challenges to 
implementation of the project plan.  However, the main features of the intended reform 
were put in place—competition was opened up among the obras sociales and between 
PAMI and the obras, such changes were expected to propel other necessary steps.  Given 
the faulty core assumptions highlighted above, it is questionable whether reforms would 
have had the intended effect even if all changes had been implemented.  Moreover, some 
of the areas in which the most drastic changes occurred and the intended changes were 
put in place faced some of the greatest challenges in terms of reform consolidation.116  
The paradox of powering can be seen especially in terms of personnel.  For 
instance, PAMI Director Markovic, following the direction of the World Bank proposal, 
sought to institute professional management. Four days after his appointment as 
intervener in PAMI, he fired over 50 individuals who sat in many of the most important 
positions, justifying the measure by declaring that it would allow “qualified personnel” 
selected based on clean, transparent and public proceedings to change the profile of 
PAMI.117 Other PAMI employees were offered very attractive voluntary retirement 
packages, cutting the PAMI workforce by 30 percent.118 These eliminatory changes 
entailed steep costs: the PAMI employees that accepted the terms of retirement tended to 
be the ones with promising employment prospects outside of PAMI—in general, the most 
capable employees, precisely the employees who were least likely to be taking bribes or 
cutting lucrative self-enriching deals.119  After reform teams and consultants left PAMI, 
                                                 
116 Author interview with Ana Paula Herrera Viana, Coordinator, Procurement Operations Unit, Ministry 
of Health (2002-present), November 2, 2012.  For lasting repercussions, see section Powering Halted, 
Gradual Advancements. 
117 Clarín, August 4, 1996. 
118 La Nación, March 26, 1997. 
119 Author interview with Mercedes Iacoviello, former Administrador Gubernamental, public sector human 
resource management consultant IADB, November 23, 2012. 
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the institute had less agency capacity than it did at the start.120 This, in addition to the 
failures of comprehensive planning, made sustaining reform efforts especially difficult.  
The effects of the powering paradox were all the more damaging because the 
radical changes occurred under normal conditions and hence blame could not be 
attributed to circumstances outside of the government’s control. By the late 1990s, the 
hyperinflation crisis had long passed. Had resistance to the plan been weakened by a 
serious crisis, perhaps the changes would not have been as deleterious for institutional 
development, but as it was, the appointment of interveners in PAMI, use of decree power, 
and the assorted ways in which Menem and his administration—often with the blessing 
of the World Bank and those in favor of the reform—sought to bend or break institutional 
constraints, meant that it was only too easy for the next administration to justify the same 
measures.  
Health sector reform in the 1990s fell far short of advancing “revolutionary and 
irreversible changes.” Despite the extraordinary time, expertise, and resources poured 
into comprehensive planning, the core assumptions of the ambitious reform program 
turned out to be faulty.  In planning for “big bang” change, modest efforts to improve the 
situation were overlooked, which meant that many initially minor issues were ignored 
until they became such acute problems that another radical reform was necessary. The 
obvious performance problems (e.g., by 2000 the arrears of PAMI alone were estimated 
to range from US$1.8 billion to $4 billion121) in precisely the agencies the comprehensive 
plan had sought to reform only contributed to the 2001 fiscal catastrophe in Argentina.     
                                                 
120 Author interview Hernán Charosky, Chief Analyst, Anticorruption Office (2000-2005); Executive 
Director, Poder Ciudadano, Argentine Chapter of Transparency International (2010-2012), October 3, 
2012. 
121 Figures depend on interpretations of contractual obligations at the time (see below). 
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The next section turns to another powering reform in PAMI in the 2000s and 
highlights another aspect of the problems of powering: the credibility problem.  
THE CREDIBILITY PROBLEM: INITIALLY IMPRESSIVE, YET UNSUSTAINABLE, PAMI 
REFORMS (2003-2007)    
When Néstor Kirchner assumed the presidency in 2003, corruption and fiscal 
crisis plagued PAMI.  The Institute’s previous directors had been charged with numerous 
counts of malfeasance, yet corruption schemes remained in place: the lion’s share of 
PAMI’s budget was going to approximately sixty-three politically connected contracting 
middlemen, who reaped billions of pesos annually in PAMI outlays but often failed to 
provide the elderly with services.122  By 2000 PAMI’s fiscal problems were exacerbated 
by the extraordinary economic crisis of 2001 that resulted in deficits at 75 percent of 
PAMI’s previous annual budget.123  In 2004, after a new spate of corruption scandals and 
an incriminating report by the National Audit Body (AGN), President Kirchner appointed 
an interventor to head PAMI, thereby sidestepping the legal procedures that demand a 
board with participation of the affiliate representatives.124 
Kirchner threw his full support behind comprehensive PAMI reform.  His choice 
of intervener indicated his commitment to transforming the agency: Graciela Ocaña, a 
representative from the Lower House of Congress, was well known for her unrelenting 
commitment to investigating money laundering and corruption. And Kirchner assured 
her, according to this author’s interview with Ocaña, of his full backing to root out 
corruption in PAMI.125 
                                                 
122 Author interview with Santiago Nardelli, former Executive Coordinator of PAMI (2004-2007), October 
17, 2012. 
123 Estimates vary widely (cf. Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006; Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2004). 
124 La Nación, June 22, 2003. 
125 Author interview with Graciela Ocaña, Director of PAMI (2004-2007), October 26, 2012. 
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Designing reforms to replace the dysfunctional institutional arrangements was a 
substantial task.  Prior to her position at PAMI, Ocaña was an elected official with little 
experience working in the Argentine federal administration.  Likewise, most of the tight-
knit team Ocaña brought with her had little to no experience in PAMI or the federal 
bureaucracies.  That is not to say that the team lacked expertise entirely; Anti-Corruption 
Office and AGN personnel were crucial for developing and implementing the reform 
strategy.126 Yet, the reformers were political technocrats in the sense that their 
appointments were sustained by political will that supported Ocaña.   
Instead of a gradual approach that built on their predecessors’ efforts to improve 
the institute, the new strategy involved a fundamental restructuring of PAMI.  Focused on 
disarming the corruption circles, Ocaña used her interventor power to rewrite PAMI’s 
contracting laws, which would eliminate the intermediary system, take contracts out of 
the hands of the powerful sixty-three middlemen, and contract directly with clinics and 
doctors (cf. Charosky 2009). Within the first months, the Ocaña team began rapidly 
implementing the changes—rewriting contracting laws, rationalizing staffing, and 
developing training. Rather than sequencing reforms over time, the Ocaña team 
implemented the plan on a number of fronts rapidly and simultaneously. She appointed 
her team of close collaborators to key positions, and often working around the clock, this 
team assumed central control over personnel, contracting, and finances.127  
Resistance came from all sides—the unions, the Ministry of Health, 
pharmaceutical companies, PAMI employees, and especially the insidious “Mafia of 
                                                 
126 Author interviews with Leandro Despouy, president of Auditoria General de la Nación (2002-present), 
November 19, 2012; Nicolas Raigorodsky, former Director of Transparency Policies, Anti-Corruption 
Office (2002-2007), November 13, 2012.   
127 Author interview with Santiago Nardelli, Executive Coordinator of PAMI (2004-2007), October 17, 
2012. 
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Medicines” (Charosky 2009).128 Implementing the new contracting system also involved 
the Herculean task of pushing reforms past the opposition of contracting intermediaries 
who had benefitted from skimming money off contracts. Despite resistance, President 
Kirchner’s support of Ocaña held firm. Moreover, because Ocaña had concentrated 
control over the Institute in her hand-picked team, there was little that the opposition 
within PAMI could do to halt the new policies. 
Within three short years during Kirchner’s term, the Ocaña team radically 
reconfigured PAMI: They completely restructured the contracting system; created an 
auditing body that specialized in PAMI contracting and appointed a well-respected 
federal prosecutor, Carlos Stornelli, to lead the audit body; published contracting 
information online; reduced personnel by 10 percent;129 set up training systems; and 
reduced deficits.130 The changes were seemingly successful in achieving the initial two 
goals: the status quo had been destroyed and a new approach instituted. PAMI was no 
longer in the headlines for corruption scandals; instead Ocaña’s efforts were lauded for 
taking control of PAMI and pushing through much-needed reform. As the next section 
will show, however, the glowing evaluations and effects of these bold reforms were 
short-lived.  
Episodic Political Will, Short-lived PAMI Reforms (2007-2014) 
In 2007, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was elected president and appointed 
Luciano Di Cesare to replace Ocaña as PAMI interventor.  One might have expected 
continuity between Néstor Kirchner and his wife; however, after a row with the 
agricultural sector, Fernández approval ratings plummeted and she began to shift power 
                                                 
128 Author interviews with Graciela Ocaña, former Director of PAMI (2004-2007), October 26, 2012; 
Nardelli. 
129 Reductions were result of retirements and dismissals for just cause. Author interview with Nardelli. 
130 Author interview with Leandro Despouy. 
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to a new group within the Peronist party, La Cámpora, a student movement led by her son 
Máximo.131   
This political shift revealed the fragility of Ocaña’s powering reform.  Di Cesare, 
a close Kirchner ally, placed his own team members in all of the key positions Ocaña’s 
people had occupied and set about unraveling, or reversing entirely, many of her reforms.  
Whereas Ocaña had purchased all PAMI ambulances to reduce corruption in ambulance 
service contracts, Di Cesare reprivatized the services.  Whereas Ocaña had reduced 
PAMI staff, Di Cesare filled PAMI ranks with new employees linked to La Cámpora; 
from 2007 to 2012, PAMI expanded from 10,800 to 16,000 employees.132 Whereas 
Ocaña had sought to make the new audit body independent; De Cesare replaced the well-
respected Stornelli.133 Finally, after Ocaña had placed PAMI on sound fiscal footing, 
under Di Cesare PAMI’s resources became an important campaign finance source.134  
Despite Ocaña’s efforts, by 2012 PAMI was again making headlines for corruption.135   
Where were the new vested interests in PAMI that powering theorists assumed 
would defend Ocaña’s policies?  Radical reforms had created new powerful opponents 
                                                 
131 Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s problems with the agricultural sector began in March 2008, shortly 
after assuming office in December 2007.  In the midst of a commodity boom, the Fernández government 
changed agricultural export taxes from a fixed rate to a one that fluctuates based on the international price 
of commodities that effectively increased export taxes on soybeans by over 35 percent at the time of 
announcement (Bloomberg, March 9, 2009). Farmers and land owner launched an unprecedented 
mobilization that included highway blockades throughout the country and massive public demonstrations 
(Volosin 2013, 19). The conflict dragged on for months, but in April the government organized pro-
government demonstrations that were attended by thousands of protestors, many of whom belonged to a 
youth organization supporting the Kirchners, La Cámpora. After the death of Néstor Kirchner the La 
Cámpora movement became even more influential, with very young ministers replacing the close-knit 
advisors Néstor had brought into the government from Santa Cruz.   
132 Author interview with Ocaña. 
133 Author interview with Gastón Blanchetiere, Subsecretariate of Cooridination, Ministry of Health (2007-
2009); Manager of Legal Affairs, PAMI (2006-2007), October 17, 2012. 
134 El Día, December 3, 2012.   
135 In particular, in many areas reformed by Ocaña such as ambulance services contracts and the provision 
of hearing-aids (El Clarín, December 2, 2012; Author interview with Ezequiel Nino, Codirector of the 
Civil Association for Equality and Justice, October 10, 2012.) 
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but left few reform defenders. During the Ocaña years, political will and the power of 
Ocaña’s political technocrats were enough to forestall reversal; when she and her team 
left, the will to stick to the new procedures left with them.  Career administrators did not 
defend the reforms: while most nominally maintained their stability during the Ocaña and 
Di Cesare turnovers, the decision-making authority of career administrators was eclipsed 
by political technocrats, the so-called “parallel” bureaucracy, under both Ocaña and Di 
Cesare.136 In other cases, they were offered “voluntary” severance packages, which the 
most capable—those with career prospects outside of the federal administration—often 
accepted. The remaining individuals within PAMI had little reason to believe that 
Ocaña’s changes would stick after she left, and therefore, no reason to come out and 
support them.137 In all of these ways, then, powering eliminated potential defenders 
within PAMI.   
The main beneficiaries of Ocaña’s policies were the pensioners who rely on 
PAMI for hearing-aids or ambulances, for example. Indeed, the reversal of reforms 
caught pensioners’ attention after the media revealed that newly privatized ambulance 
services called often failed to arrive.138 But at that point it was too late—another reform 
had already swept away Ocaña’s changes. Thus, this example demonstrates the paradox 
of powering, and in particular, the credibility issue: eliminating existing arrangements 
casts doubt on whether new rules will have staying power or whether the next powering 
reform will sweep them away. 
                                                 
136 The parallel bureaucracy is the cadre of appointed professionals with flexible and fixed-term contracts 
that form areas which are differentiated and not complementary to the regular administrative apparatus 
(Martínez Nogueira 2002).  
137 Author interview with PAMI official, October 15, 2012. 
138 El Clarín, December 2, 2012. 
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Initial versions of the powering thesis would argue that powering—in this case, 
overstepping institutional rules, placing someone atop of PAMI to sweep out corruption 
and transform the institution—was only possible during crisis situations. Yet, the reliance 
on political will, instead of crisis, often occurs under normal conditions. This sets up a 
dynamic: the more typical the circumstances under which powering is used, the more 
likely it is that the reforms forced through are susceptible to being overturned during a 
subsequent administration. Menem carried out a sweeping reform of PAMI in the mid-
1990s, and then Kirchner did the same. Kirchner did not “intervene” in PAMI because of 
crisis; every president has intervened in PAMI (Scherlis 2013, 70). Political 
constellations change, political will falters. Regardless of why such shifts occur, they 
reveal that powering reforms are not self-enforcing.   
POWERING HALTED, GRADUAL ADVANCEMENTS IN THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH  
Political Support Wanes, Powering Fails 
This section demonstrates how Ocaña’s attempt to use the same powering 
approach failed in the Ministry of Health because of the absence of high-level political 
support. The section then illustrates the broader effects of her attempt on institutional 
capacity of the Ministry. 
In 2007, Ocaña’s powering crusade shifted its focus from PAMI to the broader 
health sector when President Fernández de Kirchner appointed Ocaña to be Minister of 
Health.139 Using the same approach and strategies used in PAMI, Ocaña began to drive 
changes through the Health Ministry, dismissing employees and replacing them with 
members of her team, which she brought with her from PAMI: Gastón Blanchetiere, 
former Manager of Legal Affairs at PAMI, was placed as head of national contracting, 
                                                 
139 Author interview with Ocaña.  
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Nicolás Raigorodosky, the former head of transparency policies who had assisted Ocaña 
in designing the PAMI reforms, was placed as head of international contracting, and so 
on.140  In the words of Blanchetiere, “We refused to be incrementalists … it was all or 
nothing. We would either work with complete political backing or we would leave.”141  
The team suspected that the Superintendencia de Servicios de Salud (Superintendence of 
Health Services, SSS), which is responsible for monitoring the over 300 obras sociales, 
and Administración de Programas Especiales (Administration of Special Programs, 
APE), which provides certain high-cost services and medicines (e.g., organ transplants 
HIV-AIDS medication)—were involved in siphoning funds out of the health sector.142  In 
order to combat the corruption, the team sought to create a centralized database of health 
procurement information and to increase information regarding SSS and APE funds.143 
Efforts to do so, however, were quickly stymied. The reform team had faced 
fierce opposition in the past—the pharmaceutical companies, unions, PAMI employees, 
medical associations. This was different. Instead of receiving firm and unyielding 
presidential support as they had under Néstor Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
failed to back Ocaña as she took on the obras sociales and the unions that managed 
them.144 Without strong support from the top, Ocaña’s powering strategy was 
                                                 
140 Author interview with Ana Paula Herrera Viana, Coordinator, Procurement Operations Unit, Ministry 
of Health (2002-present), November 2, 2012.   
141 Author interview with Gastón Blanchetiere, Subsecretariate of Coordination, Ministry of Health (2007-
2009); Manager of Legal Affairs, PAMI (2006-2007), October 29, 2012. 
142 For instance, they suspected fraud in the SSS to the tune of 70 million and in the APE they uncovered a 
number of ghost companies where siphoning money to relatives of those who signed the contracts.  Author 
interviews with Hernán Charosky, Chief Analyst, Anticorruption Office (2000-2005); Executive Director, 
Poder Ciudadadano, Argentine Chapter of Transparency International (2010-2012), October 3, 2012; 
Nardelli.  
143 Author interview with Nicolás Raigorodsky, former Director of Transparency Policies, Anti-Corruption 
Office (2002-2007); Coordinador General, Unidad de Financiamiento Internacional de Salud (UFI-S), 
Ministry of Health (2007-2009), July 14, 2010.   
144 Author interview with Gastón Blanchetiere, Subsecretariate of Coordination, Ministry of Health (2007-
2009); Manager of Legal Affairs, PAMI (2006-2007), October 29, 2012; Raigorodosky.  
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inoperable.145 Two years after she had assumed the position, frustrated by the lack of 
political support, she resigned.  
Absence of Powering, Opportunities for Problem-solving 
From the perspective of Ocaña, her team, and many health experts who wanted 
the president to take on the powerful unions, the lackluster support from Fernández was 
disappointing; yet, an analysis of some of the most successful programs in subsequent 
years shows how Ocaña’s failure to upend the health sector allowed for gradual 
improvements in some areas to accumulate over time. Ministry of Health officials and 
civil servants, in addition to academics and health experts, suggest that despite Ocaña’s 
best intentions, she had thrown out a number of good apples, employees with extensive 
expertise and experience, along with the bad apples, employees involved in corrupt 
schemes.146 Both interviews with individuals at the national office of employment 
(INAP) and with civil servants corroborate the fact that Ocaña interfered to a much 
greater extent than her predecessor, Minister Ginés González García, with the civil 
servants’ positions.147   
However, after Ocaña’s departure, her replacement, Juan Luis Manzur, 
reappointed a number of individuals with extensive experience that Ocaña had sacked, 
undoing some of the most deleterious effects of Ocaña’s powering attempt.148 This 
relative continuity of personnel has been crucial for the success of health programs, such 
as Remediar and Plan Nacer. For those living below the poverty line and the uninsured, 
                                                 
145 Author interview with Graciela Ocaña, Minister of Health (2007-2009), Director of PAMI (2004-2007), 
October 26, 2012. 
146 Author interviews with Paola Bergallo, Law Professor, Universidad de Palermo, Former consultant to 
the Ministry of Health, October 16, 2012; Herrera Viana; Preigue.  
147 In the words of one interviewee, “Ella [Ocaña] tocó mas la línea.”  Author interviews with anonymous 
employees of the Ministry of Health; Ana Paula Herrera Viana, Coordinator, Procurement Operations Unit, 
Ministry of Health (2002-present), November 2, 2012.   
148 La Nación, August 6, 2009. 
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Remediar provides free access to a group of essential prescription drugs (Tobar 2004, 15) 
and Plan Nacer provides insurance for maternal and child health care (Gertler, 
Giovagnoli, and Martínez 2014, 1). These social emergency programs, started in 2002 
with World Bank financing, made use of existing systems and personnel and applied 
lessons learned from reform attempts in the 1990s in order to advance experimental and 
targeted programs that have expanded over time.149 They are widely recognized as 
successful examples of health service provision and results-based financing programs 
(McGuire 2010, 143; Gertler, Giovagnoli, and Martínez 2014).150  
Individuals such as José Priegue, head of the International Finance Unit at the 
Ministry of Health, played a central role in the continued development and expansion of 
these programs over time.  Ocaña had sacked Priegue along with a number of other 
individuals crucial for the continued success of such programs. If she had been successful 
in her overhaul of the Ministry of Health, it is unlikely that Plan Nacer and Remediar 
would have continued to receive the same support and to expand.  However, when she 
left, Manzur reappointed many of these individuals. Indeed, many attribute the 
achievements of these key programs to the relative continuity of personnel.  For instance, 
the Center for Global Development, a Washington D.C.-based think tank, hosted an event 
in 2013 that featured the successes of Plan Nacer, at which time Keith Hansen, Vice 
President of Global Practices at the World Bank, noted that since 2002 the same core 
group of 20-30 individuals from the Ministry of Health, officials from the provinces, and 
the World Bank had been working together, and that the “sheer accumulated tacit 
knowledge developed through continuous improvements” was responsible for their 
                                                 
149 Author interview with Priegue.  
150 Author interviews with Dr. Mariana Chudnovsky, Professor, Universidad de San Andrés, October 25, 
2012; Paula Ferro, Coordinator, Remediar and Programa Nacional de Salud Sexual y Procreación 
Responsable, Ministry of Health (2008-2012), November 16, 2012; Ezequiel Nino, Codirector of the Civil 
Association for Equality and Justice, October 10, 2012. 
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success.151 This would not have been possible had powering been successful.  Thus, some 
of the most important advances have been in areas that had not been subjected to 
powering reforms and that have benefited from continuity of personnel.  
Enduring Effects of Powering  
While capacity has flourished in some areas, and in particular the areas in which 
there is international involvement, the deleterious effects of powering in 1990s are ever-
present in other areas of the ministry of health.  Menem’s health reforms had dramatically 
reduced the workforce in the Ministry of Health in general, but bolstered capacity in 
particular areas that interacted with International Financial Institutions.152  Disparities 
have only widened over time and are evident in the differences between the units 
responsible for contracting: the domestic contracting office has seven employees (three 
technicians, two secretaries, and one director, of whom, four are civil servants, three have 
university degrees, and none have specialized training); by contrast, the international 
department has well over 100 employees, many with specialized training and degrees 
from elite universities.153 Interviews with Ministry of Health officials, pharmaceutical 
employees, and AGN auditors suggest that no detail is overlooked in the international 
office and standards of transparency are high;154 for the domestic office, however, it is 
                                                 
151 Keynote address by Keith Hansen, World Bank at the Center for Global Development, September 18, 
2013. 
152 Author interviews with Herrera Viana; Nicolás Raigorodsky, former Director of Transparency Policies, 
Anti-Corruption Office (2002-2007); Coordinador General, Unidad de Financiamiento Internacional de 
Salud (UFI-S), Ministry of Health (2007-2009), August 29, 2012.; Hernán Charosky, Chief Analyst, 
Anticorruption Office (2000-2005), Executive Director, Poder Ciudadadano, Argentine Chapter of 
Transparency International (2010-2012), October 3, 2012.  
153 Author interviews with José Priegue, Coordinator, International Finance Unit (2002-2007, 2009-
Present), Ministry of Health, November 29, 2012;  Gastón Blanchetiere, Subsecretariate of Cooridination, 
Ministry of Health (2007-2009); Manager of Legal Affairs, PAMI (2006-2007), October 17, 2012. 
154 For instance, see the Procurement Plan Execution System (SEPA Argentina), which provides access to 
data on all contracts for works, goods, and services that implement projects funded by the World Bank in 
Argentina: http://www.iniciativasepa.org/bm/sitio/argentina/index_ing.htm. 
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simply not possible to ensure that procurement rules are adequately followed given the 
office’s limited training and the volume of contracts they process.  The domestic office 
tends to rely on procurement “short-cuts,” use of “revolving funds” (fondos rotatorios), 
and reliance on “emergency contracting” to by-pass procurement and accounting rules.155  
A number of agreements with the Pan American Health Organization and the World 
Health Organization provide means of procuring goods and services without going 
through the domestic contracting system.156 Thus, two parallel systems have developed—
one that relies on exceptional capacity and transparency, the other, opaque and without 
the resources to follow adequately contracting standards.  
The changes in the 1990s had long-lasting effects on the structure of employment 
in the Ministry of Health in general. Interviewees highlight the instability of many 
positions in the Ministry of Health: numerous ministerial employees have multiple jobs to 
supplement their meager hours and income. Many units frequently experience complete 
turnover of personnel with shifts in political constellations. Interviewees argue that it 
does not necessarily matter whether you will be fired; it is about whether you think you 
will be.  Such instability makes public employment unattractive and limits the perceived 
time-horizons of those in the public sector.157 Greater continuity of public employees in 
                                                 
155 A revolving fund is a pot of money that is used to pay for goods and services after the fact, but it 
violates the important accounting standard of reserving money (budget check) for a purchase before the 
contract is signed.  These funds are important to maintain for cases of true emergency.  Therefore, the 
health sector in particular frequently uses revolving funds for important purchases. However, VERY often 
in Argentina these funds are abused by organizations that do not plan ahead and realize that, for example a 
security contract is running out and they extend the contract (without going through the appropriate 
channels).   
Author interview with Ana Paula Herrera Viana, Coordinator, Procurement Operations Unit, Ministry of 
Health (2002-present), November 2, 2012.   
156 Author interview with Nicolás Raigorodsky, former Director of Transparency Policies, Anti-Corruption 
Office (2002-2007); Coordinador General, Unidad de Financiamiento Internacional de Salud (UFI-S), 
Ministry of Health (2007-2009), August 29, 2012.   
157 Author interview with Paola Bergallo, Law Professor, Universidad de Palermo, Former consultant to 
the Ministry of Health, October 16, 2012.   
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some areas and external linkages provided more favorable conditions for institutional 
development, but such processes are uneven and underscore the challenges to building 
capacity after it has been wiped out by powering.  
In conclusion, this section analyzed Ocaña’s failed powering attempt in the 
Ministry of Health, demonstrating how it threatened to disrupt two of the most successful 
programs, which were the result of problem-solving efforts. Finally, it briefly 
underscored the enduring deleterious effects of the reforms of the 1990s, highlighting the 
challenges of building capacity in the areas hit hardest by powering reforms.  
ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE CASES  
Based on an analysis of a number of powering reforms in Argentina over twenty-
five years, one can conclude that radical overhauls of the state in both transportation and 
health resulted in disappointing outcomes.  A dramatic restructuring of transportation 
produced unintended negative consequences and weak institutions that gave way to a 
period of significant decline, ultimately prompting a fresh powering attempt. In health, 
powering attempts also generated unexpected outcomes, and the deepest-cutting reform, 
PAMI under Kirchner, yielded initially promising, but ultimately disappointing, results as 
advancements were abandoned or reversed soon after reformers left PAMI. In a variety of 
ways, then, the cases illustrated the problems with powering and documented the failure 
of swift, comprehensive reforms.  
What can be learned from the comparison between health and transportation? The 
overhaul of transportation in the 1990s was far more radical than that of the health sector, 
and its effects, far more deleterious for institutional development.  There are two reasons 
for this inverse relationship between depth and speed, on one hand, and reform success, 
on the other.  
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First, swifter and deeper changes imply more challenges for reform designers. 
Consider transport reforms under Menem that were crafted to be swift, comprehensive, 
and implemented during the “window of opportunity” provided by the economic crisis.  
Each of the reform characteristics—speed, scope, and timing—made efforts at 
comprehensive planning nearly impossible. Time pressures left little opportunity for 
carefully evaluating advantages and disadvantages. The sheer complexity of crafting a 
radical overhaul made proactively seeking out alternatives and evenhandedly assessing 
costs and benefits an impossible task.  Moreover, instituting changes in the midst of an 
economic crisis only heightened ambiguity and uncertainty for reform designers.  For all 
these reasons, reform designers were forced to rely to a great extent on inferential short-
cuts instead of solid information and careful calculations.   
The designers of the health reforms also faced challenges to planning 
comprehensive changes, but reforms in the health sector were less radical. 
Implementation was swift, but not nearly as instantaneous as the transport reforms.  
Reformers claimed that the health system was in a state of crisis, but the level of crisis 
was nowhere near what it was earlier in the decade.  So while health reformers were also 
forced to rely on cognitive short-cuts, which resulted in unintended consequences, the 
slower more limited reforms allowed experts to make estimates that were closer to the 
mark than the wild guesses used to design transportation reforms.  It is unsurprising, then, 
that the problems in the health sector were far less dire than those in transport.   
Case comparisons, especially PAMI under Néstor Kirchner, highlight the link 
between speed/depth and another factor important for comprehensive planning—the 
capabilities of the reformers. In almost every case of powering highlighted in the last two 
chapters, reform teams were made up of individuals appointed from outside—technocrats 
or those with the will or capacity to rapidly push through deep restructurings that, once 
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implemented, would undercut the status quo. Both Menem and Fernández relied on 
small, coherent teams to overhaul transportation. Such teams, as Chapter 2 suggested, 
lacked the type of contextual expertise important for understanding the effects of change 
in a new environment.158 By contrast, interviews suggest that the greater diversity of 
individuals involved in the health sector changes under Menem slowed the process, but 
this ultimately resulted in a more deliberative method for crafting changes and later 
provided opportunities to craft more gradual changes.  The importance of contextual 
experience in designing reforms is further underscored by Ocaña’s PAMI reforms under 
Kirchner. While Ocaña’s overhaul resulted in some unintended consequences, they were 
far less severe, far less dramatic than those in other sectors. This can be attributed in large 
part to the capabilities of the reformers; while Ocaña was an “outsider” to the 
bureaucracy, she brought with her to PAMI a group of AGN auditors, who had been 
responsible for monitoring the institute for a number of years.159  Ocaña’s reform plan 
had essentially been crafted over a much longer period of time by a cadre of experts who 
also had extensive experience with PAMI and with the federal administration.  Acting 
with less tightly bounded rationality, such experts with years of experience in the federal 
administration and with PAMI crafted changes that were much more successful than the 
transportation overhauls, designed at breakneck speed by outsiders.  
Second, the swifter and the deeper the reforms, the more damaging they tend to be 
for institutional capacity in the long run.  During Menem’s radical transformation of 
transport, government agencies and state-run companies were eliminated at a lightning 
pace as responsibility for roads and railways was transferred all at once to the private 
                                                 
158 Although not illustrated in the case examples, such tight-knit groups are also more prone to groupthink, 
which keeps dissenting views from being weighed and debated (Schafer and Crichlow 2013). 
159 Author interview with Despouy. 
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sector. The transformation was so draconian, so complete that it left few individuals in 
the state to follow up the changes with the long struggle to correct problems in the radical 
new models or to strengthen the capacity and autonomy of new institutions.  Once power 
was concentrated, it remained concentrated. This in turn limited the attention and 
experience of officials to craft solutions to the numerous and complex problems they 
faced.  By contrast, the health changes were significant, but did not completely overhaul 
the Ministry of Health.  Thus years later when attention shifted away from powering in 
health, there was a core of experts with lengthy experience that remained. The relative 
success of health programs, such as Remediar and Plan Nacer, was born out of the more 
stable conditions of the health sector. Greater continuity provided more favorable 
conditions for institutional learning.  Indeed, the health reforms that cut most deeply, for 
instance in PAMI under Néstor Kirchner, ultimately resulted in the most disappointing 
outcomes over time. This is in large part because changes pushed through by a small 
group of reformers during the Kirchner administration had little support among other 
PAMI employees, and powering reforms had weakened the civil service structure over 
time.  In this way, reform type significantly affects institutional capacity and bureaucratic 
quality, by further weakening the institutional controls and civil service protections that 
existed before the powering attempt.      
In sum, the swifter and more profound the changes, the less successful they tend 
to be in the medium to long run. This is precisely the opposite of what the powering 
thesis would predict. Instead, powering suggests reforms must be rapid and 
comprehensive to undercut the opposition and are preferably pushed through in moments 
of crisis. The cases analyzed in the last two chapters provided evidence against the 
powering thesis and demonstrated that the most draconian changes ultimately resulted in 
the most disappointing outcomes.  
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CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the Argentine health sector reveals the same pattern as the 
previous chapter on transportation. Over and over again new governments in Argentina 
have argued that the state is so dysfunctional that dramatic sweeping reform is necessary.  
Reformers come in with their technocratic teams to institute a new approach, replacing 
previous reform teams that leave once political will to sustain their efforts dries up.  This 
constant purging of decision makers and implementers often involves throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater—throwing out positive aspects of prior reforms and capable 
public servants who have institutional knowledge of previous attempts. Incremental 
reform is thwarted by grander transformations that usher in “modernization” and 
“flexibility.”  The memory of what has been tried, what worked, and what failed, is lost 
with each new attempt.  Years later, things are so bad that a dramatic reform becomes 
necessary once again. Over time such a vicious cycle erodes institutions and intensifies 
the need to do something radical to break the cycle.  
The present chapter reinforces the conclusions presented in Chapter 4 on 
transportation—powering fails for two primary reasons. The first concerns the 
extraordinary challenges it creates for comprehensive planning. Even though extensive 
resources and expertise were poured into comprehensive plans for the health reform of 
the 1990s, getting the institutions right in one shot proved a task too complex for planners 
and resulted in unintended negative consequences. The crucial components of the reform 
that were meant to ameliorate the problems that plagued the Argentine health sector were 
the very same components that by 2003 generated new performance problems.  Second, 
powering can fail because of the paradox of powering—eliminating the status quo 
hinders the probability of enduring, consolidated reforms. The powering thesis assumes 
that comprehensive changes generate benefits, and thus, a new set of beneficiaries, who 
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will make changes viable in the long term by opposing attempts to weaken, abandon, or 
reverse reforms. The problem, as the case of PAMI under Néstor Kirchner demonstrates, 
is that reforms do not automatically engender beneficiaries with the motivation and 
capacity to defend changes. In fact, the very process of powering makes such a situation 
unlikely. Relying on political will to impose draconian reforms breeds opposition, 
dismantles existing institutions, and disrupts bureaucratic continuity. Why, then, right 
after an entirely new policy framework is installed, would relevant actors believe it has 
staying power? The case of PAMI under the Kirchners demonstrated one aspect of the 
paradox, the credibility problem, by showing how wiping out existing arrangements cast 
doubt on whether new rules would have staying power or whether the next powering 
reform would sweep them away.  
Nuances in the health cases provided analytic leverage for highlighting causal 
factors in my theory of reform. The failed attempt at powering in the Ministry of Health 
under Fernández de Kirchner demonstrated the importance of political will for sustaining 
dramatic, sweeping reform.  Moreover, process tracing of that thwarted attempt also 
revealed how powering would have disrupted ultimately successful problem-solving; 
some of the most successful programs were borne out of areas of relative stability.  
Finally, the case of PAMI under Ocaña suggested that reform efforts designed by experts 
with long time horizons in the public sector resulted in fewer unintended consequences 
than those that relied on outsiders with little contextual experience in the Argentine 
federal administration.   
Finally, the comparison between the health and transportation sectors showed that 
swifter and more profound changes were less successful in the medium to long run. The 
overhaul of transportation in the 1990s was far more radical than that of the health sector, 
and its effects, far more deleterious for institutional development. Not only do swifter, 
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deeper changes imply more challenges for reform designers but also they tend to be 
crafted by outsiders with less experience in the federal administration. Moreover, 
dramatic reform tends to tear more deeply into the institutional fabric—undoing what 
controls and constraints existed before the attempt. Once power is concentrated, as the 
transport reforms demonstrated, it often remains concentrated—tightening bounds of 
rationality down the line. For all of these reasons, the most radical overhauls resulted in 
the most disappointing outcomes.  
The conclusions drawn from the comparison of health and transportation in 
Argentina also raised unanswered questions, however. Would similar reform attempts in 
a different context have been more successful? Would less ambitious attempts at change 
have resulted in more promising outcomes? What if transport reforms, for instance, had 
been slowed or sequenced over time? Under what conditions does a core of experts with 
longer time horizons develop? The following chapters focus on transportation and health 
in Brazil and analyze these questions.   
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Chapter 6 Transportation in Brazil: Powering Curtailed 
The return to democracy in Brazil has been followed by ambitious attempts to 
overhaul the state, which were, in many ways, similar to reform efforts in Argentina. The 
results of such attempts, however, differed significantly. Whereas Argentina was able to 
push through powering overhauls one after another, Brazil proved to be a sluggish 
reformer. Most radical transformations of the state were halted, and while some powering 
reforms did advance, they did so much more slowly than in Argentina or were completely 
transformed by incremental changes sequenced over time. Nevertheless, in the medium to 
long run, Brazil’s more gradual, problem-solving approach to reform has been more 
successful. What explains Brazil’s surprising success in so many areas and persistent 
challenges in others? Why has Brazil consistently been slow to adopt and implement 
reform? Yet, what accounts for the eventual advances in state building?   
This chapter answers these questions by demonstrating how political-
organizational context affects the adoption of the powering approach that was highlighted 
in Chapters 4 and 5. In Argentina, executives concentrated power in small, loyal, and 
coherent teams of technocrats in order to bring about sweeping changes. Coalitional 
presidentialism in Brazil, by inducing presidents to share executive power, has shaped 
decision making and information processing. Specifically, the prerogative to transform 
the public sector has been taken away from presidents and their tight-knit reform teams 
and placed instead in the hands of a broader group of coalition allies, subjecting reforms 
to the scrutiny of a diverse set of interests and experts. This has slowed the process 
considerably, but the ensuing negotiation, compromise, and revisions have induced top-
level decision makers to vet their proposals and make changes. As a result, radical and 
comprehensive reforms have rarely been executed as a coherent whole; instead, they are 
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often implemented piece by piece, which has allowed for a learning process to develop. 
The presence of coalitional allies has also resulted in presidents relying to a much greater 
extent on existing experts within the federal administration because Brazilian presidents 
are limited in the extent to which to they are able to make unilateral replacements of 
ministry staff with hand-picked loyalists. Experts’ institutional positions and extensive 
experience mean that these officials have had at their disposal much better information 
and greater capacity for processing it than high-level political leaders, who, as we saw in 
the case of Argentina, are forced to rely to a greater extent on cognitive shortcuts to craft 
and implement complex reforms. Therefore, in the Brazilian context, while individuals 
were still boundedly rational, their judgments were much closer to the mark because they 
relied on more solid information and had a greater capacity for processing it. For all of 
these reasons, reforms in Brazil have been less radical and proceeded more gradually, but 
with greater success. 
To substantiate and assess arguments developed in Part I, this chapter examines 
reforms in the transportation sector. It begins by demonstrating the failure of powering in 
Brazil on two levels. First, the example of President Fernando Collor’s impeachment 
following his attempt to impose swift, dramatic reforms—similar to Menem’s powering 
reforms in Argentina—shows how coalitional presidentialism reduces the extent to which 
powering is applied in Brazil. Second, the chapter illustrates how the rare cases of 
powering that do occur in Brazil generate unintended consequences, just as they did in 
Argentina. The next section documents how, during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
presidency, reform efforts were subjected to compromise, revision, and negotiation, and 
thus more limited changes advanced more slowly, but with greater success than those 
pushed through in Argentina. The following sections show that during the presidencies of 
Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, in the absence of dramatic overhauls, the transport 
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sector has undergone a slow but marked problem-solving transformation, illustrating how 
experts within the state have played a crucial role in advancing individually small, but 
cumulatively substantial changes. At the same time, the analysis of transport in Brazil 
underscores the deleterious and enduring effects of previous powering reforms; restoring 
capacity in agencies overhauled by Collor has been an arduous and slow process.  
COALITIONAL PRESIDENTIALISM IMPEDES FULL-SCALE POWERING IN TRANSPORT 
The development of Brazilian transport infrastructure during the 20
th
 century 
followed similar trends to those in Argentina, but with a greater focus on the expansion of 
the highway network. Early railroads, financed by private and, to a large extent, foreign 
investment, were far less well developed than Argentina’s by the time the network was 
fully nationalized in 1957 (Summerhill 1998).160 After nationalization, the rate of 
expansion slowed under the state-owned Federal Railroad Corporation (Rede Ferroviária 
Federal, RFFSA), as Brazilian executives began to prioritize the development of the 
paved highway network, which from 1945 to the 1980s expanded rapidly under the 
National Department of Roads and Highways (Departamento Nacional de Estradas de 
Rodagem, DNER). During this period, DNER, which was granted administrative and 
fiscal autonomy with the creation of the National Road Fund (Fundo Rodoviário 
Nacional, FRN), and the Transport Planning Agency (Grupo Executivo de Integração da 
Política de Transporte, GEIPOT) developed high levels of capacity and autonomy 
(World Bank 2003). 
                                                 
160 The states in Brazil were largely responsible for the development of the rail system through 
concessions, and in São Paulo by coffee-growers who financed their own railroads that resulted in 
integration at the regional rather than national level.  By 1929, the government owned 67 percent of the 
Brazilian railway companies and was responsible for administering 41 percent of the national network, but 
in 1957 Law 3,115 consolidated nationalization and created the Federal Railway Company (RFFSA) (De 
Castro 1999, 4).  A second railway enterprise was created in 1971 when five private rail companies were 
nationalized by the state of São Paulo to become FEPASA.  
 137 
During the 1980s, however, infrastructure investments dramatically declined for 
both the rail and highway systems as growth slowed and public spending contracted. 
Public investments in transport reached 3.3 percent of GNP in 1975 only to drop far 
below one percent in the 1980s (World Bank 1996, 7). As a result, the quality of the 
transport network deteriorated significantly.  
Collor’s Attempt to Unilaterally Impose Change Halted  
As in Argentina, the hyperinflationary crisis of the late 1980s provided a “window 
of opportunity” for an overhaul of the transport sector and President Fernando Collor 
seemed a promising reform champion. Like Menem, Collor drew on populist rhetoric and 
was a political outsider who attacked established political elites as corrupt. 
Unencumbered by the need to pay off political cronies, he appealed to popular frustration 
with the political class, promising a “sweeping housecleaning” (Weyland 1993; 1997-8). 
Upon assuming office in 1990, Collor, in response to the spiraling inflation and 
economic crisis, embarked on a drastic adjustment plan and a fundamental restructuring 
of the state—implementing austerity packages, reorganizing the state to cut payroll, and 
privatizing public enterprises and services (PR 1990, 20). In the transportation sector, this 
meant that the state could no longer afford the substantial public investment in 
infrastructure necessary to repair dilapidated rails and roads, or the salaries of the 
numerous employees of the transport sector. As a solution, Collor turned to privatization 
of transportation infrastructure through concessions.  
His powering approach was similar to that of Menem in Argentina. Relying on 
executive decrees, Collor concentrated power in the presidency by rapidly overhauling 
the state apparatus in order to shift control to his small team of loyalists, in large part led 
by his campaign treasurer, Paulo César Farias (Abrúcio and Loureiro 1998). For instance, 
 138 
a number of ministries and agencies were combined to create the Ministry of 
Infrastructure (Exposição de Motivos MP 150/1990), and nominations for many posts, 
such as head of the Secretaria Nacional de Transportes and DNER, were left to Farias 
(Gomide 2011, 87). Just as Collor had promised in his campaign, he refused to comply 
with the bureaucratic nominations of other political parties (Weyland 1997-8, 76). 
The most dramatic changes in transportation occurred in DNER, the once 
autonomous highway agency that had transformed Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Collor administration reasoned that if the majority of the highway network was to be 
either auctioned off in concessions or transferred to states and municipalities, then a large 
agency that planned and managed procurement contracts, in addition to directly executing 
construction projects, was no longer necessary (Ribeiro 1990). Thus, the agency was 
dismantled in short order. Its functions were transferred from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília in 
90 days; the number of employees was slashed from 19,000 to 8,000 by 1991, a 58 
percent reduction in one year; the planning unit within the agency was eliminated; and 
over 86 percent of planning staff were cut (MT 1994).161  
The Collor administration had been successful in pushing sweeping overhauls 
past opposition, but the reforms that were to follow—concession auctions and 
transferring the highway network to the states—were halted as Collor’s powering 
approach ran up against serious political challenges. Congress had initially supported 
Collor’s draconian initiatives during his election honeymoon, which led to the 
implementation of a neoliberal adjustment program and the initiation of privatization. 
Yet, Collor’s failure to craft a coalitional government, sharing power in the executive 
                                                 
161 As Cavalcanti highlights, the effects on the institution were profound. “Retirement and dismissal of 
personnel resulted in intense consequences for the technical-organizational world within DNER because, it 
resulted in a great loss of the accumulated institutional memory, experience, and technical competence that 
left with the individuals that left the agency (1995, 86-7).   
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among allies in rough proportion to their seats in Congress, in addition to his unilateral 
imposition of drastic reforms, soon generated widespread disgust among the political 
class. Instead of seeking to negotiate and compromise on adjustments to his reform 
program, Collor remained intransigent (Weyland 1997-8). Thus, when evidence of 
corruption emerged, political leaders were only too willing to capitalize on the scandal. 
Farias, Collor’s former campaign manager and political operative, was found to have 
solicited millions of dollars in bribes in return for government contracts. One scandal led 
to another,162 resulting in massive protests against Collor, and ultimately his 
impeachment in 1992.   
The lessons of Collor’s halted powering attempt and subsequent impeachment are 
two-fold. First, political-organizational context shapes the extent to which the powering 
approach can be applied. Collor, like Menem in Argentina, sought to impose powering 
reforms. Like Collor, Menem had also been implicated in shady dealings and corruption 
(Verbitsky 1991), but this was not enough to bring Menem down. Whereas Argentine 
executives are able to concentrate power by filling positions in the executive with 
loyalists, which facilitates powering, Brazilian executives are expected to share executive 
authority with political allies, making the powering approach far more difficult. Collor 
ignored this fact, to his detriment. Thus, as Chapter 3 highlighted and as the following 
sections will demonstrate, while the powering approach is applied occasionally in Brazil, 
coalitional presidentialism makes it a rare occurrence. 
The second lesson, which was highlighted in the previous chapters, is that the 
destructive phase of powering often hinders reconstruction. The deep-cutting changes 
                                                 
162 One of the many scandals that surfaced involved the Secretário de Transporte, Marcelo Ribeiro, who at 
the behest of P.C. Farias, proposed a program for repairing highways using “dispensa de licitação,” using 
non-competitive bidding procedures. Required kick-backs and bribes for receiving contracts had exceeded 
“acceptable” levels for entrepreneurs (Veja June 1992).  
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that Collor instituted generated such opposition that many of the reforms, which focused 
on constructing institutions were not even attempted during his administration. As the 
next sections will show, DNER was destroyed, but because regulatory institutions were 
never created and privatization and decentralization never occurred, DNER’s ability to 
oversee highway maintenance and construction was still needed. The destruction of 
DNER, the result of powering, would have deleterious and enduring effects on the 
transport sector.  
Impeachment and Corruption Scandals: Powering and Law 8666   
The political vacuum caused by Collor’s impeachment, in conjunction with 
another major contract corruption scandal in Congress, opened up space for another 
powering attempt, which culminated in the enactment of sweeping new procurement 
legislation. While Law 8666, analyzed below was not a powering reform in the same 
sense as powering in Argentina—the changes were led by Congress, not the executive, 
and did not require revamping agencies or ministries; the legislation fell closer to the 
powering side of the reform spectrum than most procurement reforms before or since. It 
is also crucial back ground for understanding subsequent advances and challenges in 
government contracting in Brazil.  
On the same day as the impeachment proceedings against Collor, investigations 
began regarding the receipt of bribes by the Joint Congressional Budgetary Committee 
(Comissão Mista de Orçamento) for writing amendments that directed public works 
contracts to a cartel of construction companies (Speck 2001, 47). Investigations revealed 
that various members of the Budgetary Committee systematically defrauded the treasury 
in preparing the budget (Praça 2011). While there is a long history in Brazil of large 
construction companies (empreiteiras) financing political campaigns through off-the-
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books accounts (caixa dois) (Campos 2012), the scale of this scandal revealed just how 
interconnected politicians and the empreiteiras had become and the extent to which 
corruption and cartels dominated Brazilian contracting.163 
As an antidote, the Congress passed Law 8666 of 1993, an overhaul of 
contracting legislation, which established demanding procedures meant to reduce 
discretion of contracting officials and make bidding and award procedures impervious to 
corruption. The law, designed by anti-corruption leader Claudio Abramo Weber and a 
group of experts with extensive expertise in public works contracts, provided an 
unparalleled opportunity, according to Weber, to craft legislation from scratch that would 
make corrupt practices of the past impossible.164 Initially, it appeared that the reformers 
had been successful. The media as well as Transparency International and other 
academics heaped praise on the law, arguing that it resulted in a more efficient system, 
lowered barriers of entry, increased social control, and reduced opportunities for 
corruption (cf. Volosin 2010, 86–88; Gonçalves da Silva 1997).   
Soon, however, it appeared that Law 8666 created new dysfunctionalities. The 
new law had been, in large part, supported by small- to medium-size construction 
companies and their trade associations,165 which saw the Budgetary Committee scandal 
as an opportunity to push for procurement reform that would allow them to participate in 
                                                 
163 By 1993 the Brazilian market for public works contracts had become extremely concentrated. A small 
group of powerful construction companies, known as the “seven sisters” won the majority of the contracts 
(cf. Volosin 2010, 81). According to Eduardo Capobianco, former Vice President of the Câmera Brasileira 
da Indústria da Construção (CBIC), and Claudio Weber Abramo, Executive Director of  Transparência 
Brasil, 70 percent of the billing of the largest 150 construction companies went to 7 firms, the seven sisters. 
Author interview with Claudio Weber Abramo, Executive Director of Transparência Brasil, Former 
consultant, Sindicato da Indústria da Construção Civil do Estado de São Paulo, March 12, 2012. On the 
history of the power of construction companies in Brazil see Campos (2012). 
164 Author interview with Abramo Weber. 
165 Câmara Brasileira da Indústria da Construção (CBIC) and the Sindicato da Indústria da Construção 
Civil do Estado de São Paulo (SindusCon-SP). 
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the government construction market.166 The new procurement rules tilted the legal 
framework in favor of construction companies,167 entrenching a new set of corrupt 
practices and leaving the risk involved in such projects almost entirely with the 
government (Rosilho 2013a, 131–132).168  
Perhaps even more problematic, the law introduced unintended consequences for 
purchasing simple goods and services. Weber notes that he and the other architects of 
Law 8666 were focused on public works contracts, and thus had not fully considered the 
implications for other types of procurement. Law 8666 soon proved time-consuming and 
costly for simple goods and services; purchasing items such as staplers often took well 
over six months.169 “Emergency” procedures that allowed officials to purchase goods and 
services directly were used excessively to bypass the competitive process, thus opening 
the door to corruption and contracts that privileged cronies. These bypasses accounted for 
well over 50 percent of government procurement (World Bank 2004). Legal scholars 
have argued that the legislation rested on the idea that norms, if precise, detailed, 
objective, and well-intentioned, would be able to generate, almost automatically, good 
contracts (Rosilho 2013a, 129), but this idea did not bear out in practice. The World 
                                                 
166 According to Abramo Weber, advisor to SindusCon-SP at the time, the union argued for reducing 
discretion of public officials in order to increase competitiveness in the procurement system and led the 
process to convince construction entrepreneurs that the reform would benefit them by allowing them to 
participate in more lucrative contracts directly with the government rather than subcontracting to the seven 
sisters. Once a consensus was reached in terms of the construction sector, they began working with a group 
of legislators willing to support the reform and to obtain the necessary votes in Congress and crafting a 
media campaign that leveraged the effect the corruption scandals had on public opinion to pass Law 8666 
of 1993. Author interviews with Abramo Weber; Aldino Graef, Assessor especial da Subchefia de Análise 
e Acompanhamento de Políticas Governamentais da Casa Civil da Presidência da República; Especialista 
em Políticas Públicas e Gestão Governamental (1993-present), December 5, 2011. 
167 Author interview with Marcelo Correia, Director of Highways and Railroads, Secretariat of the Growth 
Acceleration Program, Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (2007-present), December 9, 2011.  
168 Author interview with Rodolpho Tourinho Neto, President of the Sindicato Nacional da Indústria da 
Construção Pesada, former Senator, former Minister of Mines and Energy (1999-2001), April 18, 2012. 
169 Author interview with Ciro Campos Christo Fernandes, Advisor and Gestor Gubernamental, Ministério 
do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão, August 6, 2009. 
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Bank’s Procurement Assessment Report of Brazil showed how Law 8666’s excessive 
regulation and focus on procedure contributed to protracted disputes that generally ended 
up in the courts (World Bank 2004).  
How had the construction sector, which had just been implicated in two major 
contracting corruption scandals, been able push through such a sweeping overhaul to the 
procurement framework? Experts, including both supporters and opponents of Law 8666, 
argue that under normal circumstances the bill would not have passed.170 An alternative 
bill, presented by Senator Pedro Simon, advanced legislation that balanced the risk for 
the government and private sector and that, before the corruption scandals, seemed more 
likely to pass.171 Yet, 1993 was a turbulent moment in Brazilian history, an exceptional 
time of instability, and the weak institutional presence of the executive in the process 
meant that the group in Congress linked to the small and mid-size enterprises had much 
greater latitude than usual (Fernandes 2010, 132–133). The results, argue experts in the 
public sector, were catastrophic: Excessively bureaucratic rules focused more on detailed 
processes than results (Motta 2010, 155), and in the end, placed the risk with the 
government, to the benefit of construction contractors.172  
In sum, the watershed moments opened up space for a group of construction 
companies to impose their preferred legislation. While this reform cannot be neatly 
classified as a powering reform (changes were led by a group of lobbyists in Congress, 
not the executive, and did not require revamping agencies or ministries), it fell closer to 
                                                 
170 Author interviews with Fernandes; Abramo; André Janjácomo Rosilho, Attorney and Specialist in 
Government Contracting, Sundfeld Advogados, November 17, 2011. 
171 Author interview with Rosilho.  
172 Author interviews with Tourinho; Correia; Alexandre Motta, Diretor Geral, Escola de Administração 
Fazendária; Former Subsecretário de Planejamento, Orçamento e Administração at Ministério da Fazenda, 
November 28, 2011. 
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the powering side of the reform spectrum than most procurement reforms before or since 
and demonstrates the challenges of crafting and evaluating such complex changes.  
THE EFFECTS OF NEGOTIATION ON COMPREHENSIVE REFORMS (1995-2002) 
President Cardoso assumed the presidency in 1995 riding a wave of support 
generated from his success as Finance Minister, under interim President Franco, in 
stabilizing the economy. He sought to use this political capital to advance significant state 
reforms. Whereas Menem by this time had already successfully privatized many sectors 
and advanced administrative reform in Argentina, Brazil was seen by the World Bank 
and other experts as the reform laggard. Brazil under Cardoso did go on to make 
significant progress in privatizing public enterprises and public services, but in these 
areas, as was demonstrated above, reform was often slowed, diluted, or halted entirely, 
resulting in more of an evolutionary, but sustainable process than similar reforms pushed 
through whole-cloth in Argentina. This section, first, demonstrates how a powering 
attempt by Cardoso’s Minister of State Reform (which included legislation to overhaul 
Law 8666) was enfeebled by the process of negotiation with the diverse set of actors 
within the president’s coalition. The second section examines efforts to transform the 
transportation sector and explains how the slower, more modest problem-solving changes 
ultimately were more effective because they benefitted from learning and drew on 
experiences over a longer period of time. It then highlights the deleterious consequences 
that arose when the powering approach was used, emphasizing the considerable 
challenges of rebuilding institutions.   
Bresser-Pereira’s Failed Reversal of Law 8666  
If successful powering reform were to happen under any Brazilian president it 
should have happened under President Cardoso. In 1995 Cardoso enjoyed a clear 
 145 
mandate and support in Congress, in which 75 percent of seats were held by his party and 
his coalitional partners (Power 1998, 52). He had just shepherded Brazil through an 
economic crisis and knew the importance of additional reforms for keeping the country 
on sound fiscal footing. Therefore, Cardoso was supportive initially when his minister of 
the newly created Ministry of Administration and State Reform (MARE), Luiz Carlos 
Bresser-Pereira, a co-founder of Cardoso’s political party (PSDB) and his campaign 
fundraising coordinator, proposed sweeping administrative reform (Gaetani 2003).   
Bresser-Pereira’s plan, known as the “Plano Diretor” (Plan for the Reform of the 
State Apparatus), embodied a powering approach. The plan proposed an overhaul of the 
traditional hierarchical Brazilian state, drawing on British models and Osborne’s New 
Public Management, which emphasized the need to “reinvent government” and harness 
the “entrepreneurial spirit” to transform the public sector. Bresser-Pereira brought a 
group of alumni from the São Paulo branch of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV), 
where he had been a professor, to fill the appointment positions in the new MARE.173 
With this tight-knit team, he set about pushing through change before resistance could 
mount by simultaneously attempting to pass a constitutional amendment aimed at 
removing legal obstacles to the reorganization of public administration; developing and 
passing legislation through Congress; and implementing the plan by executive or 
administrative action in other areas.  
His bold plans soon ran into resistance, however. Bresser-Pereira’s broader 
agenda did succeed in the sense that in 1998 a constitutional amendment was passed that 
made civil servant dismissal more flexible, among other changes (Constitutional 
                                                 
173 The historical base of the Brazilian public administration community was the Rio de Janeiro branch of 
FGV, not São Paulo, which was oriented toward business administration and local government. See 
(Gaetani 2003,  p. 341).  In order to fill the civil servant positions within the new ministry Bresser-Pereira 
invited a group of elite civil servants, known as gestores, hoping they would become reform “champions” 
(n.b, gestores become important in the next episode of pregão reform). 
 146 
Amendment 19 of 1998). After this, Bresser-Pereira declared victory. However, most of 
the amendment was never regulated and little, according to many experts, actually 
changed (Vaz 2007). For instance, one of the key components in the broader reform 
design was corrective legislation to address the problems in Law 8666,174 but when the 
final version of the draft bill reached Congress in 1997, it was a shadow of the original. 
Key lawmakers indicated that the bill had little chance of passing and the reform project 
died quietly (Fernandes 2010, 165). Upon Cardoso’s reelection in 1998, Bresser-Pereira 
was moved from the Ministry of Administration and State Reform and the ministry was 
unceremoniously disbanded. 
This failed powering attempt illustrates how political-organizational context 
favors or disadvantages powering approaches. In the context of Brazilian coalitional 
presidentialism, Bresser-Pereira’s initiative was doomed to fail because there was no way 
to develop broad political support in the short time frame allotted.  
Cardoso initially supported the Plan, however, when resistance to the changes 
mounted, he was willing to support Bresser-Pereira only insofar as his coalition would 
back the reforms. As such, he could not impose reform intransigently without sacrificing 
numerous other objectives and key political allies. When Bresser-Pereira started to face 
resistance, Cardoso could have imposed the reform, but chose not to. Cardoso had 
learned from Collor’s attempt at powering, which resulted in his impeachment, that 
governing alone and forcing reforms through would be severely punished; therefore, he 
chose consultation, negotiation, transaction, and compromise (Weyland 1993).  
                                                 
174 As the previous sections highlighted, Law 8666 that was pushed through in the upheaval following 
Collor’s impeachment and the Budget Scandal, resulted in delays, prolonged court cases, and the use of 
emergency contracting for up to 60 percent of government contracts which opened the door to endemic 
corruption and collusion (Almeida 2006). 
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Transportation Concessions Advance Gradually  
Cardoso’s efforts to revitalize the transport sector with private funding did 
advance, but they did so slowly and unevenly, resembling problem-solving to a greater 
extent than powering.175 By the time Brazil resumed concessions, the hyperinflationary 
crisis had abated. This, on one hand, reduced considerably the uncertainty in planning 
long-term concessions. Whereas Menem had pushed through change at the height of the 
hyperinflationary crisis, making comprehensive planning a near-impossible task, the 
delay of reforms during the Collor and Franco administrations allowed for the 
macroeconomic situation to stabilize. On the other hand, the absence of an “exceptional” 
crisis meant less latitude for forcing radical change.176 If Cardoso was going to impose 
dramatic reforms it would require extensive use of his political capital and his 
commitment to press changes past the resistance.  
Instead, Cardoso’s problem-solving approach to addressing problems in 
transport—in particular, the inability of the state to finance necessary investments in 
infrastructure and the challenges Law 8666 created for finishing projects on time—built 
on the reform efforts and blueprints of his predecessors and the lessons learned from such 
previous attempts (Cardoso 1994). Leading jurists, for instance, had been working on a 
draft of a Concession Law for years,177 which was passed in 1995 under Cardoso (Law 
8987). Plans for the highway concessions drew on DNER’s earlier experiences with toll 
roads and the institutional framework set up under previous presidents.178 Moreover, 
                                                 
175 For an analysis of the broader set of privatization reforms see Manzetti (1999). 
176 On the importance of hyperinflationary crisis for acceptance of dramatic reforms see Weyland (2002). 
177 Author interview with Fernandes.  
178 In the 1970s DNER had experimented with the use of tolls for five sections of highway and in the 1980s 
there were a number of attempts to concession railways.  Collor’s National Privatization Program with 
Decree 473 of 1992 had created a framework for concessioning railways and roads, and Collor reorganized 
ministries taking DNER’s centralized control of roadways and concentrating policymaking within the new 
Infrastructure Ministry (Gomide 2011, 87).  In 1993, Ministry of Transport (Decree 10/1993), created the 
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earlier attempts to transform the transportation sector not only in Brazil, but also other 
countries, provided an important set of lessons for both Brazilian experts and IFIs.179  
By contrast to Menem, who concentrated reform design and implementation in his 
team of loyalists, a wide array of actors were involved in the Brazilian reform process. 
Members of the National Privatization Council (Conselho Nacional de Desestatização, 
CND) included not only key ministers from the President’s party, the PSDB, but also his 
coalitional allies. Advancing reform plans amidst so many patronage- and pork-hungry 
political actors, however, created many challenges that Cardoso.  
One of the ways he addressed these obstacles was by conferring authority to 
design and implement reforms to insiders (i.e., technical experts within the state), 
Cardoso was able to insulate many of the technical decisions from political influence.180 
CND was responsible for setting policy guidelines, but it was BNDES, the powerful 
developmental bank, that retained responsibility for carrying out much of the reform 
process (World Bank 1996; Manzetti 1999, 187). Brazilian technocrats had been working 
on these reform plans on and off for years, and this extensive expertise and experience 
meant that their bounds of rationality were looser than, for example, Argentine reformers, 
who tended to be close allies of Menem and outsiders to the federal administration.181 
                                                                                                                                                 
Program of Federal Highway Concessions (Programa de Concessões de Rodovias Federais, PROCROFE), 
which aimed to delegate to the private sector the modernization, maintenance, and operation of highways in 
exchange for toll collection (Gomide, 2011, 91). 
179 For instance, by the time Brazil finally reached the point of conceding railways, experts had learned 
from prior experience, for example, the importance of addressing the concerns of the tens of thousands of 
employees that would be adversely affected by proposed reform programs. Thus, Brazilian officials 
approved a program that financed severance payments for retrenched employees, provided incentives for 
early retirement and voluntary separation, offered involuntary separation grants for the remaining 
redundant staff, and retrained employees and provided job search and outplacement assistance (Bank 
World 2003, 3). The program was financed in part by a loan from the World Bank. 
180 Author interview with Martus Tavares, former Minister of Planning (1999-2002), May 28, 2012. 
181 Of course, Cardoso could have also concentrated power in a team of technocrats from his own party or 
from outside the bureaucracy, but this would have been seen by coalitional allies as an attempt to wrest 
control of the process from them. Technical experts from within the state provided a more neutral option. 
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This technical and administrative capacity meant that they had more information at their 
disposal and a greater capacity to process it. BNDES in particular played an important 
role in reforms under Collor and Franco, allowing it to benefit from the iterative process 
of learning from the privatization effort. Moreover, the Ministry of Transport officials 
had experimented with tolls in the past and, thus, had concrete data on how much revenue 
tolls could be expected to generate and a very clear sense of potential challenges, both 
technical and political.182 Thus, dealing with coalitional partners induced Cardoso to 
confer a greater degree of authority to technocratic insiders, whose expertise and 
experience resulted in a greater capacity to design complex reforms. By giving up control 
over the process to experts, in addition to other forms of transaction (patronage and pork), 
Cardoso was able to gradually advance his reform agenda.  
The most far-reaching changes occurred in the railway sector. Between 1996 and 
1999 seven railway concessions were held that granted the operation and maintenance of 
lines to concessionaires for 30 years.183 In December 1999 the federal government began 
the dissolution and liquidation of RFFSA, but the process would take another eight years 
to complete (Gomide 2011, 84). Meanwhile, the first stage of highway privatizations 
occurred between 1995 and 1997 when five sections of federal roads were offered to 
concessionaires for 20 to 25 years.184 These concessions transferred 1,493.2 km of federal 
roads to the private sector, representing only 2 percent of the federal highway system (cf. 
OECD 2008, 178). A second stage of concessions was to auction off an additional 7,093 
                                                 
182 Author interview with Tourinho. 
183 This included not only the six lines of RFFSA, but also São Paulo’s state-owned rail company, 
FEPASA, known as the Malha Paulista, which was transferred to the federal Government in 1997 as part of 
the financial agreement between the federal government and the state of São Paulo (Decreto 2.502/1998). 
The iron-ore company, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, owned two additional freight lines, Estrada de Ferro 
Vitória-Minas e Estrada de Ferro Carajás, which were auctioned off as a part of the Vale privatization 
process. 
184 Extensive privatization of highways has occurred at the state level as well (cf. Pinherio 2011, 270).  
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km in 2000, but became mired in endless delays.185  In the end, highway concessions only 
affected a small portion of the network and, while some railway concessions were 
completed, an agency known as VALEC would continue maintaining the remaining rail 
lines, and the liquidation of RFFSA dragged on until 2007. Thus, while Cardoso was able 
to advance his agenda, especially in the railway subsector, the broader reform agenda 
advanced in an uneven and halting way.  
Unexpected economic downturns, in particular the devaluation of the real, which 
accelerated in 1999, had negative repercussions that resulted in serious problems for 
concessions, but these were short-lived. There were details that should have been 
included in the initial contracts, such as captive shipper stipulations and requirements for 
providing accounting data, but these were resolved with amendments instead of full-scale 
renegotiation (World Bank 2003, 3).  
Such minor problems stand in contrast to the major issues in Argentina. Whereas 
Argentina charged high canons that concessionaires later were unable to pay, Brazil’s 
canon rates were much lower and charged up front (Estashe 2001, 224). While Argentina 
transferred a substantial amount of debt to concessionaires that they ultimately could not 
repay, Brazil transferred much less of the debt, but in the long run its predictions were 
more realistic and sustainable (De Castro 1999). As a result, Brazil’s labor productivity in 
transportation increased, performance substantially improved, RFFSA’s debts were 
rescheduled or settled through revenues from the sale of concessions and non-rail assets, 
and the cost of freight transport was reduced from USc2.9 in 1996 to USc2.0 in 2000 
(World Bank 2003, 3).  
                                                 
185 The next sections will address some of these delays, which occurred because of regulatory negotiations 
in congress, court cases, questioning by audit authorities (TCU), and opposition from the small and 
medium construction companies (OECD 2008, 181). 
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What accounts for these successes? Although experts with experience and 
expertise in the public sector were crucial for the technical design, as the previous 
sections and other analyses have highlighted (Manzetti 1999; Estashe 2001; Sharp 2005; 
World Bank 2003, 10), the numerous veto players involved in other aspects of the reform 
had additional effects that contributed to reform success.  
First, the many demands of different veto players had a propitious by-product: 
reforms were divided into smaller steps and slowed, simplifying the task environment. 
Instead of crafting plans to transform the entire transport sector all at once as Menem had 
done in Argentina, the process in Brazil began before Collor and advanced haltingly 
during his tenure, slowed under Franco, significantly advanced under Cardoso, and would 
go on to gain momentum only after Cardoso’s tenure. These stop-and-start efforts 
provided time to evaluate plans and meant that the reforms attempted were often smaller 
in scale, allowing officials to implement changes, assess them, and apply lessons learned 
to the next set of reforms (BNDES 1999).  Efforts to resolve smaller-scale problems drew 
on decision makers’ existing knowledge and experiences, not abstract planning that 
sought to get the entire reform perfectly calibrated in one shot.   
Second, scrutiny by a diverse set of actors—coalitional allies appointed to 
bureaucratic agencies, the courts, the audit agency (TCU), Congress, bureaucratic actors, 
IFIs, etc.—also ensured a higher degree of transparency, subjected the reform plans to a 
wide range of perspectives, and forged political support crucial for sustaining change. 
Indeed, in contrast to other Latin American countries, Brazil’s privatization process was 
remarkably transparent (Lora 2007). Although the price for gaining political support 
often involved weakening or slowing reform or doling out patronage or pork, this 
approach of relying on compromise or transaction as opposed to imposition meant that 
the reform process was also less vulnerable to reversals (Weyland 2002, 228). 
 152 
The transportation reforms, while slower and more gradual than reforms in 
Argentina, still exhibited some characteristics of powering,186 and thus, did not escape the 
problems that such an approach entails. In particular, pressure to reform meant that 
concessions occurred before the difficult task of rebuilding regulatory institutions was 
complete (Gomide 2011). Therefore, concessionaires did not know exactly what rules 
would be in force after privatization. The concession contracts designed by BNDES 
sought to address these challenges by including regulatory clauses in the contracts 
(Pinheiro 2011, 268),187 as did some preliminary regulatory guidelines that were 
established by executive decree.188 Yet, it took five years to create a regulatory agency 
for transportation (ANTT) (ANT, PL-1615 of 1999).  
The failure to pass and implement regulatory legislation before commencing with 
privatization highlights the challenges of building regulatory agencies, but also the 
challenges of rebuilding agencies after powering reforms. In particular, the law that 
established ANTT eliminated DNER and GEIPOT, the former “islands of excellence” 
that had been nearly demolished under Collor (Barat 2007). Under Cardoso, DNER had 
been politicized and after a spate of corruption scandals was finally eliminated entirely in 
2001. DNER was to be replaced by a new agency responsible for federal infrastructure 
(waterways, railways and highways), the National Department of Transport Infrastructure 
(DNIT). In effect, the legislation only changed the name of the agency and further 
                                                 
186 For a clear-cut case of problem-solving see Chapter 7 on health reform in Brazil. This case fall on the 
spectrum between powering and problem-solving and is designed to show how political organizational 
context shapes reform strategy.  
187 For instance, BNDES sought used a model proposed by Demsetz (1968) and others that presented an 
alternative to economic regulation. Thus, regulation was limited to inspection of investment and operation 
activities and annual tariff adjustments—that is, regulation was mostly technical in nature and was included 
in regulatory clauses of contracts (Pinheiro 2011, 268). 
188 Regulation of railway transportation was established by Decree 1,832 of March 1996 (RTF), created the 
Federal Railway Transport Commission (Cofer) under the Ministry of Transportation  (De Castro 1999, 11) 
(Gomide 2011, 85). 
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reduced its personnel.189 Whereas DNER had 19,000 public servants in 1990, the new 
DNIT was born with just 1,300 in 2002. GEIPOT was dismantled, but the Conselho 
Nacional de Integração de Política de Transportes Terrestres (CONIT) remained on 
paper until 2009.  
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated how coalitional presidentialism in 
Brazil and the need to compromise and negotiate with a diverse set of political actors has 
tended to impede powering in Brazil. Collor’s attempt to impose reform was rejected by 
the Brazilian political class and ultimately resulted in his impeachment.  Cardoso, having 
learned from this failure, built on his predecessors’ reforms and used negotiation and 
compromise to achieve his reform objectives. Consequently, reforms advanced gradually, 
but were more successful than those in Argentina.  
These sections also illustrate the fate of institutions weakened or destroyed by 
powering attempts. DNER was irreversibly weakened by Collor’s powering reform. Then 
Cardoso, in order to achieve his objectives, politicized the already feeble institution, until 
the situation was so egregious that Congress “abolished” the agency, essentially renaming 
it DNIT. Thus, while many institutions were strengthened during Cardoso’s tenure, his 
reforms often came at a steep cost, namely patronage and pork.  
THE PREDOMINANCE OF PROBLEM-SOLVING  
The election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as “Lula”) marked a crucial 
turning point for Cardoso’s reforms. When Lula assumed office, he inherited a number of 
serious problems with regard to transportation. After two decades of freezes on 
investments, the infrastructure network had deteriorated significantly; in 2003 almost 50 
percent of paved roads were considered in “terrible” condition and only about 20 percent 
                                                 
189 VALEC S.A. remained responsible for railway construction. 
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were in good condition (DNIT 2014). Improvements involved either auctioning more 
roads off to the private sector through concessions or relying on the newly created DNIT 
to follow the complex and laborious requirements of Law 8666 to contract the work out 
to the private sector. 
This section shows how the demands of coalitional presidentialism precluded 
powering, but gave rise to problem-solving reforms that gradually strengthened transport 
institutions under both Lula da Silva and his successor Dilma Rousseff. The demands 
placed on Lula and Rousseff by coalitional partners meant that neither governing alone 
nor sweeping overhauls of institutions were viable options. Instead, to achieve their 
goals, the PT governments of Lula and Rousseff have been induced to share executive 
appointments with coalitional allies and to work with the institutions they had inherited, 
which placed a greater premium on addressing the problems that made institutions weak 
in the first place.  
The following sections highlight thwarted powering and also problem-solving in 
transport. It is important to note, however, that because of the destruction of transport 
agencies in the 1990s, there were few individuals with experience left in the transport 
agencies. Consequently, the process of problem-solving has advanced very slowly. For a 
more clear-cut case of problem-solving see Chapter 7 on Brazilian Health. The following 
sections outline the process of strengthening institutions through sequentially advancing 
small, novel, partial, or indirect changes in the transport sector of Brazil, but also 
underscore persistent difficulties.   
Transport Sector: Success Despite Limitations  
While Lula had, in the past, criticized Cardoso for privatizations, there was no 
serious attempt to reverse the changes made by his predecessor. Lula had moderated his 
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leftist politics considerably to win the election (Hunter 2010). Yet, even if Lula had 
wanted to reverse transport privatizations, he would have faced a number of obstacles. 
First, the more incremental and modest reforms in Brazil were not plagued by the same 
type of performance problems as the hastily enacted changes in Argentina. Second, 
concessions in Brazil only accounted for a very small portion of the transport sector. 
Third, many actors and political parties in Lula’s government had a role in Cardoso’s 
reforms. In a number of ways, then, the more limited reform process under Cardoso made 
it difficult to roll back the changes.   
Moreover, Lula’s Workers’ Party lacked the majority necessary for pushing 
sweeping change through Congress. By contrast to Cardoso, who crafted a broad 
coalition by compensating allies with executive positions and pork, Lula was initially 
constrained by the PT’s distinctive commitment to party discipline and expectations that 
the vast majority of available positions in the executive would be allocated to PT 
members (Hunter 2010, 159-167). Concentration of power in the hands of the PT might 
have bred a preference for a powering approach, but would have deprived the party of 
sufficient votes in Congress to pass legislation. Thus, instead of seeking to overhaul 
institutions, the Lula administration worked with the institutions that they had inherited.   
One of the chief problems for investing public funds in infrastructure was Lula’s 
electoral commitment, outlined in his Carta ao Povo Brasileiro, to maintain a primary 
budget surplus of 4.25 percent of GDP, tightly constraining his ability to make sorely 
needed investments in infrastructure in his first years in office. Highway concessions 
would have provided private funds for maintenance and expansion; however, because 
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Lula had criticized Cardoso’s privatizations, immediately resorting to a massive 
concession initiative would have been an about-face on his campaign promises.190  
It was in this context that an idea, namely joint public and private investment in 
large infrastructure projects, or Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), was proposed to the 
Lula administration (see Figure 1 for the differences between PPPs, Procurement, and 
Concessions) (Sundfeld 2007). The idea of PPPs had circulated for years during the 
Cardoso administration as a way to bypass Law 8666 and reduce government spending. 
The Lula administration quickly learned that the 8666 procurement procedures resulted in 
endless delays and were nearly impossible to follow to the letter. In 2003—Lula’s first 
year in office—the TCU recommended that Congress suspend over 60 percent of planned 
disbursements due to contracting irregularities (Correia 2011).191 This, in addition to the 
need to reduce the burden on government coffers, contributed to the Lula 
administration’s support of PPP legislation. 
Figure 3: Types of Infrastructure Contracts  
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190 Even if this were an option, there were other challenges:  The second wave of concessions had been 
stalled by TCU audits, many of the choicest sections of road had already been auctioned off, and tolls were 
not a viable source of funding for many roads in need of repair (Portugal and Prado 2007).   
 
 157 
Congress passed the Public-Private Partnership Law (PPP, No. 11079) in 2004, 
but the new model that seemed to hold so much promise also generated substantial 
criticism.192  Moreover, as economic conditions improved, the government was in a better 
position to invest in infrastructure. Therefore, the Lula administration allowed the new 
rules to remain in disuse.  
Meanwhile, substantial under-spending in the first years of the Lula 
administration resulted in further deterioration of the transport network. As a result, the 
Ministry of Finance proposed what became known as the Pilot Investment Project 
(Projeto Piloto de Investimento, PPI), aimed at directing resources not subject to the 
budget freeze toward high-priority investments.193 The idea was born in large part from 
experiences of stop-and-start investment in infrastructure in the 1990s, wherein new 
projects were often prioritized over maintenance, only to be halted the subsequent year by 
budget freezes.194 The Lula administration negotiated an updated agreement with the IMF 
in February 2005 that facilitated PPI expenditures, equivalent to about US$1 billion a 
year over three years (2005-2007) (Casa Civil 2005). 
The new program meant there were funds to invest in transport infrastructure, but 
spending the funds successfully would be another matter. Despite careful monitoring by a 
broad executive committee comprising officials and technical experts, the program was 
falling far short of its goal of recuperating 20,069 km of roads by the end of 2006 
(MPOG 2006).195  
                                                 
192 PPPs generated criticism from a number of different angels—from those who wanted to continue with 
the concession model, from the segments of the private sector wanted to have a Fund that guaranteed 
payments established before they committed to the new model, and from civil servants wary of the new 
model (CNI 2005). Author interview with Tourinho. 
193 One of the cornerstones of the project was the rehabilitation of part of the Federal Road network under 
the Federal Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Program (World Bank 2013). 
194 Author interview with Carlos Alvares da Silva Campos Neto, Coordenador de Infraestrutura 
Econômica, IPEA, April 24, 2012. 
195 In the end, only 7,340 km were finished by 2007 (DNIT 2007).  
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Two bottlenecks impeded the recuperation effort—the new highway agency, 
DNIT, and Law 8666. DNIT was born weak, with few professionals and inadequate 
experience after the recurring budget freezes, while Law 8666 resulted in extensive 
delays and numerous points at which the contractors could challenge contracts in court.  
As a way to circumvent Law 8666 and the ineffective DNIT, the Lula 
administration attempted to concentrate power in order to break through the log-jams, 
launching in 2006 an emergency intervention known as PETSE (DNIT Portaria 1806) to 
repair stretches of road deemed unsafe. The “emergency” aspect was important; it was 
used as a justification for using dispensa de licitação, emergency contracting procedures 
that do not require competitive bids governed by Law 8666. In other cases, funds were 
applied using existing contracts. Controversy swirled around the project, not only 
because of the suspicious bidding procedures, but also because the funds, over R$400 
million, were released via executive decree and during an election year (Executive 
Decree 276 of 2006). After an outcry, the Casa Civil made a formal request that the TCU 
supervise the contracting processes (Correia 2011, 202). This attempt to use power to 
address the problems in transport was curtailed.   
The TCU audits of DNIT’s projects in Lula’s first term marked the beginning of 
an antagonistic relationship between the audit court and the executive.196 The audit 
agency had amassed increasing power to audit and halt public works projects 
incrementally after a series of scandals related to public works in the 1990s.197 Since 
1997, the budget laws have stipulated that the TCU send an annual recommendation to 
Congress of public works projects that ought to be halted (paralizados) due to grave 
                                                 
196 Author interview with Graef.  
197 Author interviews with Cláudio Cruz, Auditor Analista de Controle Externo, Tribunal de Contas da 
União (1995-present), May 8, 2012; Henrique Ziller, Auditor Federal de Controle Externo, Tribunal de 
Contas da União (2001-2014), Founder and President, Instituto de Fiscalização e Controle (2004-present), 
October 31, 2011. 
 159 
irregularities. The number of halted projects jumped from 38 in 2004 to 56 in 2006 (TCU 
2007). Regarding PETSE in particular, the TCU found that for 44.6 percent of the 
stretches of highway audited by TCU there was no legitimate “emergency” (Acórdãos 
686 of 2006 and 1973 of 2006).  
Army Execution of Public Works: An experiment in bypassing DNIT and Law 8666  
After the failed attempt to circumvent institutional constraints, the Lula 
administration began a problem-solving experiment—using an existing source of 
transport expertise in the public sector, the Brazilian Army engineers. Historically, the 
military has maintained 12 Engineering Battalions in the Department of Engineering and 
Construction (Departamento de Engenharia e Construção, DEC), responsible for 
executing small infrastructure projects for the army, which before 2005 accounted for 
approximately 3 percent of federal investments in infrastructure.198  DEC in the 1980s 
and 1990s—in stark contrast to DNER/DNIT’s meager investments and dwindling 
number of engineers—enjoyed relatively stable budgets and maintained a well-trained 
core of engineers, educated by the Military Engineering Institute (Instituto Militar de 
Engenharia) and stationed throughout Brazil.199 Essentially, DEC was one of the only 
areas of the federal government that had retained its engineering capacity to design 
complex projects throughout almost twenty years of underinvestment in infrastructure.  
DNIT’s cooperation agreements with DEC made the Army Corps of Engineers 
responsible for both the design and execution of projects,200 providing a way around not 
only Law 8666,201 but also the limited capacity of DNIT. The first projects were minor 
                                                 
198 Valor Econômico, July 12, 2012 
199 Author interview with Campos Neto.   
200 Interministerial Order DM/MT 230 of 2003 and Interministerial Order 408 of 2005. 
201 See Figure 3 above for differences between infrastructure contracts and agreements. 
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and in remote locations, often of little commercial interest to the private sector because of 
logistical difficulties involved in such operations, but the idea gained more supporters as 
the Army Corps proved it was able to complete projects ahead of schedule and without 
cost overruns.202 As following sections will show, the administration gave the army a 
more extensive role in the ensuing years. 
Consequences of Exclusion, then Inclusion, of Coalitional Allies  
Congress’s role in paralyzing the administration’s infrastructure projects was even 
more problematic than that of the TCU during Lula’s first term, underscoring the extent 
to which political parties that perceived they were undercompensated in terms of 
executive posts and pork would retaliate against the president’s initiatives. In 2004 and 
2005 Congress froze more projects than the TCU had recommended. Figure 4 shows the 
budget funds (LOA, Lei Orçamentária Anual) halted in comparison with the TCU’s 
recommendation. Congress halted nearly 45 percent of public works funds in 2005.   
 
  
                                                 
202 Folha de São Paulo, November 6, 2005.  
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Figure 4: TCU recommendations and public works projects halted by Congress 
 
 
Source: TCU and LOAs 
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203 D’Araujo and Lameirão (2009) estimate that the PT occupied 60 percent of ministerial positions in 
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PAC: Big Problems, Incremental Solutions  
In January 2007, the Lula administration launched the Growth Acceleration 
Program (PAC), a multi-sector infrastructure development project focused on medium- to 
long-term strategic planning and increased spending on infrastructure (highways, 
railways, energy, air transportation, telecommunications, housing, water and sanitation), 
in order to accelerate development and spur economic growth (Rousseff 2007). Over 
R$28.6 billion was allocated to investments in the highway system alone, which was to 
be complemented by private investment from the second phase of highway concessions 
that was to reach R$4.4 billion (PAC 2009).204  
PAC represented a major initiative and one of two signature programs of the Lula 
government;205 yet, PAC was very different from the sweeping powering reforms 
imposed in Argentina and those begun under Collor. Instead of overhauling ministries 
and agencies, PAC sought to work with existing agencies. Instead of concentrating power 
in a tight-knit group of likeminded individuals close to the president and making them 
responsible for advancing changes, the PAC executive committee was made up of a 
wide-ranging group that would work with the many ministries and agencies involved in 
the effort.206 Instead of forcing an untested model, PAC built on the experiences and 
lessons learned from the PPI and from longstanding efforts to address infrastructure 
                                                 
204 Brazil for the last two decades had lagged far behind the developed, and much of the developing, world 
in terms of infrastructure spending, in large part because of recurring fiscal crises. Dilapidated roads and 
ports resulted in bottlenecks and dragged down the economy. During harvest season, for instance, traffic 
jams of trucks waiting to get to ports stretched miles. Inadequate infrastructure steeply increased the custo 
Brasil, as the tremendous cost of doing business in Brazil is known.   
205 Bolsa Família, a conditional cash transfer program, is the other signature program. 
206 The Executive Committee was comprised of individuals from the Casa Civil and Ministries of Planning 
and Finance, led by Undersecretary of Monitoring of the Casa Civil, Miriam Belchior (Decree 6,046 of 
2007). The ministries and agencies involved ranged from Agricultural Development; Cities; 
Communication; Culture; Education; Health; Mines and Energy; National Integration; Planning, Budget, 
and Management; Sports; Tourism; and Transportation.  In the case of Transport alone, the ministries and 
agencies included the Ministry of Transportation, DNIT, VALEC, ANTT, and the agencies involved in 
environmental licensing (i.e., IBAMA, FUNEI, IPHAN).  
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logjams. Instead of transforming the infrastructure model to rely entirely on the private 
sector or the public sector, PAC included provisions for both approaches. Thus, PAC, 
instead of replacing the existing model of infrastructure, focused on working within 
inherited policy frameworks and institutions, which would mean a problem-solving 
approach to resolve problems one by one.  
In responding to concerns about the lack of coordination, PAC addressed some of 
the challenges of coalitional presidentalism. Building on the PPI model, instead of 
allowing the PR, the allied party with the most appointments to the Ministry of Transport 
and DNIT, to use investment funds for pork, the PAC sought to ensure that infrastructure 
spending was in line with the president’s objectives.207 Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s close 
advisor who would go on to become president, was appointed Chief of Staff in June 
2005. During this time she and her team elaborated sophisticated “situation rooms” to 
monitor PPI spending.208 The PAC effort expanded this monitoring role and was again 
led by the increasingly powerful Rousseff (Lameirão 2011), in collaboration with the 
Ministries of Finance and Planning.  
PAC made funds available, but in doing so revealed new problems such as 
DNIT’s inability to translate funds into completed projects. By 2009, reports showed that 
most projects in DNIT were stalled or halted in the contracting process.209 Even DNIT’s 
Director acknowledged the agency’s lack of expertise and experience.210 Instead of 
having a pipeline of viable infrastructure projects, engineering blueprints used in bidding 
processes were of very low quality, many of them dating back to DNER. This resulted in 
                                                 
207 Author interview with Correia. 
208 Author interview with Miriam Barbuda Fernandes Chaves, Diretora de Programa da Secretaria-
Executiva do Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão (2007-present), November 8, 2011. 
209 Estado de São Paulo, July 1, 2009. 
210 Estado de São Paulo, July 5, 2009.  
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cost overruns, contract modifications, and delays; without a clear engineering plan—
especially for complex projects—it was impossible to estimate how much a project 
should cost and how long it should take.211 In 2010 alone, 79 percent of active PAC 
contracts were modified, with the additional costs averaging 32 percent of the original 
contracts (Correia 2011, 220). DNIT fell far short of having sufficient staff to design 
projects, conduct bidding procedures, obtain environmental licenses212 and monitor 
private sector construction.213  
The appointment of Paulo Sérgio Passos, an experienced civil servant and former 
Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Transportation, as interim Minister of Transport in 
April 2006 (while Minister Nascimento ran for office) provided an opportunity to 
advance a problem-solving reform agenda. While the position was temporary, Passos 
now had an opportunity to advance a number of proposals that addressed implementation 
problems in the PPI, just as the PAC proposal was being developed.   
Interviews suggest that Passos used the focus on PAC to quietly advance a 
number of changes that technical experts had been waiting to promote since the early 
1990s.214 In order to address the lack of capacity of DNIT, Passos increased the number 
of civil servants in the transport sector, created a new career, Infrastructure Analyst 
(Edital ESAF 2007), and restructured salaries to make the transport sector more 
                                                 
211 Instead of using more detailed “executive” projects, DNIT relied on what are known as “basic projects” 
in Brazil. Such designs often lack essential details necessary for contractors to execute projects successfully 
and for DNIT employees to hold them accountable.  
212 Expensive environmental studies are required at various stages of development of large construction 
projects, often delaying near-completed projects.  Estado de São Paulo, July 1, 2009.  
213 Author interviews with anonymous DNIT employee, May 25, 2012; Aldino Graef, Assessor especial da 
Subchefia de Análise e Acompanhamento de Políticas Governamentais da Casa Civil da Presidência da 
República; Especialista em Políticas Públicas e Gestão Governamental (1993-present), December 5, 2011.  
214 Author interviews with Tourinho and DNIT employee.   
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competitive.215  To address the absence of a planning body—the result of the destruction 
of GEIPOT—Passos initiated discussions with transportation experts and the Army’s 
transport planning body about creating a foundation or a public company216 that would 
specialize in research and strategic planning and provide a forum for federal, state, and 
municipal coordination (Correia 2011, 211). In 2007, the body Passos advocated for, the 
Plano Nacional de Logística de Transportes (PNLT), was created to provide long-term 
strategic plans (MT 2007).217  
During this time, Passos also sought to remove another major obstacle for the 
transport sector: Law 8666.  Passos and other reformers used the focus on PAC to their 
advantage; streamlining of procurement procedures was included in PAC’s objectives 
(PAC 2010) and even gained the support of Dilma Rousseff. While the legislation passed 
the House (PL 7709/2007 – Câmara), it stalled in the Senate (renamed PLC no 32/2007), 
largely because of opposition from private construction contractors and political leaders 
who benefitted from exploiting the legislation’s loopholes.218 Passos’s first attempt to 
change Law 8666 had failed and after Lula’s reelection, in 2006219 the Ministry of 
Transport position was given back to Nascimento of the PR. But as the subsequent 
                                                 
215 One of the biggest problems for the transport sector is evasão, when those who pass concursos created 
specifically for an agency, in this case DNIT, are pouched by other federal ministries and agencies that 
provide higher salaries, less work, and more prestigious roles (e.g., TCU, CGU, etc). 
216 In addition to a planning body called PRODEST, under the Sarney administration. 
217 While this was an achievement, the planning body still lacked the capacity to fill the void left by 
GEIPOT.  
218 Interviews suggest that despite public support from large empreiteiras (CNI 2008) and many others, 
substantial resistance remained (Author interview with Beatriz Nunes, Confederação Nacional da Indústria, 
December 12, 2011). Some in the public administration opposed the bill because a rapid shift away from 
Law 8666 would reduce the ability of the TCU to carefully audit such funds. Many of the small and 
medium sized businesses worried that a change in Law 8666 would push them out of the market entirely 
and back into subcontracting for the construction giants, the role they had filled prior to 1993. Finally, a 
shift implied uncertainty for the large empreiteiras who had learned how to reap massive profits from the 
Law. (Author interviews with anonymous private contractors, October 8, 2011).  
219 PLC 32 was the most notable attempt to change Law 8666 during Lula’s presidency, but there were two 
other attempts by the same group of reformers leading up to this effort. Author interview with Beatriz 
Nunes, Confederação Nacional da Indústria, December 12, 2011. 
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sections will show, as a civil servant with longer time horizons, Passos would have more 
opportunities to attempt change.  
Trying to Bypass Obstacles: The Army and Concessions 
The continued delays in DNIT and the inability of the Lula administration to both 
retain PR support and overhaul the agency prompted PAC coordinators to seek way to 
circumvent DNIT and Law 8666. They did so by relying on two initially unlikely 
options—the Army and privatization.  
The Army Engineering Corps’ (DEC) role in PAC grew substantially as it 
demonstrated that it could rapidly execute public works projects for much less money. 
Numerous projects that had been halted due to procurement irregularities, environmental 
licensing problems, or auditors were delegated to a division of DEC led by General Jorge 
Fraxe. By 2010 the Army had become the largest contractor in the country, with 11,000 
soldiers and other employees working on about 80 different projects, and was responsible 
for 16 percent of DNIT’s budget.220 Experts estimate that the projects executed by DEC 
cost 20 percent less than those contracted out by DNIT.221  
The Lula administration also began to rely increasingly on concessions. After 
years of discussions and delays, highway concessions resumed. Toward the end of 2006 
the government released the official invitation to bid,222 and finally, in October 2007, 
auctions took place that transferred 2,600 km of roads to private sector management. The 
high level of scrutiny these processes received ahead of time meant that while the 
implementation was painstakingly slow, the results were far more successful in the long 
run.  
                                                 
220 Isto É Dinheiro, August 2, 2010.  
221 O Globo, July 16, 2006; Estado de São Paulo July 16, 2012. 
222 Folha de São Paulo, November 8, 2006. 
 167 
TECHNOCRATS AT THE HELM OF TRANSPORT 
Dilma Rousseff, often referred to as the Mother of PAC, went on to win the 2010 
election. She then launched PAC II, which continued and expanded the project, more 
than doubling the budget for transportation, with projected investments totaling over 
US$100 billion (Biedermann and Galal 2013, 3). After Rousseff’s election, Nascimento 
was again appointed as Minister of Transportation and Pagot remained in DNIT. But the 
contrast between the marked reduction in spending during Passos’s interim ministry and 
the run-away spending on cost overruns and contract amendments under Nascimento 
caught the attention of the PAC Secretariat. In 2011, scandal enveloped the sector as 
media reports revealed corruption and mismanagement of transportation contracts by PR 
appointees.223 As a result, Nascimento resigned, and Rousseff sacked 27 of the top-level 
PR managers in the Ministry of Transport, DNIT, and VALEC.224 The allegations of 
corruption and Rousseff’s tough stance on those implicated spread to other ministries in 
what became known as Rousseff’s faxina, or housecleaning.225 
Instead of filling the transport ministries and agencies with representatives from 
an allied party, Rousseff appointed long-time technocrats from within the executive to the 
top positions. The appointment of career technocrats reflected the importance of the 
transport sector not only to PAC, but also to the upcoming Soccer World Cup in 2014 
and Olympics in 2016. Sérgio Passos was appointed Minister of Transport, his third time 
                                                 
223  Reports revealed that PR operative Valdemar Costa Neto in conjunction with Anor (National Highway 
Construction Assoc.) ran an intricate scheme to divide highway construction contracts among contractors, 
who would pay a 5 percent fee to the PR operative to “win” contracts (Veja, July 2, 2011). The allegations 
of illicit enrichment spiraled after the Veja report; confirming reports that PR’s main campaign contributors 
all had construction contracts with the transport sector (cf. O Globo July 6, 2011; July 11, 2011).  
224 Estado de São Paulo, September 25, 2011 
225 Four ministers were replaced in a few short months. Interviews suggest that Rousseff had long known 
about the corruption in transportation. Many recognized that the PR’s domination of transportation—a 
lucrative position within the executive—was the price the PT paid for the PR’s support in Congress. Author 
interviews with Chaves; anonymous MPOG employees. 
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in the position.226 General Fraxe was appointed to DNIT, with a transportation auditor 
from the CGU as his second in command.  
The astonishing scandals laid bare numerous problems that internal reformers, 
such as Passos and General Fraxe, had long sought to address and provided increased 
latitude for advancing change. In particular, an internal report exposed the alarming lack 
of capacity in DNIT (DNIT 2011). In 1987 DNER was responsible for 51,000 km and 
had 19,000 civil servants; by 2011, although DNIT was managing an annual portfolio of 
investments on the order of R$15 billion, it had just over 2,600 employees, less than the 
Highway Department of the State of São Paulo.227 The problems were particularly acute 
in some areas; the agency had only 9 accountants (the 3 in Brasília alone were 
responsible for 597 delayed processes); and although the agency had 800 engineers, they 
estimated they needed 3,000 to design, evaluate, and supervise PAC projects.228 The 
report concluded that the biggest problem was not corruption per se but the waste created 
by the low capacity of the agency (DNIT 2011; cf. Motta 2011).  
In response, the Rousseff administration authorized a competitive exam for 1,200 
DNIT civil servants (Edital ESAF 2012). In the meantime, to increase engineering 
capacity and experience with contracting, General Fraxe appointed Colonel André Kuhn, 
an engineer from the Military Institute of Engineering, with a master’s degree in 
procurement and project management, to the DNIT projects unit. In 2012, Minister 
Passos mandated important posts within DNIT be reserved for career civil servants of the 
                                                 
226 Passos was previously Minister of Transport in 2006 and 2010 when Nascimento was running for 
office. 
227 By 2016 a third of employees were scheduled to retire. Estado de São Paulo, February 18, 2012. 
Despite recent concursos for positions in DNIT (300 positions were opened in 2009), those who pass the 
exams often opt for higher paying positions in the CGU, MPF, and TCU, or in the private sector (DNIT 
2011, 11).     
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agency.229 Passos’ efforts to recreate a planning body similar to GEIPOT, which he 
proposed back in 2007, also came to fruition during this time, with the creation of the 
Empresa de Planejamento e Logística (EPL) in August 2012. In this way, actors within 
the state took advantage of the light cast on problems by scandals to advance their reform 
agendas. 
Such efforts were complemented by incremental efforts throughout PAC I and II. 
Although the first years of PAC were marked by confrontations with the TCU, with Lula 
casting blame on the TCU for delays,230 auditors soon realized there was no way for 
DNIT to improve without assistance.231 DNIT began to adopt a new methodology based 
on TCU recommendations, including requiring detailed engineering blueprints before the 
contracting process was initiated and using standardized bidding documents (Instrução 
Normativa 04/2007).232 In these and in many other ways, DNIT absorbed the guidance of 
the audit body, and by 2009, experts had recognized the increasing professionalization of 
DNIT.233 As DNIT began to rebuild its capacity after years of underspending in 
infrastructure,234 its transformation was reflected in the restoration of the highway 
network (see Figure 5). In 2003, nearly 50 percent of the network was in bad or terrible 




                                                 
229 Grandes Construções, May 8, 2012. 
230 Folha de São Paulo, October 23, 2010.  
231 Author interview with André Pachioni Baeta, Diretor da Secretaria de Obras do TCU, May 25, 2011. 
232 Revista Construção e Mercado, October 2009. 
233 Author interview with Bittencourt. 
234 Author interview with Baeta.  
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Figure 5: Quality of paved federal roads  
 
Source: Confederação Nacional do Transporte (CNT) 2014 
 
Chipping Away at Law 8666  
Consensus had been building among experts such as Passos, Fraxe, and the PAC 
Secretariat that something must be done about Law 8666. But after the failure of the 2007 
bill and subsequent attempts at change,235 the reformers took a new, somewhat 
unorthodox approach. In 2011, an executive decree had been issued to establish a 
Secretariat of Civil Aviation. This decree had nothing to do with contracting, but when 
the measure was about to be approved by Congress, Deputy José Guimarães (PT-CE) 
proposed an amendment, referred to as the Differential Contracting Regime (RDC), that 
created the option to apply the auction logic of concessions to public works projects. By 
2011, the positive evaluations of concessions and another alternative to Law 8666, known 
as pregão, had been attracting interest in other areas of the federal administration.236 
                                                 
235 For an analysis of all attempts to pass RDC see Rezende (2011, 7–8). 
236 Pregão, however, was limited only to goods and services, that is, the law specifically forbade the 














The amendment was limited in a number of important ways. Among other 
restrictions, it could be applied only to World Cup and Olympics projects and only when 
“convenient” (Rosilho 2013). In this way, proponents of overturning Law 8666 sought to 
incrementally introduce changes to procurement legislation for public works contracts 
and to avoid the full-blown attention of political actors that a law devoted entirely to 
procurement reform would entail. Modifications to the amendment that provided for even 
greater oversight from audit agencies ensured the auditors’ support for the new 
procedures.237 
As the new approach showed promise for reducing delays and cost overruns,238 
RDC was soon extended. In July 2012 Congress made RDC applicable to PAC (Law 
12688 of July 2012),239 and in October 2012, RDC was authorized for public school 
construction. This expansion has continued and the approach can now be applied in 
almost all areas of the federal administration. RDC is not a panacea for all of Brazil’s 
transport infrastructure issues, but the expectation among many is that as the new 
approach is more widely applied and refined, its results will make repeal of Law 8666 a 
mere formality (Rosilho 2013b, 8).240 Such a possibility was unthinkable in 2000. Yet, 
the problem-solving changes spearheaded by a reform coalition of civil servants and 
other public administrators with experience in using Law 8666 slowly transformed rigid 
procedures and eroded resistance to change.  
                                                 
237 Valor Econômico, June 27, 2012; November 5, 2012; and November 20, 2012.  
238 The federal government estimates that RDC reduces by 50 percent the amount of time required for 
procurement (PAC 2014, 29). For other benefits see Folha de São Paulo, January 29, 2014.  
239 The government highlighted the fact that the new procedures offered a 15 percent discount in relation to 
the reference price for six Infraero contracts and reduced contracting time from 250 day to 80 (Valor 
Econômico, April 26, 2012). 
240 Even President Dilma Rousseff confirmed that she would like to see RDC substitute Law 8666 (Estado 
de São Paulo, June 28, 2011; Brazilian Senate 2014). 
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Concessions and PPPs: Slow adoption, sustainable models 
By the end of Rousseff’s first term in 2014, Brazil’s problem-solving efforts over 
time had developed one of the strongest institutional and regulatory frameworks for 
private investment of infrastructure in Latin America. Figure 6 shows the evolution of 
Brazil’s composite score on the Economist’s Infrascope Index, which measures a 
country’s ability to mobilize private investment through concessions and PPPs. This 
index includes scores on regulatory and institutional framework, project experience and 
success, investment climate, and financial facilities. By 2014 Brazil ranked second only 
to Chile in Latin America (Economist 2014).  
Figure 6: Institutional Framework for Private Investment in Infrastructure 
 
Source: Infrascope (Economist 2014) 
Moreover, after nearly two decades of delays and, by many accounts, under-
utilization of private investment during PAC, concessions and PPPs slowly but surely 
accounted for more and more of the transport sector during Rousseff’s administration 
(see Figure 7). Today, Brazil’s privatized road network is second only to China (World 

















Figure 7: Total Investment in Transport Concessions and PPPs (US$ million) 
 
Source: PPIAF-World Bank. 
What accounts for this success? Similar to other patterns of reform presented in 
this chapter, the attempt to transform the transport sector resulted in seemingly endless 
delays and negotiations of major reforms. The slower pace and scale of radical changes, 
however, opened up space for problem-solving.  For instance, the constant revisions from 
BNDES, the TCU and CGU, the judiciary, and Congress, forced the government to take a 
careful and limited approach and contributed to a good deal of institutional learning 
(Correia 2011, 283). Moreover, because many actors were involved in reforms, changes 
were less prone to reversals, and the relatively successful concessions meant that 
dramatic reforms were not necessary. Thus, when the government was constrained by 
DNIT and Law 8666, they considered concessions and PPPs a viable option. 
The experience of Brazil stands in sharp contrast to Argentina. Whereas reforms 
in Argentina were rapidly pushed through, only to result in disappointing outcomes and a 
backlash, Brazil’s halting reform process provided opportunities to learn from mistakes, 
to adjust the approach, and to build up the institutions necessary for a new model. Thus, 
as Argentina was abandoning the concession model, Brazil’s use of concessions and 
PPPs was just gaining steam and procurement contracting procedures had improved 
dramatically as well.241  
                                                 








This is not to say that the long task of building institutions is complete. Indeed, 
problems regarding private investment in infrastructure remain. Much remains to be done 
to strengthen regulatory agencies, especially those at the state level (Correa et al. 2006). 
And regulatory agencies have not been immune from political pressure of presidents 
appealing to their base (Amann et al. 2014).242 Yet, problem-solving modifications 
sequenced over time have provided a way to make progress in reconstructing institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis demonstrated how political-organizational factors affect 
reform type. Expectations that Brazilian presidents will distribute bureaucratic positions 
meant that President Collor’s attempt to impose reform intransigently would not be 
tolerated by the Brazilian political class and resulted in his impeachment. President 
Cardoso learned from Collor’s failure that governing alone was not an option and, thus, 
returned to the inclusionary governing pattern. As a result, however, attempts at powering 
reforms were diluted, slowed, or halted entirely due to negotiation, compromise, and 
transaction with coalitional allies until they looked more like partial reforms. In his first 
term, President Lula da Silva sought to placate the PT’s demand for executive positions 
by limiting the number of appointments allocated to allied parties; but as a result, 
Congress halted some of his signature policies, such as infrastructure projects. 
Consequently, Lula included a broader coalition in the executive in his second term.243 In 
                                                 
242 On occasion, Presidents Lula and Rousseff have changed the regulatory model for new highway 
concessions, selecting winning bidders on the basis of those able to offer the lowest tolls rather than on the 
basis of track record or capacity to deliver (O Globo, 8 December 2013) (Amann et al. 2014, 23). 
243 Dilma—in large part because she reduced patronage in agencies such as transport and developed strong 
mechanisms to limit pork and monitor budget amendments by coalitional allies (such mechanisms are 
addressed in greater detail in the next chapter)—has faced increasing resistance from her coalitional 
partners in achieving her policy goals. This highlights the ever-present tension between advancing policy 
objectives and compensating coalitional allies.  
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all of these cases, the obstacles to concentrating power in small loyal teams close to the 
president tended to impede powering attempts from going forward.  
Where powering did occur, it left negative and enduring repercussions. The 
transport planning agency (GEIPOT) and the highway agency (DNER) were nearly 
destroyed during Collor’s powering attempt. This resulted in their politicization under 
Cardoso, and ultimately Congress’s decision to abolish the agencies. Nearly all of the 
problems in the transport sector in Brazil today are in some way related to the weak 
capacity and autonomy of transportation agencies. Recent protests have erupted in Brazil 
over the quality of urban transport. Earlier in the 20
th
 century GEIPOT planned and 
coordinated urban transport development with states and municipalities. Without a 
planning and coordination agency or even a forum for discussion, municipalities have 
been left to hash out the complex engineering designs, jurisdictional debates, and 
investment issues on their own. Despite efforts to rebuild GEIPOT and DNER, under 
their new names EPL and DNIT, reconstructing experience, expertise, and political 
autonomy is a long, arduous process.  
The deleterious effects of the initial powering efforts were slowly ameliorated by 
problem-solving. The incremental stop-and-start process meant that complex problems 
divided into smaller steps. Instead of relying on comprehensive planning to get reforms 
right in one shot, policymakers were able to make a change, evaluate, adjust, and 
implement an improved approach. This was of crucial importance for designing 
concession contracts. The delays allowed policymakers to learn from experiences of 
earlier privatizations. It also meant that reforms were scrutinized by a diverse set of 
individuals, instead of likeminded reform teams prone to group think. This enhanced the 
transparency of the process and also meant that reforms were thoroughly assessed before 
implementation.  
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Second, the challenges of advancing changes in a context of coalitional 
presidentialism opened up space for technocrats. Because Brazilian executives needed to 
appoint coalitional allies to key ministries and agencies within the executive to ensure 
their support in Congress, they often conferred greater authority to technical experts. 
Under Cardoso, BNDES provided an antidote to coalitional allies’ attempts to use 
privatization to their advantage. Lula turned to the Army in order to enhance capacity and 
to limit all-out thievery in DNIT. Finally, Rousseff turned over the top positions in 
transportation to a long-time civil servant and a general in order to reduce the 
politicization of these areas and to achieve her policy objectives. By contrast, Argentine 
executives have tended to rely on individuals who are both partisan loyalists to the 
executive and in some cases also technical experts. Brazilian presidents induced to 
distribute executive appointments among coalitional allies often use more neutral 
technical experts as a counterweight. Such technical experts and civil servants tend to 
have greater expertise and experience and thus wider bounds of rationality than their 
political counterparts. For all of these reasons, smaller-scale reforms phased in over time 
by experts within the state tend to be more effective.  
Third, problem-solving tends to be more enduring. Imposition of overhauls breeds 
opposition, but modifications phased in gradually do not have the same effect. In 
Argentina, privatization was rapid and deep-cutting, transforming the entire model of 
service provision for infrastructure, but a decade later, reforms were reversed completely. 
By contrast, in Brazil concessions advanced slowly, accounting for a small percent of the 
network. Lula, who had long argued against privatization, could have overturned the 
model, but there was little reason to—concessions were working quite well. The absence 
of powering reforms in Brazil meant that a number of different models for addressing 
transportation needs were used simultaneously, assessed in their effects, and gradually 
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improved: Concessions started slowly and only accelerated under leftist presidents; PPPs 
were introduced and only applied years later, after experimenting and testing the model; 
DNIT and Law 8666 were slowly transformed and improved over time; and the Army 
was given a significant role in advancing infrastructure and rebuilding DNIT.   
In the absence of dramatic overhauls, since Collor the transport sector has 
undergone a slow but marked transformation. Changes accumulated over time, and failed 
reforms resulted in new rounds of modifications. In this way, institutions in the transport 
sector in Brazil exhibited considerable dynamism. Much of the effort has necessarily 
been focused on recreating the capabilities of GEIPOT and DNER. While this has been a 
very slow process and there is still much more to be done,244 problem-solving has 
provided an ongoing way to transform weak institutional environments and make 
improvements in state building. 
  
                                                 
244 The 1980s constituted a drought in terms of spending on infrastructure and the 1990s was not much 
better. The PAC program, starting in 2007 made an important contribution to infrastructure spending, but 
Brazil still remains far behind in this regard. In 2013 just 1.5 percent of Brazil’s GDP went into 
infrastructure from both public and private sources (McKinsey Global Institute 2013), with a global 
average of 3.8 percent. The Economist estimated that to catch up, Brazil would have to triple is annual 
infrastructure spending for the next 20 years (Sep 28th 2013).  Thus, Brazil has improved not only in terms 
of strengthening institutions, but also in terms of investing more in infrastructure.  
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Chapter 7 Health in Brazil: Problem-Solving Success 
The preceding chapter on transportation explained why most reforms in Brazil 
unfolded in increments and less precipitously but with greater success than those in 
Argentina. The analysis demonstrated that the development of entrenched patterns of 
executive power-sharing (coalitional presidentialism) shapes who is involved in the 
reform process and which type of reform will likely be selected. While President Collor’s 
application of powering in transportation policy demonstrated that such an approach can 
be tried in Brazil, it was an anomaly: under normal conditions, the chapter showed how 
the multiplicity of veto players in the Brazilian context of coalitional presidentialism 
resulted in discussion, negotiation broke up grand plans for change, slowed the process, 
and afforded a greater role to insider experts. This resulted in judgments that were much 
closer to the mark because they relied on more solid information and had a greater 
capacity for processing. For all of these reasons, transportation reforms in Brazil illustrate 
the negative repercussions of powering, but showed that ensuing problem-solving 
gradually ameliorated the negative and enduring consequences of dramatic overhauls and 
achieved greater success than the powering approach in Argentina. 
Health reforms in Brazil have proceeded even more gradually and with 
particularly high success. In the 1980s, health indicators in backward areas of Brazil fell 
far behind health indicators in other countries at a similar level of development (McGuire 
2010). Health care coverage reached only a limited proportion of the population and was 
highly centralized, not extending to many areas in vast Brazil. Since the return of 
democracy, Brazil’s healthcare system has been thoroughly reconfigured. It has 
undergone both universalization and municipalization. Remarkably, this radical 
transformation has not been accompanied by disjointed shifts, “Big Bangs,” or critical 
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junctures. Indeed, the 1988 Constitution enshrined new health rights, but such changes 
built on a series of gradual changes that had been slowly transforming health in Brazil 
and began long before the democratic transition (Weyland 1996; Falleti 2010; cf. 
Kaufman and Nelson 2004). Such problem-solving changes by actors within the state 
continued and gradually transformed general principles of the 1988 Constitution into 
reality. This often occurred under the radar of political actors, but such quiet alterations 
accumulated over time into an irreversible sea-change (cf. Falleti 2010). Thus, while 
reforms in health were more gradual and developed more slowly than the reforms 
analyzed in other chapters on Brazil and Argentina, they have been more successful at 
achieving their goals and they have been cumulatively transformative.   
To account for these slower changes and even higher achievement of goals, this 
chapter emphasizes continuity in the absence of powering, which extended the time-
horizons of actors within the state for affecting change. A group of health professionals 
faced problems in the existing policy process and were able to reorient, inch-by-inch, 
existing policy. They built consensus in favor of transforming a system based on 
expensive, curative treatments into one based on preventative care. This process was 
marked by trial and error and learning from past mistakes. These smaller-scale changes, 
phased in over time, did not require the same tremendously complex comprehensive 
planning necessary for reforms in Argentina. Thus, reforms in the Brazilian health sector 
were less likely to run up against cognitive constraints. And when they did, when reform 
strategies failed or the changes themselves failed to produce expected outcomes, health 
officials were able to learn and correct their approach or the reforms. Moreover, 
reformers in health tended to back away from frontal, revolutionary changes that would 
incense opponents, and which carry substantial risk of reversal. Instead, the piecemeal 
approach had lower costs and better prospects for success.  
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The slow unfolding of this multifaceted process that spanned over twenty-five 
years and various levels of government consists of innumerable important problem-
solving reforms. After providing a brief overview of such changes, I focus on one area in 
particular: transparency in government contracting. The Ministry of Health has the largest 
budget of all Brazilian ministries and spends far more in terms of procurement than any 
other sector, even though much of the contracting for health occurs at the state and 
municipal levels.245 Moreover, the Ministry of Health, in the past, has been particularly 
vulnerable to corruption and pharmaceutical cartels. Thus, procurement is an important 
area for understanding the performance of the health sector.   
After outlining the basic features of the gradual revolution in health this chapter 
moves to the analysis of procurement. The analysis of contracting intersects with many of 
the reform efforts highlighted in the previous chapter on transportation in Brazil and also 
demonstrates how gradual changes in one area of the federal administration expand to 
others and set in motion additional changes that accumulate over time, enhancing 
transparency and accountability.  In addition, reform in health procurement illustrates two 
important advantages of problem-solving—its ability to engender learning and to 
safeguard bureaucratic autonomy. Next, the chapter highlights persistent challenges in 
health; while the changes over the last twenty years have been impressive and substantial, 
the challenges should not be understated—there is much to be done to improve health and 
transparency in Brazil. The section also highlights ongoing efforts to improve health care 
provision. The penultimate section compares health and transportation reforms in Brazil 
and draws broad comparisons with Argentina. A final section concludes.  
                                                 
245 Data from Siga Brazil and ComprasNet (2011).  
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GRADUAL BUT POWERFUL TRANSFORMATION OF HEALTH CARE IN BRAZIL   
The 1988 Constitution: One step in a long reform process 
Prior to 1988, health care was centralized in the federal government, which 
contracted most services from the private sector. Coverage extended only to formal sector 
workers and tended to privilege curative treatment over preventative care, which left 
much of the population without access to basic health services. Health indicators 
reflected the miserable conditions for those without health care; in 1990, Brazil recorded 
the eighth highest infant mortality rate among 105 developing countries, controlling for 
GDP per capita (McGuire 2010, 151).   
In this context, then, the 1988 Constitution would seem a watershed moment, a 
“big bang” for health in Brazil (cf. Kaufman and Nelson 2004).  The document produced 
over almost two years by a constituent assembly, enshrined the right to health care for all 
citizens, created provisions of decentralization, and formally established the Brazilian 
Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS).  
Nevertheless, the 1988 Constitution was far from a powering reform. As scholars 
such as Tulia Falleti have emphasized, the seemingly radical changes were the 
culmination of a gradual reform process by actors that had “infiltrated” the state long 
before (2010). In particular, reform efforts that led up to the 1988 Constitution were 
largely led by a group of progressive health professionals, formed during the military 
dictatorship (1964-1985), known as the Movimento Sanitário (public health movement). 
The movement criticized the health care available to the rural and urban poor, considered 
health a universal human right, and objected to the excessive reliance of the health care 
system on curative as opposed to preventative medicine (Arretche 2005, 167; Weyland 
1995, 1702).  Beginning in the 1970s, many sanitaristas became civil servants or filled 
appointed positions in the bureaucracy, first at the state and local levels, then in the 
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federal government (Weyland 1995; 1996);246 thus, “infiltrating” the state (Falleti 2010; 
Escorel 1999, 183, 189).    
Using administrative rules and regulations the sanitaristas continued the process 
of extension of legal entitlements and the provision of medical services to rural regions 
(Weyland 1995, 1703). While one might expect strong resistance from numerous vested 
interests, such change did not arouse significant opposition. Modifications and 
adjustments were gradual and continued a process of extension that had been under way 
for decades (Malloy 1979).  
By the time the constituent assembly was convened the sanitaristas had well-
established networks and expertise after years of learning from trial and error. In a 
context of multiple veto players, this put them in a position to exercise strong influence, 
so that the codification and institutionalization of the practices they had perfected over 
the years of military rule were politically feasible. This is not to say that the constituent 
assembly debates over the fate of health care in Brazil were without political conflicts. 
Medical business’s opposition to many of the changes in the end resulted in removing 
provisions that would result in the gradual statization of health care (Weyland 1996, 168).  
Nonetheless, the 1988 Constitution was an achievement for the sanitaristas and 
included sweeping principles—the universal right to health care, in addition to the 
decentralization and unification of the public health system. While this was an important 
advance, many of these general principles were left vague in order to avoid additional 
conflict (Weyland 1996, 169). Moreover, authors highlight that the changes in the 
Constitution regarding the health sector “brought to light change that had been 
                                                 
246 The Sanitarian Movement was not really an interest group: it never acquired a mass base and exercised 
its influence more like an issue network within the state than as a pressure group operating mainly in civil 
society (McGuire 2010, 177).  
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percolating beneath the surface and been nurtured at the local level for more than a 
decade” (Falleti 2010, 58).  
Thus, the 1988 Constitution was an important step, but only one step in the long 
process of transforming the health sector. Such changes did not imply an immediate 
overhaul and had no teeth without sustained support in the implementation process. That 
is, without enabling legislation and sustained, far-reaching institutional changes, the 
extension of health rights would mean little in practice. Such rights needed to be 
operationalized. Thus, there was every possibility that little would, in fact, change. 
From Failure to Progress: The Evolution of SUS (1990-2010) 
Indeed, at first it seemed that little would change in the provision of health care. 
By 1995 results were disappointing. Although there were attempts to push through 
sweeping changes that would create a unified and decentralized health care system, these 
were undermined by the diverse veto players, which included not only the welter of 
political parties, but also the private sector, institutions of horizontal accountability, states 
and municipalities, and the bureaucracies at all of these levels.  Some states had received 
federal transfers that were to assist with their assumption of a greater role in the provision 
of health services, but such transfers were often used for other purposes. By the mid-
1990s, actual change seemed negligible and scholars noted that “the movement achieved 
few improvements” (Weyland 1996; 1995, 1699).  Brazil was also deemed a laggard 
reformer by the IFIs. In the 1990s, like Argentina, most countries adopted neoliberal 
health reforms. By strengthening the public system, Brazil moved in the opposite 
direction. Later in the 1990s, Brazil did negotiate a policy-based loan from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) and World Bank, but in the end, Brazil was given 
a rare “unsatisfactory” rating for its performance (Weyland 2006, 152-4).  
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Nonetheless, twenty years later, evaluations of health care report very different 
findings. The Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS) has been completely reoriented: 
access is free, coverage is universal, delivery is decentralized, and services are integrated. 
The private sector continues to exist and play a complementary role to SUS, but the 
capacity of the public system has expanded significantly. The number of health care 
facilities grew from 22,000 to 75,000 in 2009 (IBGE 2010; Gragnolati, Lindelow, and 
Couttolenc 2003, 2). Much of the expansion reflects the growing emphasis on primary 
care; the Family Health Strategy (ESF), which was based on pilot programs in Ceará and 
other states in the 1980s, played a central role in this expansion. Family health teams 
increased from 4,000 to more than 31,600 and are present in over 90 percent of Brazil’s 
5,565 municipalities, providing coverage especially to families in the lowest-income 
quintiles (Ministry of Health DAB 2011, Macinko 2011; Ministry of Health DATASUS 
data). This strategy, and the gradual reallocation of resources to primary care, has 
reduced the hospital-centric nature of the system and increased preventative care. In 
doing so, SUS has also reduced disparities across regions (Couttolenc 2011).  Thus, since 
1988 the transformation of health has made significant progress towards the initial 
objectives of the sanitaristas.  
Such developments have yielded clear results. From 1960 to 1990 infant mortality 
decline was much slower than GDP per capita growth predicted. This trend was reversed, 
however, from 1990 to 2005. During that time Brazil’s infant mortality rate dropped very 
rapidly, despite slow economic growth. By 2005, infant mortality had fallen to the level 
predicted by Brazil’s GDP per capita (McGuire 2010, 149). Recent World Bank reports 
confirm these findings. In terms of coverage of health interventions with a clearly defined 
target group, such as immunizations, antenatal care, and hospital deliveries, “Brazil is a 
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stellar performer, with nearly universal coverage and limited geographic disparities” 
(World Bank 2013, 6). 
Another approach to assessing the contribution of the health system is to evaluate 
trends in avoidable mortality (i.e., deaths that could have been avoided with timely and 
effective health care). A number of studies of avoidable (or amenable) mortality in Brazil 
suggest that SUS has played an important role in improving outcomes; mortality from 
avoidable causes declined significantly, while mortality from other causes remained 
stable (World Bank 2013, 8-9; Malta et al. 2010; Abreu, Cesar, and Franca 2007; 
2009).247  Table 5 shows the change in health outcomes in Brazil along with comparable 
countries. Life expectancy has increased by 15.5 percent and infant mortality decreased 
by 71.3 percent. These advances far outpaced improvement in Latin America and other 
middle-income countries, and are very close to the best performing countries. In sum, a 
sea change has occurred in Brazilian health.  
Thus, despite initially disappointing advances in health reform, Brazil went on to 
transform the health system, which yielded impressive results in a number of areas. 
Indeed, challenges remain, but before addressing persistent difficulties, the next section 
addresses factors that contributed to the reorientation of the health system. 
  
                                                 
247 In some cases mortality has increased. Socioeconomic changes in Brazil mean that first-world health 
problems such as noncommunicable diseases like heart disease and diabetes, are increasingly causes or 
contributors to mortality.  
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Table 5: Change in Health Outcomes in Brazil and Comparable Countries, 1985-
2009 (percentage change) 
Country or group of countries Life expectancy Infant mortality 
Brazil 15.5 -71.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.1 -33.2 
Middle-income countries 6.1 -28.5 
China and India 11.1 -60.5 
Best performers in groupª 16.5 -76.3 
Sources: IBGE 2004; Ministry of Health data (Ministry of Health, SVS 2011); World Bank 2011; World Bank 2013, 82. 
ª Best performers are Peru in life expectancy and Turkey in infant mortality. 
Factors Contributing to Advances  
Why were reforms successful? How did reformers achieve complex 
transformations such as universalization and decentralization given all of the vested 
interests in the existing system? Given that the changes spanned decades, what sustained 
the reforms? How was it possible to develop a unified system given the lack of political 
will? Two characteristics of the reform process were crucial: First, the scale and speed of 
reform, and second, the collective characteristics of the reformers. I’ll address each of 
these factors in turn.  
Small-scale changes advanced over time, meaning that there was no need to 
comprehensively plan the whole reform at once. While many actors within the state were 
guided by broad goals such as basic health care for all, they did not propose a specific 
model and they did not attempt to make comprehensive changes in one shot. Instead their 
reform tactics were flexible and they adapted their approach along the way. The core 
ideal espoused by sanitaristas and other groups was shifting the emphasis of health care 
from curative to preventative care. The specific means to this end evolved over time.  
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For instance, initially sanitaristas expected that municipalization—that is, 
bringing care closer to patients—would result in greater levels of accountability and 
better care. Yet, as reformers realized that rent-seeking political leaders at the local level 
were a threat to their hopes regarding quality care and as more sanitaristas entered the 
federal government, they began to favor making funding at the municipal level 
conditional on fulfilling requirements. As they observed consequences of greater 
autonomy at the local level, reform groups initially opposed to centralized rules that 
reduced municipalities’ discretion began to support the ability of the Ministry of Health 
to influence local policy (Barros 2001; Carvalho 2001). Similarly, as reformers 
discovered that smaller municipalities did not have the personnel or resources to 
effectively manage hospitals, sanitaristas began to advocate a shift to greater regional 
coordination.248 The inability of experts, such as many of the well-educated sanitaristas, 
to foresee such problems in their initial reform objectives, illustrates that even specialists 
are cognitively constrained. 
Yet, sequencing of adjustments made learning possible. Trial and error is a much 
more forgiving approach than shooting what one hopes is a magic bullet. It was precisely 
the more experimental approach that gave rise to one of Brazil’s widely admired 
initiatives, Programa Saúde da Família (Family Health Program, PSF). This program 
was designed to deliver basic health services to the poor in all parts of the country and 
served as a gateway for the health care system. From 1994 onward, the program 
expanded with a series of successive reforms, which increased funding for basic 
                                                 
248 Author interview with Dr. Luciana Mendes, health coordinator, Institute of Applied Economic 
Research, January 26, 2012. 
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preventative care (Weyland 2006, 175; Hunter and Borges Sugiyama 2009). Such reform 
successes often cascaded from one area of health policy to another.249   
Second, the characteristics of reformers were also crucial for shaping success of 
Brazil’s health reform. The sanitarista movement was made up of many academics and a 
variety of other individuals, many of whom possessed high levels of education. Certainly, 
this was important for their efforts. Yet, in interviews with sanitaristas many of them 
recounted the importance of experience—their previous positions in local, state, and 
federal government. Successes and failures over time provided the fodder for not only 
their contribution to the Constitution of 1988, but also for a wide variety of other 
piecemeal changes.250   
Reform strategies were shaped by not only individual experience, but also by the 
collective interaction of the reformers. The sanitaristas did not have a monolithic 
approach or a singular set of objectives. They had a few core principles, but there was 
substantial divergence on even basic ideals. Most wished to see a shift from curative to 
preventative care, but what that meant and what level of government should provide it 
varied dramatically.251 While the different objectives and experiences of reformers often 
further slowed and complicated reform efforts, it also meant that sanitaristas were 
induced to explain and defend their proposals to those who disagreed, which contributed 
to cross-checking reforms and refinements.  
Moreover, the diversity in the health sector seemed to grow over time. New 
groups developed. For instance in early 1990s the Primary Care Movement, a loose 
                                                 
249 Author interview with Mendes.  
250 Author interviews with Dr. Jovita José Rosa, Diretora da Secretaria Executiva do Movimento de 
Combate a Corrupcao Eleitoral (played a central role in negotiating ficha limpa law), auditor for Ministry 
of Health DENASUS, President for the National Union of Health Auditors (UNASUS), January 16, 2012; 
Sanitarista and high-level Ministry of Health official, December 5, 2011.  
251 Author interview with Sanitarista and high-level Ministry of Health official, December 5, 2011. 
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alliance made up of a large contingent of nurses, emerged.252 The Sanitarista Movement 
itself began to further splinter and no longer held unified objectives (Arretche 2004, 
185).253 Such groups were also prompted to subject their proposals to the scrutiny of an 
even more diverse set of actors. For example, the Minister of Health under Cardoso, José 
Serra, was an economist by training. Reform proposals, then, were cross-checked and 
vetted by a diverse group of individuals, and, thus, were less prone to “groupthink.” In all 
of these ways, the bounds of rationality were looser for reformers with expertise and 
experience and who were induced to negotiate and compromise.  
By including a wide array of approaches in the reform process, concessions were 
often made to opponents, but this also had salutary effects on the reform process in the 
long run. Instead of foisting responsibility for health services onto municipalities, local 
governments were provided a range of options for assuming responsibility for changes. It 
took over a decade, but by 2001 all Brazilian municipalities had qualified for the federal 
health care decentralization program, although they had the autonomy to reject the 
increased responsibility (Arretche 2004, 179). Along the way numerous changes were 
made to ensure that reforms were palatable to points of resistance. For instance, increases 
in the amount of revenue states, municipalities, and federal government are obliged to 
spend have been gradually phased in (Piola and Biasoto 2001). Such strategies often 
diluted or slowed change, but it also meant that they were politically feasible and less 
subject to reversal later on. By seeking allies, developing networks, and building reform 
coalitions, change could be advanced down the road when resistance subsided. Longer 
                                                 
252 This group played an important role in persuading the Ministry of Health in 1991 to scale up to the 
national level the Health Agents Program in Ceará, which had been developed in 1987 (Tendler; McGuire 
2010, 162; Weyland 2006, 174-5, 207-209). As a result the national Community Health Agents Program 
(PACS) was created and later became a part of the Family Health Program (PSF).  
253 Author interview with Sanitarista and high-level Ministry of Health official, December 5, 2011; Dr. 
Roberto Nogueira, IPEA health expert, January 10, 2012.  
 190 
time horizons meant that failure to immediately reform generated learning and new 
tactics to advance change down the line. 
In sum, these two factors—smaller-scale change sequenced over time and 
characteristics of the decision makers—allowed reformers to experiment, learn, adjust, 
and ultimately perfect reforms over time. Moreover, by advancing modifications inch by 
inch and negotiating the more substantial changes, reformers made improvements more 
sustainable. This section provided a broad overview of the transformation of the Brazilian 
health sector, which was the product of hundreds of different reforms in a variety of areas 
and at different levels of government. The next section analyzes the unfolding changes in 
one area of the health sector: public procurement.  
A SLOW BUT SUSTAINED EXPANSION OF TRANSPARENCY IN PROCUREMENT 
Despite the incremental advance of health reforms in the 1990s, powerful political 
and economic interests remained entrenched in the health sector and in public 
procurement in particular. Although spending on health services was slowly 
decentralized, the Ministry of Health remained responsible for much of the spending on 
pharmaceuticals for SUS. As was the case in Argentina, it was well known among many 
experts that pharmaceutical cartel behavior was the norm and was responsible for 
siphoning millions off public health coffers.254  
Moreover, although there are strong civil service protections in Brazil, they do not 
extend to procurement officials.255 The pay is low, the work undesirable (Motta 2010). 
Thus, those responsible for maintaining integrity in the government contract bidding 
                                                 
254 Author interview with Dr. Jovita José Rosa, Diretora da Secretaria Executiva do Movimento de 
Combate a Corrupcao Eleitoral (Movement responsible for ficha limpa law), auditor for Ministry of Health 
DENASUS, President for the National Union of Health Auditors (UNASUS), January 16, 2012.  
255 There are no careers or specific tenure protections for the approximately 20,000 procurement 
employees (Motta 2010).  
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processes were often appointed based on a political logic and strategically positioned in 
the health contracting unit to divert health resources.256 Those that were meritocratically 
selected often lacked training or the autonomy to hold contractors accountable.257  
Such problems were only exacerbated by the procurement Law 8666 passed in 
1993.258 The law proved tremendously time-consuming and costly for simple goods and 
services. Purchasing basic pharmaceutical products often took well over six months and 
could stretch on for years, which was common when the process ended up in court. Given 
the bottleneck in obtaining medications, surgical supplies, or hospital beds, for example, 
“emergency” procedures were used excessively in bypassing these delays. Instead of 
requiring competitive bids, emergency procedures allow government officials to buy 
from the supplier of their choosing and with no limit on price. In cases of true emergency 
this is justified. However, officials estimate that emergency contracts in some agencies 
were used for well over 70 percent of contracts in 1997,259 opening the door to corruption 
and contracts that privileged cronies and, in particular, the strong pharmaceutical lobby. 
 As Chapter 7 demonstrated, when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his 
Minister of State Reform Bresser-Pereira attempted to push through comprehensive 
corrective legislation between 1995 and 1998, it was precisely the corrupt interests which 
defended Law 8666 and prevented passage. Yet, another set of reforms did go on to 
                                                 
256 Author interview with Dr. Rosa.  
257 In contrast to the meritocratic recruitment and job security enjoyed by many Brazilian public 
employees, there are no careers or specific tenure protections for the approximately 20,000 procurement 
employees. In (cf. Motta  2010). Author interview with Francisco Gaetani, former Deputy Executive 
Secretary at the Ministry of Planning (2003-2011), February 24, 2012. The situation is not much better at 
the policy-making level: Supervisory procurement positions in federal ministries are filled by the lowest-
ranking non-clerical political appointees. And while supervisory appointees and the staff of the small 
contracting policy and technology department (DLSG) enjoy higher salaries, none of the positions are 
specifically reserved for civil servants (Motta 2010, 144-148). 
258 As Chapter 6 discussed, the rigid procurement rules tilted the legal framework in favor of construction 
companies that bid on public works contracts. 
259 Author interview with Marcos Ozorio de Almeida, World Bank Consultant and SERPRO, August 7, 
2009. 
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transform procurement and transparency not only for the health sector, but also for the 
rest of the Brazilian government.  
The following case demonstrates how a seemingly small change led to the gradual 
introduction of a new system, pregão, which set in motion other changes that 
accumulated over time, enhancing transparency and accountability in government 
contracting and health in particular. As the analysis below will explain, pregão is a simple 
online reverse auction; in an auction, the highest bidder wins, but in the “reverse” auction 
the lowest bidder wins the contract.  
Pregão: Crafted Under the Radar   
In contrast to highly political attempts at change, the problem-solving pregão 
reforms that went on to transform transparency and procurement in the health sector were 
developed by a small team of technical professionals in the little-known Department of 
Logistics and General Services (DLSG) within the Ministry of Planning, Budget, and 
Management. In 1999, at the beginning of the second Cardoso administration, executives 
decided against the powering approach that had failed to reform procurement in the first 
administration; the political appointees who were supporters of comprehensive change 
left the administration. Instead, Elisabeth Braga, a low-profile career civil servant from 
the Ministry of Finance, was appointed to lead the contracting policy and technology 
department and a few of the technical members from the prior team were appointed to 
join her in the DLSG (Fernandes 2010, 176). It was, according to these team members, 
precisely the absence of political interest in reforming procurement and their technical 
acumen that allowed them to remain in positions related to procurement policy.260 Indeed, 
                                                 
260 Author interview with Carlos Moreira, former Director of DLSG (2004-2010), January 23, 2012. None 
of the positions in DLSG are specifically reserved for civil servants (Motta  2010,144-148). Thus, the 
effective protections which guarantee meritocratic recruitment for much of the Brazilian federal 
administration do not extend to the pregão case.  
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these professionals had learned from past reforms and their experience in other ministries 
that sweeping change was neither desirable nor feasible; most knew firsthand how the 
well-intended 1993 reform resulted in furthering corrupt practices. Therefore, they did 
not have a clear reform program in mind but sought simply to improve the existing 
situation and resolve some of the problems created by Law 8666. 
The problem-solving solution for procurement reform did not emerge from an 
extensive, systematic evaluation of all possible alternatives, but from an existing 
alternative familiar to the team: the pregão contracting experiment in the newly created 
National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL)—itself an example of a successful 
problem-solving reform (cf. Monteiro 2005). In 1997, an exception to Law 8666 was 
created for ANATEL that resulted in the use of the pregão online reverse auction, which 
increased efficiency and transparency in contracting while reducing costs. Braga’s team 
began exploring possibilities for piloting pregão in other areas of the Brazilian federal 
administration, with the hope that such a change would provide a way around Law 
8666.261 
Interviews with key decision makers suggested they intentionally employed a 
number of tactics to keep the pregão reform incremental and to remain under the radar of 
political actors and construction companies.262 Braga’s team began drafting a medida 
provisória (provisional measure), an executive decree with legislative force which would 
extend applicability of the ANATEL law to other areas and agencies, but that was 
strategically limited in three important ways. First, the change was not mandatory. Pregão 
would be one of many modalities that contracting officers could use to procure goods and 
                                                 
261 Author interview with Elisabeth Braga, former Director of DLSG (2000-2004), May 18, 2012. 
262 Author interviews with Braga; Vera Monteiro, legal consultant for pregão legislation from Sundfeld 
Law Office, November 27, 2011. 
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services. Therefore, despite the adoption of pregão, opaque areas of the Brazilian federal 
administration could continue reaping their ill-gotten gains from the use of emergency 
contracts and other loopholes. Second, public works were excluded from the measure. In 
Brazil, large construction firms (empreiteiras) that benefit from public works projects are 
known for their contributions to political campaigns through off-the-books accounts 
(caixa dois). According to Vera Monteiro, one of the drafters of the law, the exclusion of 
public works was crucial for the measure’s survival against the powerful construction 
company representatives in the legislature who would halt any public-works-related 
change to Law 8666.263 Finally, while the provisional measure would initially have the 
force of law, it would later require the Legislature’s approval.264 In these ways, the team 
started small, hoping that with time, perceptions regarding the reform would change in 
their favor.  
Timing was also crucial. Braga and her team presented the pregão modification to 
Minister of Planning Martus Tavares, who in turn presented it to President Cardoso just 
as the high-profile Fiscal Responsibility Bill (FRL) was put on his desk.265 Would-be 
opponents of pregão were focused on the FRL, the culmination of incremental changes 
aimed at stemming the financial drain caused by state governments’ spending and at 
stabilizing the Brazilian economy (Schneider 2007). This important bill overshadowed 
the pregão proposal, which seemed, by contrast, a harmless technical modification. Both 
the FRL and the provisional measure were passed on May 4, 2000 (Medida Provisória n. 
2.026 of May 4, 2000). One might wonder: Could high-level decision makers, such as the 
minister, really not have understood the important pregão change? In an interview, I 
                                                 
263 Author interview with Monteiro. 
264 For an explanation of provisional measures see Pereira, Power, and Rennó (2008, 14).  
265 Author Interview with Braga. 
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asked Minister Tavares about the pregão policy, expecting that he, known for his 
technical acumen, would recall its passage.266 Tavares was familiar with the results of 
pregão, but had little recollection of the details of its approval; his efforts at the time were 
focused on the FRL. 
In sum, the pregão initiative was developed by technocrats in response to the day-
to-day problems created by Law 8666. Learning from past failure was essential to their 
strategy, which at every turn was incremental and designed to remain outside the 
attention of potential opposition. One might argue that this seemingly small change was 
simply not an important reform, but, as the next section demonstrates, the new procedure 
proved both effective and enduring. Once begun, pregão’s dissemination was difficult to 
halt; with increased information, the new form of bidding spread and revealed the need 
for additional reforms. 
An Incremental and Sustained Sequence of Reform      
By 2002, when the provisional measure was brought before the legislature for 
approval as a permanent law (Monteiro 2010, 36–49), the advantages of pregão were 
undeniable. Numerous federal agencies had adopted the optional procedure in order to 
speed up the contracting process. Procurement processes for simple goods and services 
that once dragged on for months could be completed in fewer than 15 working days 
(Almeida 2006, 507). These agencies also demonstrated that pregão reduced costs 
considerably—the Inter-American Development Bank estimates a reduction of up to 24 
percent in product acquisition costs (IADB 2009, 20)—and provided other benefits, 
including increased transparency, a reduction in emergency contracts by approximately 
20 percent (Almeida 2006, 507–9), increased competition, and the elimination of 
                                                 
266 Author interview with Martus Tavares, former Minister of Planning (1999-2002), May 28, 2012. 
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intermediaries and geographic limitations on participation by making the process 
available nationwide via the Web (Joia 2002). Years earlier any permanent change to 
Law 8666 would have seemed impossible; however, as the new method became 
entrenched, proven results made the reform difficult to reverse and, as the next sections 
show, the reform process was sustained over time despite presidential turnover. 
As use of pregão spread during President Lula da Silva’s first term, pressure 
increased to use the new approach. And as information accumulated, public servants 
discovered additional areas that could benefit from such reforms. In 2004, the use of 
pregão resulted in the break-up of the “Vampire Mafia,” a group of pharmaceutical 
companies, lobbyists, and Ministry of Health employees who had been manipulating 
bidding processes since the early 1990s. Auditing officials had long suspected a 
corruption ring in the Ministry of Health; therefore, after encountering irregularities in a 
bidding process for hemoderivatives, blood products (hence the “Vampire” Mafia) used 
to treat hemophilia, AIDS, and cancer, the external oversight agency (TCU) mandated a 
new, pregão bidding process for hemoderivatives.267 The online bidding process, wherein 
all participants are anonymous and compete for the lowest bid, challenged the existing 
arrangement; prices dropped by 42 percent.268 The pregão system facilitated the entry of 
other bidders, pushed companies to compete, and reduced opportunities for public 
officials to rig the process. After the initial pregão bids, the Federal Police and the public 
prosecutors of the Ministério Público began an investigation that in 2004 resulted in 
“Operation Vampire;” 17 people were arrested, of whom six were government officials, 
                                                 
267 Author interviews with Dr. Jovita José Rosa, Auditor for Ministry of Health DENASUS, President for 
the National Union of Health Auditors (UNASUS), January 16, 2012; Senior TCU official, January 20, 
2012. 
268 Folha de São Paulo, May 20, 2004. 
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including high-ranking Ministry of Health employees. Officials estimated that the 
Vampire Mafia drained US$40 million from public coffers from 1997 to 2004.269  
This episode triggered two important spillover effects. First, Brazilian states—
which were also affected by the Vampire Mafia—began adopting pregão for 
hemoderivatives (and later for other goods and services). The states and municipalities 
had access to federal online pregão systems as early as 2002, yet only after the shocking 
price reductions did they begin to use them.270   
Second, the adoption of pregão revealed the need for additional reforms. The 
Vampire episode uncovered a major loophole used to direct contracts to cronies: 
Pharmaceutical products were often listed by brand, not generic, name (e.g., “Aspirin” 
instead of “acetylsalicylic acid”), which effectively reduced the number of potential 
suppliers, facilitating collusion among remaining bidders. Shortly after Operation 
Vampire, the Ministry of Planning discovered that this problem resulted from improper 
coding in the Catalog of Materials (CATMAT). The group responsible for coding 
medications had no expertise in medical terminology; therefore, they did not know that 
they should code for “acetylsalicylic acid” when given a request for “Aspirin.” In 2004, 
CATMAT coding of medical products was transferred to a team in the Ministry of Health 
(CGU 2005). Many experts claim that, in the end, this was one of the most important 
advancements in eradicating corruption.271  
In sum, as the use of pregão increased information regarding malfeasance and 
compliance, it revealed the need for the extension of pregão and for additional changes, 
                                                 
269 Folha de São Paulo, May 20, 2004. 
270 Author interview with Adriana Pacheco Aurea, consultant, Ministry of Health and Institution for 
Applied Economic Research, January 25, 2012.  
271 Author interviews with Mariana Ramos, Ministry of Health, March 23, 2012; Adriana Pacheco Aurea, 
consultant, Ministry of Health and Institution for Applied Economic Research, January 25, 2012; Servo.  
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triggering a cascade of reforms. If the powerful drug companies had been aware of 
pregão and its potential, they perhaps would have opposed the modification from the 
beginning. However, at the time of the initial reform, it was impossible to forecast the 
sequence of events that would result in Operation Vampire, demonstrating a key reason 
why the pregão reform was successful: It caught potential opponents unaware.  
Meanwhile, as use of pregão in other ministries and agencies advanced, producing 
impressive results, public servants within the Ministry of Planning and the TCU watched 
for the right moment to make pregão mandatory.272 Pressure to use the new method 
increased over time as contracting officials and middle-level managers realized pregão 
offered autonomy from outside influences by increasing transparency in the process. Yet, 
not all applied—or perhaps were allowed to apply—the new approach. Predictably, 
agencies with the highest levels of corruption were the last to adopt the method. 
Eventually, non-adopters appeared corrupt (cf. Hyde 2011). This was no surprise to the 
TCU, and it became clear that some areas of the government refused to use the new 
method precisely because it would clean up contracting offices that had established 
relationships of kickbacks, bribes, and campaign contributions. Thus, by the time another 
contracting scandal hit in 2005 in the Brazilian Post Office (the initial stages of the 
Mensalão Scandal, a corruption scandal that involved the highest levels of President Lula 
da Silva’s administration), the Ministry of Planning and the TCU had a law regulating 
pregão already drafted.273 President Lula da Silva signed it, making pregão the preferred 
method of contracting, not only for the federal government but for states and 
municipalities using funds from voluntary federal transfers (Decree No. 5504 of August 
5, 2005). 
                                                 
272 Author interview with senior TCU official, January 20, 2012. 
273 Ibid. 
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As Chapter 6 showed, the reform efforts in procurement continued to expand, 
finally reaching public works contracts that also have far-reaching implications for 
health. (e.g., hospital construction falls under public works.) In 2011, under President 
Dilma Rousseff, a new law, the Differential Contracting Regime (RDC), created the 
option to apply some of the concepts of pregão to public works projects, but related only 
to the World Cup and Olympics and only when “convenient” (Rosilho 2013a). Yet, RDC 
has already been extended to public works projects for health (SUS) in addition to a 
number of other areas. All of this would have been unthinkable in 2000, but the quiet, 
gradual changes spearheaded by civil servants have slowly transformed the rigid 
procedures and eroded resistance to change. 
Experiential Learning, Sophisticated Experts, New and Complex Reforms 
As the pregão team learned from prior experiences what was feasible and how to 
sequence changes, their tactics became more sophisticated and they took on new and 
complex areas. One of the areas that reformers in both the Ministries of Planning and 
Health sought to conquer with their quest for transparency was federal transfers to states 
and municipalities.274 A considerable amount of federal funds transferred through 
agreements to states and municipalities or to private, non-profit, non-governmental 
organizations through transfer of contracts never reached their intended recipient or 
purpose (TCU 2014). Such opaque transfers, often initiated via budget amendments 
linked to a specific congressperson (emendas parlamentares), were increasingly used as a 
loophole to divert funds as transparency increased at the federal level.275  
                                                 
274 Interview with Moreira. In Portuguese, such transfers are known as convênios e contratos de repasse. 
275 There are nearly 40,000 municipal partnerships. While the amount of money transferred is often small 
the sheer quantity of transfers means that a significant amount of public funds are diverted (AGN 2010).  
Author interview with a senior TCU official.  
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In 2003, the same team that developed pregão and extended transparency to 
procurement in general, now under the leadership of one of its long-time members, 
Henrique Moreira, began a project that sought to slowly bring federal transfers under the 
same transparency regime as other areas of the federal government. After discussions 
with the TCU, Moreira and his team began developing what came to be known as 
SICONV, a system that would track federal transfers from their originators in Congress 
to their final recipients. The development of the new system simply extended the model 
used for pregão to a new, more complex area.  
The team had weaved together a coalition of government officials who supported 
the effort and they initially drew little attention. But as their work became more widely 
known, resistance emerged. According to Moreira, the experience was like the Battle of 
the Alamo; they maintained the support of a few key Ministry of Planning officials, but 
they sustained attacks from all sides, including deputies and senators, the Ministry of 
Planning, and the other line ministries.276   
The siege subsided, however, as another corruption scandal broke as a result of a 
Federal Police investigation, code-named Operation Bloodsucker (or “leech,” 
sanguessuga), which uncovered fraudulent purchase of ambulances using federal 
transfers. The investigation that followed found that congressional aides had been bribed 
to write individual budget amendments financing the purchase of ambulances with Health 
Ministry funds, and then bidding processes were rigged at the local level. A 
Congressional Investigation (CPI) recommended that seventy-two members of Congress 
be expelled (cassação) (Praça 2011).  
                                                 
276 Author interview with Moreira.  
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Thereafter the TCU officials, who had been in touch with Moreira’s team all 
along, issued a ruling mandating that the Ministry of Planning within 180 days present a 
technical study for the implementation of an information technology system that would 
allow online monitoring of all agreements and other legal instruments used to transfer 
federal funds to other agencies/organizations, federal agencies, and the private sector 
(Acórdão 2066/2006). Essentially, the TCU mandated that the Ministry of Planning 
develop the system that Moreira had told them 3 years earlier was necessary to track such 
expenditures.  
Following the ruling, the reach of SICONV continued to expand (TC 
012.075/2014-0), and is now obligatory for most federal transfers.277 Especially in the 
area of health, it has reduced the opacity of the tremendous amount of funds that flow 
from the federal governments to the states,278 and has become a rich source of data for the 
audit bodies, journalists, and citizens.279  
The Virtuous Circle of Problem-solving     
Advancing modest changes and allowing career administrators to spearhead them 
increases the likelihood of making progress in institution building in a number of ways. 
First, problem-solving reforms tend to de-emphasize political struggles; for instance, in 
the case of pregão, decision makers intentionally avoided reforming public works 
contracts head-on. Instead, they emphasize technical expertise (cf. Dargent 2011). 
Second, if the problem-solving process is successful, then the need for wholesale reform 
is less dire, reducing the impulse to start over from scratch. For example, during the 
turnover between Presidents Cardoso and Lula da Silva, there was no attempt at 
                                                 
277 O Globo, November 12, 2011.  
278 Author interviews with Ramos; Orlando.  
279 Author interview with Toledo; Author interview with Roberto Maltchik, O Globo (top reporter on 
corruption scandals for Globo), October 10, 2011. 
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comprehensive procurement reform; pregão reforms slowly ameliorated the situation. 
This also had implications for personnel decisions: During the turnover, Alexandre Motta 
replaced Braga, but the rest of the skilled technical team remained in place at Motta’s 
request.280 The same situation applied when Henrique Moreira assumed the role. The 
Braga team’s efforts were intentionally non-political; they did not clearly serve one 
political side or another and they were effective. Thus, there was little incentive to 
attempt a completely new reform strategy or replace the team. This made learning 
possible. The team learned from prior reforms what was feasible and how to sequence 
changes, transforming existing employees into reform experts. With increased knowledge 
of the game, experts became more sophisticated, eventually taking on new and complex 
areas such as federal transfers to states and municipalities. In this way, problem-solving 
also allowed bureaucratic autonomy and capacity to build over time.  
By providing opportunities for learning over time, improvements in one area often 
reveal underlying problems in another (e.g., use of pregão revealed needed reforms in 
CATMAT). Such problem-solving changes are important for identifying areas of 
improvement and preserving autonomy. Brazil has strong civil service norms, yet 
improvements in the CATMAT coders’ capacity happened only after pregão exposed the 
problem. And incremental problem-solving changes have, over the long run, enhanced 
the autonomy of procurement staff and increased efforts to provide them with training: 
Motta long argued that pregão was not the solution to all procurement problems and now, 
as the Director of the School of the Ministry of Finance, he spearheads training in this 
area.281  
                                                 
280 Interview with Alexandre Motta, former Director of DLSG (2003-2004), December 22, 2011. 
281 Author interview with Motta.  
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The problem-solving strategy has also contributed to preserving bureaucratic 
autonomy in a broader sense. Brazil has strong civil service norms today (Echebarría and 
Cortázar 2007). Nonetheless, twenty-five years ago this was not ensured. Members of the 
elite team of governmental administrators, who have been in the state since the return of 
democracy, recount in interviews that the impressive level of meritocratic recruitment 
and adherence to civil service guarantees in Brazil was not a given. Such advances, were 
constructed and won slowly, the result of a long problem-solving process.282 Sanitaristas 
have also worked to improve the quality of health professionals and to reduce the amount 
of staff on short-term contracts,283 just as the Transparency Movement has sought to 
improve competitive exams to select only the highest quality candidates who have a zeal 
for safeguarding state resources from corruption.284  
Indeed, Argentina at the dawn of democracy also developed an elite corps of civil 
servants,285 in addition to guarantees of meritocratic recruitment.286 Yet, radical 
restructuring halted many of these programs and disrupted the slow process of building 
up civil service norms and guarantees. Complete overhauls of programs tend to interrupt 
small but cumulatively substantial transformations.  
                                                 
282 Author interview with Aldino Graef, Assessor especial da Subchefia de Análise e Acompanhamento de 
Políticas Governamentais da Casa Civil da Presidência da República; Especialista em Políticas Públicas e 
Gestão Governamental (1993-present), December 5, 2011; Dr. Luiz Alberto dos Santos, Subchefe de 
Análise e Acompanhamento de Políticas Governamentais da Casa Civil da Presidência da República and 
EPPGG, December 8, 2011.  
283 Author interviews with Mendes; Pacheco Aurea.  
284 Author interviews with Gaetani; Dr. Rommel Carvalho, Data Scientist, CGU, April 19, 2012; André 
Luiz Furtado Pacheco, Auditor, Secretaria de Fiscalização de Tecnologia da Informação (Sefti), TCU, 
Brasilia, August 6, 2009.  
285 Known as the Administradores Gubernamentales (governmental administrators). Author interview with 
Hugo Dalbosco, Ministry of Economy, Civil Service Secretariat, Argentina, November 6, 2012. 
286 Author interviews with Guillermo Schweinheim, Director of Training and Development, Tribunal de 
Cuentas de la Nación, Argentina (1984-1992), August 22, 2012.  
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PERSISTENT PROBLEMS 
This is not to say that problem-solving is perfect. Certainly, pregão is not a 
panacea for contracting corruption.287 While there have been major advances in 
transparency, progress at the state and municipal levels is very uneven, especially in a 
country of continental size with high levels of inequality.288 Moreover, much remains to 
be done to improve the Brazilian health system. Basic health care has improved, but a 
shortage of doctors for extending basic health care to remote areas remains a challenge. 
Citizens have access to public hospitals, but the quality of care varies tremendously (e.g., 
many municipalities are too small to operate hospitals effectively and to provide 
necessary funds to ensure quality care).289 Brazil has successfully decentralized and 
brought care closer to citizens, but the coordination across autonomous levels of 
government has blurred defined roles and responsibilities. Finally, civil servant 
protections are strong for many health workers, but state and local governments have 
increasingly augmented the health care workforce with short-term contracted employees, 
which often results in problems with continuity and quality.290 Indeed, many obstacles 
remain to providing quality health care for all.  
                                                 
287 Author interview with Dr. Florencia Ferrer, President, e-Stratégia Pública, November 20, 2011. 
288  A Brazilian NGO, Contas Abertas, conducted a comprehensive assessment of financial transparency at 
various levels of government. While the federal and many state governments ranked quite high, others 
ranked very poorly, providing only data at the most aggregate level. Author interviews with Gil Castello 
Branco; Eduardo Cunha (no relation to the current President of the Chamber of Deputies of Brazil of the 
same name), Senior executive and leader of Accenture’s Global Service Strategy and Operations group in 
Latin America and formerly responsible for supply chain management in Brazil, July 18, 2009; Author 
interview with Roberta Clemente, Assessor Técnico. Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de Sao Paulo, 
September 24, 2011. 
289 In states, such as Amazonas, interviewees suggest that pharmaceutical cartels still have a strong hold on 
the market for certain products. Interview with Ferrer.  
290 Author interviews with Gaetani; Adriana Pacheco Aurea, consultant, Ministry of Health and Institution 
for Applied Economic Research, January 25, 2012. ] 
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE 
Nonetheless, problem-solving provides a way forward, solving seemingly 
intractable problems bit by bit. For example, the extension of transparency continues. In 
an interview with the lead Senate Budget Consultant in 2012, Orlando Neto, the 
ambitions of the transparency movement were outlined clearly. Neto developed the web 
platform, Siga Brasil, where users can access the full budget down to specific 
amendments and line items, in addition to information on public revenues and 
expenditures shortly after execution (including pregão and federal transfer data)—another 
example of successful problem-solving. In the interview, Neto drew a detailed map of 
financial data in Brazil on a giant white board to show exactly what his team has gained 
access to and areas they are working to bring into their database universe. State 
enterprises (e.g., Petrobras) and BNDES, for instance, remained out of their control.291 
Access to federal transfers had expanded information on states and municipalities, as had 
legislation that phased in requirements for municipalities of increasingly smaller sizes to 
make data accessible. Yet, the team had gained access to most of the information over 
time by working with states, municipalities, and a vast network of individuals within the 
federal government who share the goal of expanding transparency. Such networks 
developed over time and have been crucial to the quiet efforts of the elite team of budget 
consultants.292 
Regarding health, experimentation continues, especially at the state and regional 
levels. To address the shortage of medical professionals, the government has piloted 
                                                 
291 Given the recent corruption scandals around Petrobras, this is likely to change.  
292 They are among the highest paid civil servants in the country. After each competitive exam to enter the 
civil service, the lead consultant, who wins his position through an election of the other consultants 
(Orlando Neto has been in this position for over 15 years), selects the candidates he would like on his team. 
Since it is one of the most coveted positions, the team usually gets who they would like, the pick of the 
litter. 
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programs that allow foreign doctors to serve in remote areas.293 Moreover, members from 
the National Health Council (CNS) have started to discuss the development of small pilot 
programs to train physician assistants and nurse practitioners to extend services to these 
areas.294 In recent years, the Ministry of Health has initiated dialogue with the judiciary 
regarding the effects of their rulings on public policy, in addition to improving the 
systems and procedures for incorporating new technologies (Gragnolati 2013, 4).295 The 
debate over judicial decisions regarding health is also present in Congress (Piola et al. 
2012, 152-158). Moreover, experiments with more effective and efficient ways to deliver 
health care have proliferated throughout the country.296 For example, in Bahia, public-
private partnerships have been used to develop and manage hospitals, and in São Paulo, 
the state has turned to private non-profit management groups (i.e., Social Organizations 
in Health, OSS) to administer hospitals. 297 While it is too soon to judge such efforts, such 
experimentation seems promising, precisely because it engenders a learning process.  
Faced with persistent challenges, many auditors and health officials have 
developed innovative ways to reach outside of their roles in the state to mobilize the 
public. For instance, auditors from a variety of different state entities have banded 
together to create NGOs that seek to engage citizens in combating corruption. One of the 
most high-profile results of their efforts was the passage of the “clean sheet” (ficha 
limpa) law (Law no. 135 of 2010), which was proposed by a popular initiative that 
                                                 
293 These are only for positions that no Brazilian doctors have expressed interest in.  
294 Author interview with Rosa.  
295 Author interview with Mariana Ramo.  
296 Brazil has also made significant strides in recent years in clarifying the roles and relationships across 
levels of government with ongoing efforts to modify the framework for contracting between federal 
government and health regions and institutional mechanisms for coordinating between municipalities, 
states, and federal government (Gragnolati 2013, 11). 
297 Author interview with Dr. Luciana Mendes, health coordinator, Institute of Applied Economic 
Research, January 26, 2012. 
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included over 1.3 million signatures in September 2009.298 This law specified that 
candidates with “dirty” court records (i.e., convicted by a second-level court) would be 
ineligible to run for office. Other initiatives seek to educate citizens, especially in poor 
areas, on how to detect, respond to, and report fraud. The Instituto de Fiscalização e 
Controle (Institute of Auditing and Monitoring), for instance, conducts “Caravans” that 
travel to poorer municipalities to educate citizens on the basics of corruption in health, to 
facilitate meetings between citizens and mayors and health officials, to conduct “civic 
audits,” and to develop municipal health councils.299 Indeed, studies have shown that 
each additional year of health council experience reduces corruption incidence levels by 
2.1 percent (Avelino, Barberia, Biderman 2013, 694). In other cases auditors have moved 
into politics, running for office themselves.300 Thus, in a variety of ways, such individuals 
with greater levels of expertise and experience have sought to make connections with 
citizens to increase their power, while seeking to attenuate the cognitive constraints of 
those unfamiliar to the complex world of diversion of funds through health.  
                                                 
298 This effort was largely led by Articulação Brasileira Contra a Corrupção e a Impunidade (Abracci). 
Author interview with Rosa. Only four laws have been passed in such a way in Brazil. O Globo, May 20, 
2010.  
299 Author interviews with Henrique Ziller, Auditor Federal de Controle Externo, Tribunal de Contas da 
União (2001-2014), Founder and President, Instituto de Fiscalização e Controle (2004-present), October 
31, 2011; Rosa.  Auditors have also sought to use their positions by serving as “guides” for citizens at 
participatory governing events. Through a process of dialogue, auditors explain the importance of 
advancing some measures over others to citizen delegates. Indeed, the proposed legislation from such 
participatory conferences looks strikingly similar to auditors’ own proposals for reform. This author was an 
invited observer at the CONSOCIAL 2012, a national participatory conference. The legislation from the 
conference was to be sent on to the Congress.  
300 Author interview with Henrique Ziller, Auditor Federal de Controle Externo, Tribunal de Contas da 
União (2001-2014), Founder and President, Instituto de Fiscalização e Controle (2004-present), October 
31, 2011. 
Author interview with Dr. Jovita José Rosa, Diretora da Secretaria Executiva do Movimento de Combate a 
Corrupcao Eleitoral (played a central role in negotiating ficha limpa law), auditor for Ministry of Health 
DENASUS, President for the National Union of Health Auditors (UNASUS), January 16, 2012.  
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In sum, while problem-solving is no magic bullet, it provides developing 
countries with weak institutional environments an ongoing way to make improvements in 
state building. 
ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE CASES  
Brazil has changed dramatically since the early 1990s when its democratic 
institutions were labeled “feckless” (Mainwaring 1995). Nevertheless, it is hard to pin 
such change on particular turning points. Instead a multitude of seemingly insignificant 
shifts, modifications, and adjustments have occurred, often under the radar, but have 
added up to significant transformations. To observers of any single point in time, Brazil’s 
policy process might have seemed relatively stable and unchanging. Yet, for those who 
visited Brazil in the 1990s, a trip to the country a decade or more later often elicits an 
exclamation such as, “Something has changed here.”  
Based on the analysis of reforms in Brazil over twenty-five years, one can 
conclude that gradual change has, over time, yielded a remarkable transformation. 
Powering in transportation was followed by a long process of problem-solving, which, 
while very slow, has made progress in rebuilding capabilities in this crucial sector for 
Brazil. In health, the absence of dramatic overhauls and the steady series of problem-
solving changes has created a sea change in Brazil—a country that had health indicators 
in many areas that resembled Africa is now held up as an example of successful basic 
health provision.   
Cutting across both areas are impressive advances in transparency and auditing in 
Brazil. Whereas the constant powering in Argentina disrupted similar efforts, 
transparency has flourished in Brazil. Why? The chapters on Argentina demonstrated 
how the centralization of control in tight-knit reform teams facilitated powering that 
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disrupted efforts to increase transparency, monitoring, and oversight. By contrast, in 
Brazil the president hands over many ministries and agencies to coalitional “allies,” but 
allies often have rent-seeking in mind more so than advancing the executive’s governance 
objectives. Thus, there is a governance logic for enhancing transparency and controls. 
But it is not quite that simple. Very often, the executive’s party is just as interested in 
rent-seeking. As a result, presidents do not plunge headlong into transparency and audit 
reforms, but rather are pushed into them. In many of the instances outlined in the 
previous chapters on Brazil, the emergence of corruption scandals provided technocrats 
within the state who wished to advance their objectives the opportunity to do so. In sum, 
the multiplicity of actors in the Brazilian policy process contributes to greater 
opportunities for civil servants and technocrats to advance their own objectives.  
What can be learned from the comparison between Brazilian reforms in health 
and transportation? The comparison between these two areas reveals, first, that even 
though political-organizational patterns make powering rare, an executive still retains 
agency. Collor pushed through powering measures. Despite the current weakness of 
President Rousseff, political-organizational context does not preclude the rise of a 
president who would be willing and able to push through dramatic change. Thus, the 
Brazilian case demonstrated the development of strong patterns of executive power 
sharing, but my study does not guarantee their endurance.  
Second, the comparison underscores the deleterious and enduring consequences 
of powering. Collor’s destruction of transportation agencies left a lasting print on Brazil. 
The years of neglect—the result of firing capable professionals in the transport sector 
(e.g., engineers, auditors, and accountants)—have been corrected very slowly. Rebuilding 
institutions and capacity takes time. Great progress has been made, but Brazil has had to 
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play catch-up in transportation investment and institution building because of large-scale 
blunders decades ago.  
By contrast, health was never subject to the same type of powering. Although it 
has also had to play catch-up—Brazil did not make the same type of progress in the early 
and mid-twentieth century that Argentina had—it has done so quickly, especially given 
its GDP and levels of income inequality. In the area of health, although advances have 
been uneven and have depended to a great degree on politics at other levels (parts of 
Brazil still have vestiges of authoritarian enclaves) the slow building of institutions over 
time has contributed to significant advances in health care for Brazilians.  
CONCLUSION  
This chapter explained how gradual changes sequenced over time by actors within 
the state have thoroughly transformed the Brazilian health system and improved 
transparency in particular. This sea change in Brazil was not the result of a political 
leader taking advantage of a window of opportunity, but rather small, novel, partial, and 
indirect changes were sequenced over time, often quietly and under the radar of political 
and social forces. Nor was the reorientation of health the product of a clear, 
comprehensive model; instead many of the objectives arose from actors within the state 
addressing problems with the existing policy approaches. Indeed, broad principles, such 
as shifting the system from an emphasis on curative to preventative care, guided changes, 
but the specific means toward those broad objectives evolved.  
Proponents of reform at many turns wished for more extensive changes and for a 
quicker process.301 Yet, the multiplicity of actors involved often diluted, delayed, or 
halted changes. This, then, slowed the process and prompted health reformers to consider 
                                                 
301 Author interviews with Nogueira, Rosa, and Mendes. 
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a wider variety of alternatives, but resulted in corrections and revisions. Such an 
approach contributed to an ongoing learning process.  
As my theory suggests, such efforts to resolve smaller problems drew on decision 
makers’ existing knowledge and experiences, not abstract planning that requires greater 
time, information, and intellectual capacity than such actors could possibly have. Thus, 
dividing complex problems into smaller steps and learning over time resulted in more 
effective changes in the long term.  
The preceding analysis further substantiated these claims by focusing on 
transparency reforms in government contracting. It demonstrated how a seemingly small 
change led to the gradual introduction of a new system, which set in motion other 
changes that accumulated over time, enhancing transparency and accountability in 
government spending. Not only did such an approach benefit from learning over time, but 
the gradual nature of the reforms meant that they were less prone to reversals. Reform 
coalitions were crafted slowly along the way. As benefits became clear, reform coalitions 
were built, bit by bit, until they were strong enough to take on opposition that would have 
thwarted the whole effort if it had been presented as a whole.  
 This chapter also revealed an important insight regarding “expertise.” In the early 
1990s, Brazil defied institutions such as the World Bank by moving in the direction of 
universal health care. Twenty years later, however, the very same international 
institutions heaped praise on Brazil for its advances in health care. By addressing 
problems in the policy process, experts within the state made gradual advances over time. 
Experiential learning was crucial for the gains made in health. Experiments in some 
municipalities generated new insights, then changes were made and tested again. This 
process engendered learning, which in the end, turned out to be much more effective than 
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taking the World Bank experts’ advice. In sum, while expertise is important, the findings 
of this chapter emphasize the importance of experiential learning.  
Finally, the chapter highlighted an important factor underlying this analysis—the 
quality of the bureaucracy. It showed that not only were parts of the Ministry of Health 
dominated by clientelistic structures but also that the vast majority of contract officials in 
Brazil do not enjoy civil service protections and they often have very low levels of 
bureaucratic autonomy and capacity.  
Nevertheless, civil service structure is subject to change. This chapter 
demonstrated how reform type significantly affects bureaucratic quality. As Chapters 4 
and 5 on Argentina have demonstrated, powering does not ameliorate governance 
maladies but exacerbates them in the long term; and worse, it may further weaken what 
civil service protections do exist. By contrast, problem-solving has a salutary impact by 
building bureaucratic capacity over time. While the existing structure of the civil service 
matters (cf. Bersch, Praça, Taylor 2014), this chapter demonstrated how change and 
improvements are possible in areas of weak civil service protection and how one reform 
type, problem-solving, can strengthen civil service norms.  
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Chapter 8: Theoretical Implications and Comparative Perspectives 
CENTRAL FINDINGS 
This dissertation presents an in-depth comparative analysis of two competing 
approaches to public administration reform. I demonstrate that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, incremental changes sequenced over time (“problem-solving” reforms) are more 
effective in reducing corruption, increasing transparency, and enhancing accountability 
than swift, ambitious overhauls pushed through by political leaders (“powering”). 
Drawing on cognitive-psychological insights about decision making, I show that gradual, 
sustained changes are more promising because they allow for modifications and 
corrections along the way and do not depend on finding the right solution beforehand, a 
very difficult task in 21
st
-century policy making. 
In addition, I examine the influence of political-organizational context on 
policymakers’ decisions to either embark on sweeping transformations or proceed more 
gradually. I argue that executive power concentrated in single-party cabinets facilitates 
large-scale change, while executive power sharing frustrates “big bang” reform attempts. 
In contexts of coalitional presidentialism, however, relative stability (due to the absence 
of repeated, dramatic overhauls) and the diversity of actors involved in policy making 
open up opportunities for technocrats from within the state to advance modifications and 
corrections piece-by-piece that often accumulate into thorough transformations. 
Paradoxically, the dissertation argues, political-organizational contexts that hinder grand 
reform attempts may facilitate greater long-term success. 
My main contribution is a theory of state building that explains why some reform 
strategies result in sustainable improvements and describes the political conditions under 
which policymakers tend to adopt such successful strategies. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, incremental changes sequenced over time in response to failings in previous policy 
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(i.e., “problem-solving” reforms) provide two crucial advantages over the powering 
approach.  
First, continual adjustments and modifications led by actors within the state 
engender an incremental learning process that allows reform tactics to evolve along the 
way. Instead of taking on comprehensive reform, problem-solving tackles smaller 
problems one by one and is often led by technocrats from within the state (insiders) who 
possess expertise and experience. The bounds of rationality are looser for experienced 
technocrats working on smaller problems than they are for political leaders and outsiders 
attempting to craft perfectly calibrated overhauls in one shot. As the empirical chapters 
demonstrated, such change often brought results slowly and haltingly, but in the medium 
to long term, these changes accumulated and led to impressive transformations. 
Second, small changes sequenced over time make reform more sustainable and 
help preserve bureaucratic capacity and autonomy, especially in weak institutional 
environments. Whereas imposition of radical change breeds resistance, problem-solving 
relies on tactics that avoid conflict or imposition. Such tactics often proceed under the 
radar. Thus, support for change is built or won as reforms produce benefits, and 
reformers move on to the next step with a new set of beneficiaries. In doing so, the 
technocrats who lead modest reforms without strong political backing are likely to remain 
at their posts when political constellations shift, safeguarding their positions and creating 
opportunities to extend their reforms. 
The process-tracing analysis of reforms over time in Argentina and Brazil in the 
areas of health and transport detailed the failures of powering and the merits of the 
problem-solving approach. Instances of powering were in some cases seemingly 
successful at achieving their goals in the short term, but were plagued by performance 
problems, backlashes, and credibility issues. As a result, these reforms were subject to 
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reversals in the long term. The deepest, most draconian overhauls of the state resulted in 
deleterious and enduring problems; such overhauls were problematic not only for one or 
two administrative terms, but in some cases sparked cycles of institutional deterioration, 
with one set of radical overhauls begetting another. By contrast, while problem-solving 
advanced in a frustratingly slow fashion, these cautious, gradual changes accumulated 
into thorough transformations that tended to be more sustainable. The changes benefitted 
from the scrutiny of a variety of diverse actors and experts within the state with longer 
time horizons than their political counterparts. These insiders played an important role in 
sustaining the reform process. Thus, in both Brazil and Argentina, attempts to achieve 
short-term policy goals by rapidly revamping the state resulted in long-term problems; 
whereas problem-solving initially advanced slowly, but resulted in impressive 
transformations over time. 
This study analyzed both approaches to reform in Brazil and Argentina. Indeed, 
problem-solving was more effective and sustainable in the long run in both countries. 
Yet, the chapters also demonstrated that the powering approach was adopted far more 
frequently in Argentina.  
As discussed at length in Chapter Three, the extent to which policymakers select 
one reform approach or another is shaped in large part by political-organizational context. 
Powering is more prevalent in some countries, while change occurs more gradually in 
others. My theory explains this variation: Entrenched patterns of executive powering-
sharing influence the characteristics of the reforms and the reformers, which in turn affect 
the decision to embark on a sweeping transformation or proceed with modest and gradual 
change. Executive power concentrated in single-party cabinets facilitates powering; the 
ability to appoint loyal experts to key positions in the line ministries and agencies means 
that unified reform teams can impose profound and sweeping changes rapidly. By 
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contrast, coalitional presidentialism, by inducing presidents to share executive power, 
frustrates “big bang” change. The absence of repeated overhauls provides opportunities 
for technical experts within the government to make smaller changes that ultimately add 
up to larger reforms. In sum, shared executive power tends to lead to problem-solving, 
while executive power concentrated in single-party cabinets facilitates powering.  
My analysis of reform in Argentina and Brazil provides empirical support for this 
theory. In Argentina, presidents since the 1990s (and long before) have largely governed 
in an exclusionary fashion, appointing single-party cabinets which have facilitated the 
powering approach. In many of the cases analyzed, reform teams comprised of like-
minded loyalists and experts were tasked with the near-impossible feat of crafting 
comprehensive change in one shot. In order to cope with uncertainty, ambiguity, 
overabundant information, and time-pressure, policymakers—many of whom were 
newcomers to the federal administration—were forced to rely to a great extent on 
inferential shortcuts. In order execute change before resistance mounted, reforms were 
implemented at a lightning pace. In all of the cases analyzed, the powering approach 
ultimately resulted in either poor performance or reversals after the will to sustain the 
dramatic reforms dried up with the next change in administration.   
By contrast, coalitional presidentialism in Brazil induced presidents to share the 
executive with allies. The diverse actors involved in this policy-making process slowed, 
halted, or diluted most attempts at radical change, limiting the scale and speed of reform. 
For the limited changes that did advance, however, a broader-based consensus was forged 
and plans were subjected to the scrutiny of a diverse set of interests and experts. 
Moreover, smaller scale changes opened up greater space for experts within the state to 
use their longer time horizons and technical acumen to craft continuous improvements 
that contribute to impressive transformations over time. While policymakers in contexts 
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of executive power sharing still apply inferential heuristics, their assumptions tend to be 
closer to the mark because the approach narrows the scope of their problem solving, and 
makes use of technocrats from within the state (insiders), who are often less bounded 
than political actors and political technocrats (outsiders). Additionally, the sequencing of 
reform contributes to learning over time. In this context, experts can advance change 
without inciting opposition and remain in a position to defend and quietly extend their 
reforms. Finally, if the problem-solving process is successful, then there is no need for 
wholesale reforms. For all of these reasons, reforms in the countries with established 
executive power-sharing practices are less radical and proceed more gradually, but with 
greater success. 
The lessons of this study extend beyond contracting in health and transport to a 
broader set of governance reforms in Argentina and Brazil. In Argentina, reforms have 
ricocheted between extremes, where presidents of different ideological orientations have 
used the same powering approach to push through sweeping overhauls. After President 
Menem’s privatization and transformation of the state in the 1990s, Presidents Kirchner 
and Fernández de Kirchner have renationalized not only railroads and highway 
concessions, but also private pensions, the postal service, the main water utility company, 
the national airlines, and the oil company. The Kirchners have also sought to restructure 
the civil service and a number of state agencies, most notably the national statistics 
agency and tax agency (Scherlis 2013). Recurring overhauls have disrupted smaller 
efforts to advance corrective changes and in the process have weakened mechanisms of 
horizontal accountability. 
By contrast, radical change has been quite rare in Brazil. Indeed, there were some 
attempts at dramatic restructuring under Collor in the early 1990s and Brazil did go on to 
privatize a number of state-owned companies under Cardoso in the late 1990s, yet such 
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changes were not pushed through in one fell swoop, but rather proceeded haltingly and 
were the subject of negotiation and compromise. Transformations such as the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law, passed in 2000, or the development of the highly successful 
conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Família, may seem like cases of successful 
powering. Yet, the Fiscal Responsibility Law was the culmination of incremental changes 
aimed at stemming the financial drain caused by state governments’ spending and at 
stabilizing the Brazilian economy (Schneider 2007). It also stipulated a number of 
additional steps that were set to be phased in over time. Thus, the adoption and 
implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility Law was stretched out for over a decade and 
resembled problem-solving far more than powering.302  Similarly, Bolsa Família started 
as an experimental social program under Cardoso after earlier, local-level experiments. It 
was then expanded under Presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. This effort was 
not managed primarily by political appointees, but rather by technocrats from within the 
state. In sum, change in Brazil has built on predecessors’ efforts and has rarely occurred 
in disjointed policy overhauls. 
Instead, reform has often advanced almost imperceptibly, transforming the 
institutional framework in a number of areas. Slowly and quietly individuals within the 
Brazilian state have built and made accessible to the public one of the most complete and 
centralized information systems in Latin America. Information on budget, procurement, 
civil servants, and federal transfers allows for unprecedented levels of transparency (OGP 
2011).303  Such advances have fostered far greater oversight of the federal government 
than had ever been possible, as have gradual changes that have enhanced the capacity and 
                                                 
302 Author interview with Martus Tavares, former Minister of Planning (1999-2002), May 28, 2012.   
303 Author interview with Orlando Neto, Director of Senate Budget Consultants, May 9, 2012. 
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authority of audit institutions (Praça and Taylor 2014; Power and Taylor 2011).304  
Likewise, the strengthening and professionalization of the civil service has also 
progressed largely under the radar. With the exception of the 1988 Constitution, most 
changes in the civil service have occurred in practice without any input from Congress or 
legal changes (Praça, Freitas, and Hoepers 2011).305 In sum, changes accreting at the 
margin have resulted in a sea change in Brazil over time. 
The divergent results from these different state reform strategies in Argentina and 
Brazil are also reflected in a number of different measures. Over the last decades, 
Argentina’s score on governance indicators (e.g., the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption, Government Effectiveness, and Regulatory Quality) has dropped 
significantly while Brazil’s score has for the most part slowly and steadily climbed.306  
Assessments of the overall quality of public policies since the 1980s find low levels of 
public policy stability in Argentina, as well as low levels of enforcement and 
implementation, whereas Brazil received high rankings for policy stability, enforcement 
and implementation (Stein et al. 2008, 134).  
This dissertation has shown that in Brazil improvements in transparency, resource 
monitoring, and audits for the direct federal administration have advanced considerably. 
These advances, however, have been uneven. States and municipalities, which were not 
analyzed in this study, remain responsible for many public services. While there are a 
                                                 
304 Author interviews with André Pachioni Baeta, Diretor da Secretaria de Obras do TCU, May 25, 2011; 
Fernando Moutinho Ramalho Bittencourt, Consultor de Orçamento do Senado (2007-present), TCU 
Auditor (1995-2006), May 11, 2011.  
305 Interviews with Aldino Graef, Assessor especial da Subchefia de Análise e Acompanhamento de 
Políticas Governamentais da Casa Civil da Presidência da República; Especialista em Políticas Públicas e 
Gestão Governamental (1993-present), December 5, 2011; Luiz Alberto dos Santos, Subchefe de Análise e 
Acompanhamento de Políticas Governamentais da Casa Civil da Presidência da República, December 8, 
2011. 
306 See for instance the World Bank’s Governance Indictors, World Economic Forum, and the Economist’s 
Infrascope. 
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number of efforts to extend mechanisms of transparency and accountability developed at 
the federal level to the subnational level, this remains a work in progress.307 Massive 
protests in June 2013 that sparked over hikes in bus fares and the poor quality of public 
services, most of which are subnational responsibilities, underscore just how far Brazil 
needs to go in this regard. 
It is also possible that efforts at the federal level to improve transparency and 
accountability in directly administered programs may have pushed rent-seeking into other 
areas—state or municipal spending, loans from the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), or state-owned companies—that do not fall under such tight controls.308  
Indeed, the recent Petrobras scandal, which uncovered massive corruption schemes in the 
state-owned oil company’s contracts, has revealed the extent to which illicit enrichment 
and backroom deals still factor into politics and business in Brazil. Corruption has most 
certainly not been eradicated in all areas. At the same time, Brazil is no longer the 
country where corruption is simple and so commonplace that no one is afraid of being 
caught. Instead, it has become quite sophisticated, especially at the federal level, 
involving Swiss bank accounts and artwork. As the corruption scandal has played out, it 
has provided momentum for reforms proposals that have circulated in Brasília for years 
and that would extend controls that apply to the rest of the federal administration to the 
oil giant.309 State building is a long process; in countries such as the United States and 
Sweden, making the transition from spoils systems to a professionalized civil service 
                                                 
307 Interview with Carlos Moreira, former Director, Secretaria de Logística e Tecnologia (2004-2010), 
January 23, 2012. 
308 For instance, this author’s Freedom of Information requests to obtain civil servant data from BNDES in 
2013 were denied because the bank does not fall under the direct administration. 
309 Author interviews with André Pachioni Baeta, Diretor da Secretaria de Obras do TCU, May 25, 2011; 
Orlando Neto, Director of Senate Budget Consultants, May 9, 2012. 
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took decades (Skowronek 1982; Teorell and Rothstein 2013; Grindle 2012). Brazil has 
taken great strides forward, even if it has a long way to go. 
GOVERNANCE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA  
To what extent do this dissertation’s findings, which are based on governance 
reform in Argentina and Brazil, apply more broadly? Can my theory shed light on the 
effectiveness and sustainability of governance reform in Latin America? Have other Latin 
American countries pursued reforms that are characteristic of the powering and problem-
solving approaches? Which approach has been more successful in producing effective 
and enduring changes?  
This section examines state reform efforts and their performance in Chile and 
Venezuela. These countries have consistently relied on one reform type over the other; 
state reform in Chile since democratization has largely been characterized by gradual 
change, whereas powering has been applied more frequently in Venezuela since President 
Hugo Chávez’s tenure. Both of these Latin American countries also have been the 
subjects of a rich array of policy research. Thus, the selection of Chile and Venezuela 
allows for a clear illustration of and plausibility probe for my theory.   
The examination of reform in these secondary cases provides additional support 
for the arguments advanced in this dissertation that gradualist policies have outperformed 
radical overhauls. While this analysis does not address all the background differences 
between these countries, there are some important similarities: Venezuela is subject to 
booms and busts based on oil, just as Chile experiences with copper. And as Chile 
experienced long-term growth, Venezuela from 2003-2008 had relatively high levels of 
growth. In spite of these similar economic conditions, their different approaches to 
reform have produced contrasting results. The most successful of all of the cases 
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analyzed in this dissertation is Chile; on a wide range of indictors Chile ranks ahead of 
other Latin American countries. While Venezuela boasted considerable progress towards 
its economic and social goals in the short term, these achievements were weakly 
institutionalized and have proven short-lived. 
Powering has been used under Chávez in Venezuela to a far greater extent than 
any of the other cases examined in this dissertation. Upon assuming office, he convened a 
Constituent Assembly that superseded the existing Congress in order to create a new 
constitution that dramatically expanded the power of the executive branch (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008, 275-6). Chávez also eviscerated the Supreme Court by expanding it and 
packing it with supporters. The bureaucracy was a target as well. When Chávez assumed 
office, high public sector salaries meant that some of the most qualified professionals in 
the country worked for the state (Gónzalez 2002). “Pockets of efficiency” included the oil 
company PDVSA, the central bank, the electric power producer Edelca, and the Metro de 
Caracas. In his first years in office, however, Chávez eliminated PDVSA’s financial and 
operational autonomy, reversed many of the structural reforms that had sought to enhance 
the capacity and autonomy of federal agencies (Monaldi et al. 2008, 410-411), fired 
employees who opposed him, and enervated institutions of accountability (Corrales and 
Penfold 2011). In this way, he used the very process of reform to weaken resistance to his 
changes and to concentrate power at the apex of the state. 
Unencumbered by resistance or opposition that might otherwise dilute or delay 
reform objectives, Chávez sought to institute a completely new model of social service 
provision. In 2003, he launched the Misiones Bolivarianas, a series of social programs 
with a variety of goals aimed at eliminating illiteracy, reducing poverty, and providing 
basic health care services to low-income Venezuelans (Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 
2011). Instead of working with established programs or institutions, Chávez created new 
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ones from scratch by presidential decree. It was far quicker to rely on loyal partisans to 
directly create and execute programs than to attempt to reorient the complex bureaucratic 
machinery of the state. Thus, authority over missions was given to entities, such as 
appointed advisory boards and presidential commissions, parallel to the line ministries 
(Hawkins 2010; Handlin 2011). Off-budget revenues from the state-owned petroleum 
company funded the missions and provided additional latitude for presidential 
prerogatives, allowing the administration to circumvent legislative oversight. In order to 
bypass opposition by the medical community, the health missions relied on Cuban 
doctors to staff health clinics. In all of these ways, Chávez used the reform process to 
sideline resistance that might thwart the lightning advances. 
The missions soon boasted striking results on a number of fronts. For instance, in 
2005 Chávez announced that illiteracy had been eliminated by the education missions and 
that health missions had indeed extended coverage to the marginalized (República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela 2011). But the veneer of success soon wore thin. Reports 
began to show that educational progress had been grossly overstated; the missions had 
only a minimal impact on literacy (Ortega and Rodríguez 2008, 7). Reports emerged of 
Cuban doctors fleeing the country and health missions abandoned and occupied by 
squatters.310 In 2008, Chávez himself declared a “health emergency” and relaunched the 
health missions. Studies suggested that missions were often used for political purposes 
and the initiative extended around election time (Hawkins 2010, 203-205, 226; Ortega 
and Rodríguez 2008, 27). Perhaps worse yet, the public system, which remained the 
primary health service for the majority of Venezuelans and provided maternity services, 
                                                 
310 The Economist, June 18, 2009. 
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surgeries, and a host of other basic health services, languished as funds were diverted to 
the missions (D’Elia and Quiroz 2010, 8; Kraul 2008).311     
The dramatic reform strategy was also applied in a number of other areas. State 
intervention increased dramatically under Chávez; he expropriated or nationalized 
approximately 1,200 companies, ranging from steelworks to a maker of cleaning 
products.312  His administration also launched an ambitious overhaul of the country’s 
dilapidated infrastructure and a massive extension of the rail network. In order to execute 
these lofty plans, he seized control over roads, airports, rails, and ports from state 
governments, placing them in the ambit of the national government. Such pursuits were 
financed not only by the windfall gains of the oil boom, but also by issuing debt, which 
Venezuela racked up at greater pace than any other emerging economy in 2007-2011.313   
To what extent has the powering approach generated enduring improvements? 
Over time, the deleterious effects of Chávez’s transformation of the state were laid bare, 
especially after Chávez’s death in 2013 and the drop in oil prices. Unemployment rose 
and inflation skyrocketed. In 2013 inflation reached 40.6 percent and was even higher in 
2014, with some sources putting it at close to 70 percent (World Bank 2014).314  The IMF 
projects annual inflation of 98.8 percent in 2015 and expects the country’s GDP to 
contract by 7 percent in 2015. In the last decade Venezuela has systematically been 
ranked among the last places, in both the region and the world, on indicators of 
institutional and policy quality by institutions such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank (2008), the World Bank (2013), Transparency International (2012), and the World 
Economic Forum (2014). 
                                                 
311 This section has been informed by Pribble (2013, 158-168).  
312 The Economist, February 14, 2015. 
313 The Economist, July 2, 2014. 
314 The Economist, April 15, 2015. 
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As the analysis of social policy above highlighted, the missions generated quick 
successes in boosting popular well-being, according to official statistics, which may well 
be questionable. Yet, the circumvention of established institutions in the short term, 
which facilitated such gains, endangered the durability of the changes in the long term. 
Lack of institutionalization meant that without Chávez’s political will and the windfall oil 
rents to sustain the effort, there was little left to hold the missions together. Over a decade 
later, more than half of the primary-care health missions have been abandoned and the 
Cuban doctors have since left (PROVEA 2013, 184).  
Moreover, the public health care system is collapsing after years of neglect. 
During Chávez’s tenure health ministers changed frequently (Corrales 2009). Likewise, 
President Nicolás Maduro, who assumed the office after Chávez’s death, appointed 13 
different health ministers in his first two years in office (Watson 2015). Without 
competent health officials in the state, increasingly pressing problems went unnoticed or 
were ignored. The government underreacted until a true crisis emerged. In recent years, 
the number of doctors has declined precipitously, as both Cuban and Venezuelan doctors 
have fled the country. Vital medical supplies—bandages, heart valves, penicillin—are in 
short supply; in many cases patients are advised to show up at hospitals with their own 
gloves, medicine, or orthopedic screws. Bribes for treatment are increasingly common. 
Malaria, eradicated from much of Venezuela by the 1960s, is again spiking, and a rare 
disease from Africa, chikungunya, is sweeping the country. Health officials have been 
unable to track or provide basic statistical information about its spread.315 
Initially, scholars showed that Venezuela had made some gains in health, albeit at 
a much slower rate than improvements in the rest of Latin America (cf. Pribble 2013, 
                                                 
315 This section was informed by Wade (2015) and The Economist (April 15, 2015).  
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163-164), but since 2013 the deterioration in statistics such as infant mortality suggests 
that any progress has since been undone (Wade 2014; Watson 2015). In 2014, 
Venezuela’s official statistics office (INE) reported that in one year the number of 
Venezuelans below the poverty line went from one in four to one in three (INE 2014; cf. 
Nagel 2014). Poverty is likely much higher than official estimates.  
The powering approach also failed to produce lasting progress in other areas. The 
first section of the rail project was completed at lightning pace just before the 2006 
election. But because of the haste to finish the project on time it was forced to operate 
without a central control system, obliging drivers to call each other on mobile phones to 
avoid collisions. The grand overhaul of transportation did create some new roads and 
rails, but the overall record of reform is dismal. The College of Venezuelan Engineers 
(CIV) puts the percent of roads in urgent need of maintenance at 60-70 percent and 
bridges at 80-90 percent (EIU 2014). Collapsing bridges and tunnels have become 
increasingly common, as have commuter train collisions.316  A new term—the “mega-
hole”—has developed for pot holes that swallow up entire vehicles. It is no wonder. 
During the Chávez years there were eleven different ministers of transportation and the 
name of the infrastructure ministry changed five times. Ministries and agencies were 
gutted in Chávez’s attempt to concentrate power. This meant that there were few 
professionals left to plan, design, and supervise complex engineering projects. 
Meanwhile, basic maintenance and safety standards were neglected. 
My theory of reform can account for the failure of reforms in Venezuela. 
Chávez’s use of rapid overhauls of the state allowed him to concentrate power in the 
executive in order to swiftly implement his desired policies whole cloth. In doing so, he 
                                                 
316 The Economist, April 15, 2015.  
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greatly restricted diverse views and the role of technocrats with experience who 
commanded the information and experience to assess changes. Thus, decision makers 
were prone to rely to a great extent on cognitive heuristics, resulting in ill-informed 
decisions and unintended consequences. This was especially the case in transportation. 
The lack of qualified and experienced engineers produced faulty plans, and therefore, 
delays. Finally, the massive transformations were abandoned when bridges and tunnels, 
which had not been maintained for years, started collapsing. In some cases, the 
consequences of Chávez’s approach, such as the neglect of the public hospital system, 
were not immediately apparent. Yet when grave problems did appear, the Chávez 
administration underreacted and problems festered. Without individuals with the time, 
expertise, and information to, for instance, track malaria, such basic tasks fell off the 
government radar.  
The case of Venezuela also illustrates the paradox of powering. The very process 
of radically transforming established arrangements crucially hindered the consolidation 
of the new reforms and long-term bureaucratic stability. Imposing reform breeds 
resistance. During the Chávez years, his political will and oil money sustained many of 
his pursuits. Now that Chávez is gone and oil prices have dropped, there is little left to 
prop up many of his weakly institutionalized changes against opponents keen on 
reversing his reforms.  
In sum, the unfolding of Chávez’s state reforms in Venezuela largely corroborates 
my theory. Radical overhauls made it possible to push changes past the opposition, but 
the complexity of designing such overhauls meant that serious errors were made, 
ultimately undermining Chávez’s objectives of eradicating poverty and providing health 
care to all. Moreover, by intransigently imposing change, Chávez polarized the country 
and made his changes vulnerable to reversals. The case of Venezuela highlights just how 
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far powering can go in dismantling existing institutions, dividing a nation, and generating 
a true crisis.  
By contrast, the approach to state reform in Chile has been characterized largely 
by gradual changes phased in over time,317 even though the 1980 constitution granted 
Chilean presidents substantial unilateral powers. Since 1990, governments based on 
broad coalitions and constrained by multiple veto points—including (until 2005) 
appointed senators that kept the government from attaining a majority in the Senate—
have restrained presidential exercise of this power. Instead, presidents have sought to 
improve upon the institutions they inherited and to work with coalitional allies and the 
opposition to negotiate changes. Resolving disagreements among the welter of different 
voices in the policy process often involved concessions that limited grand plans and 
inevitably slowed reform. With a few exceptions,318 this conciliatory process has meant 
that powering is indeed rare. As a result of the smaller-scale changes, however, Chilean 
experts from within the state have assumed a much greater role, resulting in what has 
been characterized as a technocratic style of policy making (Boeninger 1997; Fuentes 
1999).319  For all of these reasons, patterns of change in Chile fall closer to the problem-
solving side of the reform spectrum. 
Changes in social policy have advanced gradually and built on existing 
institutions and sought to improve, rather than restructure, the institutional architecture 
inherited from the Pinochet years. This is remarkable, especially considering the 
                                                 
317 This analysis does not include non-democratic periods. Thus, this section does not analyze the reforms 
under Pinochet.  
318 The 2005 constitutional changes eliminated the last authoritarian vestiges in the 1980 Constitution by 
allowing the president to fire the armed forces’ commanders and eliminating appointed senators. This was 
indeed a major change, but even this important reform happened 15 years after the military regime ended 
and was a negotiated reform. 
319 Some explicitly argue that technocrats constitute a buffer zone between the president and the political 
parties, serving as mediators between contending social and political forces (Silva 2009, 222-3, 234).  
 
 229 
transition to democracy and the center-left shift in ideological orientation of the 
government in 1990. In the late 1980s, the rise of the center-left Concertación 
government created expectations that dramatic changes would be quickly achieved; 
however, reform advanced at a pace that was frustratingly slow for many. Chilean 
presidents did increase spending to address the underinvestment in health in previous 
years, but otherwise many of the changes were unremarkable and the result of seemingly 
quotidian processes (Barrientos 2000, 105-111). In the early 2000s, President Ricardo 
Lagos proposed an initially bold plan, elaborated largely by policy experts within the 
state in response to policy problems, that introduced basic health care for a specific set of 
illnesses (Universal Access to Guaranteed Rights, AUGE) (Ewig 2008). However, in the 
laborious process of negotiation with multiple veto points that ensued over the next four 
years, many of the most ambitious changes were eliminated, such as the establishment of 
the solidarity fund (Espinosa, Tokman, and Rodríguez 2005). Moreover, instead of being 
implemented all at once, coverage for AUGE illnesses was to be phased in gradually over 
time (Pribble 2013, 48). Negotiation and compromise thus resulted in downsizing of 
initial plans and contributed to their staggered implementation. Like Weyland, Madrid, 
and Hunter (2010) argue, this process set reforms on a much more solid foundation than 
those in Venezuela or Argentina. The same is true of alterations to the pension system in 
2009, which expanded guarantees to poor individuals not previously included. These 
changes have been limited by compromise with the opposition and are small in 
comparison to the fundamental overhauls executed by Chávez in Venezuela, but have 
accumulated over time.  
The approach to transportation policy has also exemplified the characteristics of 
problem-solving rather than the swift overhauls of powering. In the 1990s the center-left 
Concertación coalition quietly began a public works concession program for highways. In 
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order to avoid delays and negotiation with a variety of ministers and political officials, 
post-authoritarian governments purposefully downplayed political dimensions of 
infrastructure development (Silva 2011, 41-42). For instance, reformers also used 
existing institutions as much as possible to keep changes below the radar of Congress.320  
The program began slowly and in an experimental fashion, with the first highways 
auctioned off in 1993. But thereafter, the pace of concession increased in a steady but 
sustained fashion (PPIAF-World Bank 2014). In other areas, Chilean presidents have 
maintained a good deal of state intervention. For instance, the state railway company, 
Empresa Ferrocarril del Estado (EFE), has remained in control of railways. While freight 
lines were concessioned, the EFE remains responsible for passenger services and 
infrastructure maintenance. This is a much more limited approach than the privatization 
in Brazil and especially Argentina (Sharp 2005; Estache 1999).  
One exception to the gradual approach was a radical attempt to revamp Santiago 
bus transport (the Trans-Santiago). On paper, the idea of completely replacing the 
informal bus system with a comprehensively planned system that relied on large modern 
buses, which was inspired by TransMilenio in Bogotá, seemed like a good idea. It would 
reduce noise, congestion, and exhaust fumes. But the ambitious plan resulted in a 
nightmare for commuters and initial transportation chaos.321 It was only after a long 
series of gradual changes, adjustments, and additional funding that the system became 
workable.   
                                                 
320 As former Minister of Public Works (MOP), Carlos Hurtado, explained, “We never really worried too 
much about making institutional changes to accommodate the concessions system within the existing 
structure of the MOP. We tried to use the existing structure. If we had proposed something else in addition 
to the actual concessions law, such as changing the institutional structure of the MOP, we would have been 
stumped right then and there. Imagine putting the concessions law and a MOP reorganization law before 
Congress … that’s as far as we would have gone.” Interview with Hurtado 2005, quoted in Silva (2009, 
45). 
321 The Economist, February 7, 2008.  
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Reforms aimed at strengthening institutions and modernizing the state have not 
been an explicit priority of the government, yet efforts of technocrats and civil servants to 
advance adjustments and modifications where possible have resulted in impressive 
transformations in the civil service and transparency systems over time. Changes in both 
areas began in the 1990s by implementing measures that did not require legislation 
(Volosin 2010). Based on these measures a number of proposals were developed and 
administrative officials worked to put their policy changes on the agenda (Echebarría and 
Cortázar 2007, 128-9; Armijo 2002). After President Lagos’s center-left coalition was 
implicated in a bribery scandal in 2003, many of these efforts gained momentum. Soon 
thereafter, Congress passed one of the proposed reforms, the High-Level Public 
Management System (Alta Dirección Pública), which stipulated that 735 management 
positions in the government previously filled on a discretionary basis must now be filled 
through a merit-based selection process (Stein et al. 2006, 124). Similarly, a number of 
measures to enhance transparency in procurement were passed during this time (Garretón 
2005; Volosin 2010). Instead of being introduced and implemented in one fell swoop, the 
idea of the system was introduced in the mid-1990s, tested in the late 1990s, gained 
momentum after the corruption scandals in the early 2000s, and were then phased in over 
time (Garretón 2005; Volosin 2010). This allowed the measures to gain political support 
along the way and technocrats to learn from their reform experiences. Moreover, because 
changes were less visible and their use sustained by actors within the state, they were 
protected from political fatigue, entering onto the legislative agenda only when the 
process was quite mature (Echebarría and Cortázar 2007, 128-9). 
Gradual but sustained reforms in these and other areas have yielded striking and 
transformative results in the long run. Chile outranks the rest of Latin America on a host 
of other indicators, such as the Economist’s Infrascope Index, Heritage Foundation’s 
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Index of Economic Freedom, and the World Bank’s Governance Indicators. Chile’s 
health indicators, such as infant mortality and lifetime expectancy, are higher than what 
its economic development would predict (CEPAL 2014, Aninat et al. 2008). Poverty has 
also dropped steadily; in 1990 38.6 percent of Chileans fell below the poverty line, but by 
2013 the percentage had fallen to 7.8 (CEPAL 2014). Steady improvements in 
infrastructure have also had impressive results: The quality of roads in Chile ranks 31 out 
of 144 countries, just next to the United Kingdom (World Economic Forum 2014; Aninat 
et al. 2008, 163). Finally, the problem-solving approach has also been quite successful in 
strengthening the public administration. The Chilean bureaucracy ranks only second to 
Brazil in Latin America on indicators such as functional capacity and merit (Zuvanic and 
Iacoviello 2010). Advances in transparency and efficiency, such as Chile’s information 
technology system for procurement, have been used as models throughout the region 
(Volosin 2010). In sum, incremental sequences of change led largely by actors within the 
state have been associated with remarkable and sustainable transformations in many 
areas. 
In conclusion, the analysis of state reform in Chile offers further corroboration of 
my central argument, that incremental changes sequenced over time are more effective 
and enduring than rapid overhauls. The simplification of complex problems into smaller 
steps, in addition to the capacity of the decision makers, resulted in reformers achieving 
their objectives slowly but steadily. Whereas radical changes adopted all at once are 
perhaps the most difficult type of reforms to plan and execute, small adjustments and 
modifications in the Chilean case allowed for careful analysis of costs and benefits, 
evaluation, and changes made in the next round of alterations. This reduced the demands 
on cognitive capabilities. Decision makers not only benefited from an iterative process of 
reform and simpler task environment, but technocrats’ greater access to information, 
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longer time horizons, and expertise meant that their bounds of rationality were looser in 
the first place.322  Instead of underreacting to problems, and then overreacting when a 
crisis emerged, policymakers possessed greater capabilities for addressing policy issues 
in a more proportionate fashion.  
This approach also resulted in more enduring reforms, especially compared to 
powering in Venezuela and Argentina. Instead of seeking to break the existing status quo, 
the more gradual reforms in Chile relied on tactics to avoid conflict. Proposals were 
frequently subjected to the scrutiny, negotiation, and compromise of the opposition and 
coalitional partners. This often meant they achieved far less than presidents may have 
wished, but what they did accomplish was less likely to be overturned. For instance, the 
center-right coalition from 2010-2014 essentially maintained the changes they had 
inherited. After all, the president’s party had a part in making such changes. While 
incremental and slow, this process makes change more durable and sustainable in the 
long run.  
The case of state reform in Chile also corroborates my macro-structural argument: 
Executive power-sharing accounts for the adoption of the problem-solving approach. 
Since democratization Chile has been governed by coalitions. The binomial electoral 
system in Chile, with two members elected per district, has contributed to the formation 
of two relatively stable, broad-based electoral coalitions. But the strong expectations that 
presidents will govern in an inclusionary manner have also been shaped by a variety of 
other factors (Siavelis 2006), such as elite political learning (Boeninger 1989; Weyland 
                                                 
322 On the importance of technocrats for reforms in Chile, see Boeninger (2008) and Silva (2009, 222-3, 
234).  
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1997).323 As was the case in Brazil, patterns of power sharing frustrated powering 
attempts, but resulted in more gradual reforms. 
In conclusion, the reform approaches in Chile and Venezuela have largely had the 
expected effects. The powering approach in Venezuela, despite its ability to achieve 
quick results in the short term, has weakened institutions over time and undermined the 
initial goals overall. In the process, it has increased polarization and eviscerated 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability. By contrast, the slow process of reform in Chile 
has yielded impressive, sustainable results over time. 
BROADER THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
It has been well established that political rationality is distinctly bounded (e.g., 
Baumgartner, Jones, and Wilkerson 2011; Simon 1990; Weyland 2009) and that the 
extent to which cognitive constraints bind depends on the computational capabilities of 
the actor (Simon and Simon 1962). Grand Masters in chess outperform duffers, just as a 
well-trained engineer will be more successful than a construction worker at designing a 
bridge. Indeed, bounds of rationality are not uniform. 
My argument highlighted a second factor that is vitally important for shaping the 
bounds of rationality, namely, the complexity of the task at hand (Bendor 2010, 3; 
Bendor 2003, 435; Simon 1990, 7). Policymaking tasks in the 21
st
 century vary 
tremendously, from minor adjustments (e.g., increasing the number of Medicare 
recipients) to radical overhauls that aim to get to the root of numerous problems 
simultaneously. Thus, it is not only computational capabilities that shape whether 
                                                 
323 Weyland argues that both the left and the right had learned during and after the military regime, and 
understood the consequences of failure in this environment (1997). Boeninger recognized this and, in a 
memo circulated among high-level members of the Concertación alliance, wrote: “The fear of a military 
regression, and the understanding of the risk of such an event occurring, will be directly determined by the 
level of conflict that exists between political parties” (Boeninger 1989, 1; quoted in Siavelis 2006, 37). 
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policymakers are cognitively constrained, but the match between their abilities and the 
complexity of the problem they attempt to solve. Simon explains that “the structure of 
task environments and the computation capabilities of the actor” have joint effects and 
are like a “scissors [with] two blades” (Bendor 2003, 435; Simon 1990, 7).   
This point is often missed by social scientists (Bendor 2010, 3). Yet, theories of 
bounded rationality, as Bendor highlights, have cutting power—especially relative to 
rational choice—only when both of the scissors’ blades operate (Bendor 2003, 435). Both 
blades operate in my framework: Problem-solving means both 1) more experienced and 
competent decision makers and 2) more manageable tasks by dividing complex reforms 
into pieces. By contrast, powering means 1) less experienced decision makers and 2) 
terrifically complex task environments. Thus, we might expect cognitive limitations to 
always bind in the case of powering, whereas bounds of rationality loosen for 
experienced decision makers that simply modify an existing policy or experiment with a 
new approach.  
Moreover, problem-solving results in an additional advantage: both blades of the 
scissors cutting together result in learning. In the sequential process of solving smaller 
problems, reformers learn which changes are effective and which are not, increasing their 
ability to recognize solutions to a given problem (Simon 1990; 1996). This enhances 
decision makers’ cognitive resources. By contrast, powering requires getting reforms 
right in one shot. As President Collor of Brazil once famously said, “I have only one 
bullet to kill the tiger of inflation.” Therefore, powering requires an optimal solution, 
whereas problem-solving works even with decision makers who seek not the best option, 
but an acceptable option, allowing them to learn and correct later (Simon 1956).  
The cognitive resources of decision makers are often conceptualized in terms of 
expertise, i.e., the education and sophistication of actors. As regards Latin American 
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policy making, foreign-educated technocrats might come to mind. Indeed, education-
derived knowledge is important. Yet, very often such high-profile experts have been 
brought in to implement grand “one size fits all” solutions, leaving office with the 
political leader who appointed them.  
My theory and the empirical cases, however, emphasized another component of 
expertise—experience, which allows capabilities to build over time, including knowledge 
of problems caused by previous policies. Bureaucrats have often been given a bad name: 
They drag their feet, they would prefer to go home early, and they are resistant to change. 
This is true in some cases. Often it is not, however. Indeed, in countless interview-hours 
with civil servants in Brazil and in Argentina, I heard story after story of their efforts to 
resist political leaders’ sweeping overhauls of the public sector because the changes 
either did not address the problems at hand or would not be sustainable. Deep contextual 
understanding is especially crucial for designing administrative reform. This knowledge 
is developed by learning over time. Furthermore, longer time horizons free such 
technocrats and civil servants from the need to advance their preferred changes all at 
once. Thus, my application of bounded rationality to reform decision making highlighted 
not only the importance of considering the complexity of the problem at hand, but also 
the importance of expertise developed by experiential learning over time.  
By applying these insights to my analysis of state reform and integrating them 
with macro-factors, this study also makes a contribution to the literature on historical 
institutionalism. The classical version of historical institutionalism is well suited to 
explain continuity, but not change. According to this paradigm, critical junctures, or rare 
moments of uncertainty when the rules of the game are in flux, are followed by long 
stretches of continuity.    
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This historical institutional model does not, however, characterize the empirical 
reality of reforms analyzed in this study. Instead of a “big bang” followed by continuity, 
radical change in Argentina has been recurring. Over the course of the 20th century, the 
country’s trains have been nationalized, then privatized, then nationalized, and on it goes. 
The same has been true in a number of different areas, with some agencies experiencing 
complete overhauls during each executive term. Scholars such as Steven Levitsky and 
Victoria Murillo, focusing on overarching institutional changes such as constitutional 
replacement, argue that radical and recurring change, or serial replacement, is quite 
common in Latin America (2014). The change pendulum swing backs and forth, but 
more quickly than most models of change would suggest, as if the clock of change were 
sped up. But where are the long stretches of continuity? Such patterns of frequent and 
radical change do not follow the patterns postulated by historical institutionalists or by 
punctuated equilibrium theorists (Thelen and Mahoney 2010; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; 2012; cf. Levitsky and Murillo 2014).    
Changes in Brazil represent another pattern that fails to conform to the historical 
institutionalist models. Incremental changes in Brazil were seldom triggered by a critical 
juncture, yet often went on to be transformative and lasting. Transformations have rarely 
been kicked off by a disjointed shift, and the metaphor of a pendulum swing rarely seems 
to apply to what occurs in Brazil. At the same time, policy making cannot be accurately 
characterized as stable and unchanging. Brazil has changed substantially since the early 
1990s (cf. Mainwaring 1995). Nevertheless, it is hard to pin such change on particular 
turning points. In sum, neither radical and recurrent nor transformative incremental 
change is explained by existing paradigms.   
My theory addresses this lacuna and contributes to efforts at theory construction 
within historical institutionalism by drawing on the work of scholars who focus on 
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microfoundations of change (e.g., Baumgartner, Jones, and Wilkerson 2011; Simon 1990; 
Weyland 2009) while embedding such insights in organizational context (cf. Weyland 
2014). Why do we see patterns of radical recurring change in some countries and 
incremental transformations in others? Under what conditions might we expect more 
proportionate changes? What explains variation in collective information processing? 
According to my theory, patterns of executive power sharing play a critical 
role.324 Where power is concentrated in single-party cabinets, presidents and their 
political appointees rely heavily on informational shortcuts in designing and 
implementing institutional transformations. Bounds of rationality are especially tight for 
such decision makers: election cycles are short and such high-level appointees usually 
come and go with the executive who appointed them. Accordingly, they rush to make 
reform decisions in order to make a difference before opposition has time to mount 
against the changes. Thus, they sacrifice careful planning, evaluation, and scrutiny for 
short-term outcomes, leading to ill-informed decisions. These leaders often lack time, 
information, and expertise to resolve problems with a proportionate solution. Moreover, 
hand-selected teams of like-minded individuals—instead of fostering debate and 
deliberation to cross-check inferences, bringing to bear on problems from prior reform 
experiences—are prone to the problems of “groupthink,” suffering from more severe 
distortions in judgment, with rash inferences reinforcing each other (Janis 1982; Schafer 
and Crichlow 2010; McDermott 2004, 249-56; Weyland 2012, 56). Conformity and 
cohesiveness is good for rapid implementation, but not for identifying problems in grand 
reform plans. Moreover, challenges of designing radical restructurings all-at-once 
predispose reforms to new problems. Yet the rapid turnover and high level of career 
                                                 
324 For another example of how organizational developments mediate the bounds of rationality, see 
Weyland (2012) or Chapter 3 for a brief summary. 
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uncertainty of politically appointed reform teams means that there are often few experts 
left to address problems after the initial powering. Thus in the interim between dramatic 
reforms, decision makers underreact. Problems build until they cannot be ignored, 
triggering another round of powering.  
By contrast, coalitional presidentialism, which induces presidents to share 
executive power, means that negotiation and compromise with coalitional partners slow 
sweeping overhauls. Yet, such policy proposals benefit from scrutiny and discussion; 
diverse perspectives lead to revisions and corrections. Such negotiations also often result 
in the downsizing of initial proposals. Consequently, dramatic overhauls are less 
common. In this context, experts from within the state are afforded a much greater role in 
the policy-making process; the relative stability extends their time-horizons for effecting 
change and smaller scale changes phased in over time are often left in their hands, as 
opposed to political leaders or high-level technocrats. Moreover, the technical acumen 
and access to information of technocrats and civil servants, in addition to the more 
limited scope of reform, means that these individuals are able to process information in a 
more balanced fashion. Thus, bounds of rationality loosen when sweeping change is 
broken into smaller pieces, and experts with longer time horizons play a greater role in 
crafting change. In such a context, information is processed in a more proportionate 
manner. As a result, we would expect fewer radical changes and more gradual 
transformations.    
This study, then, has demonstrated how established governing patterns mediate 
the bounds of rationality and can explain patterns of policy change. Patterns of executive 
power sharing and expectations regarding coalitional formation—concepts of classical 
historical institutionalism—play a crucial role in this theory because they shape who is 
involved in the reform process and the type of reform that will likely be selected. 
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The importance of history in the study of politics has long been underscored by 
scholars of historical institutionalism; this study’s integration of this approach with 
bounded rationality provides microfoundations that explain why history is so important.  
Overhauling institutions and dismissing large swaths of the public sector have long-
lasting effects because they shape collective cognitive capabilities. Expertise developed 
via experiential learning is not easily recreated. Nearly 25 years after powering reforms in 
Brazil wiped out almost all the engineers, accountants, and auditors in the transport 
sector, the country is still struggling to rebuild capacity in those areas. Cognitive 
capabilities are built over time and enhanced by experience and memory; when they are 
lost, no amount of political will can recreate them quickly. By developing this line of 
reasoning, my study draws theoretical connections between historical institutionalism and 
bounded rationality, in addition to explaining new types of institutional change. 
Additionally, the findings of this dissertation have important implications for the 
study of state reform. Policy studies often focus on specific episodes, such as the passage, 
implementation, or initial effects of an important policy. Problem-solving in any of these 
isolated instances appears quite unimpressive: a small adjustment here, a modification 
there. This research, however, shows that we only understand the impact of reform type 
fully if we look at a whole sequence of modifications. An observer of only the first 
stretch of the race between the tortoise and the hare would declare the hare the champion.  
Likewise, victory should not be declared before reforms have withstood three or more 
administrative cycles. Such turnover is essential for assessing powering, permitting 
researchers to observe grand changes that fail to take root and subsequent administrations 
that overhaul the same institutions again. A significant time frame is also important for 
evaluating problem-solving because it allows researchers to demonstrate continuity and 
to see how small improvements accumulate into more impressive transformations. In 
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sum, employing longer time horizons, as this and other studies demonstrate (Jacobs 2011; 
Patashnik 2008), reveals previously obscured factors crucial for understanding successful 
governance reforms. 
Finally, this study has important implications for policymakers and practitioners. 
My argument suggested that established governing patterns limit the extent to which the 
option to power or problem-solve exists in a given country. However, sometimes there is 
indeed a choice between relying on political leaders to support complete institutional 
restructuring, on the one hand, and sequencing modest changes over time, on the other. 
Decision makers would be wise to opt for the latter and to work with the institutions they 
inherit. The massive protests in Brazil that erupted in 2013 in response to corruption and 
the poor quality of public services, for instance, might seem an opportunity to harness 
popular support and political will to press for grand, sweeping change. The findings of 
this study, however, suggest that this would be a mistake. Progress in institution building 
in Brazil has occurred gradually and haltingly, but its advancements have been 
significant. There is reason to believe that progress will continue. Public interest in 
corruption and the quality of service delivery indeed plays an important role in 
continuing such advancements; however, the lessons of this study suggest that the most 
ambitious reforms aimed at increasing transparency and enhancing accountability, 
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